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VARIABLE PRINT QUALITY 
INTRODUCTION 
An attempt io :nt.do here to oxaL'line the analysis three 
political thinkers - Thomas Peine, Hlliam Godwin , and Jeremy 
Oenthc1rn have offered of the icea of equality . The inquiry 
.rnriertaken is philosophic&l ana not historical in ch.?racter , 
s ince no attempt is made either at tracing the influence ht the 
biographical-cum-intellectual level of one of them upon the 
other or at treating their ideas on equality &s born out of their 
preoccupation with the saroe problem to which they eive various 
answers and which can therefore be considered within a single 
overall framework . Instead , each thinker is considered 
indepenr1ently, And a study is undertaken of the way he understanc'ls 
equslity , the way he justifies it, the sort of equelity he 
considers most important ~nd his reasons for this , the area of 
lif he take·a the idea of oqua.lity to illuru.nate , the '!lanner in 
which he relates it to other ideas, etc .. In each case, a fairly 
coherent philosophy of equality is sought to be constructerl out 
of their respective writings . 
These three thinkers are selected for two reusons . The 
ie1ea of e(luali ty looms ·mite large in their thoue-ht; as such , 
it was felt that looking at their writines from the standpoi nt 
of e1uelity may illuminate t ~eir certain features that may 
otherwise remain obscure or relatively un<lerempha~ized . further , 
2. 
as they c ~nsi~er equ1lity from ~ifferent phil~sophic&l 
poPition:, it wtta l>eli ,.verl that s critical eX£.ninc1t.ion of their 
:ri t.in,:,:., could, . "::rh! 1,s, l oint ~o the r..-~ nerHl :-ori ts ~nd li111 tations 
of tl~eir r<!apective positions in t ,rr.10 of equAlity . 
In c apter I , 1 t is srdued t i.at tr.ere are threR rliatinct 
views of Go<" rlL c.,rnible in / ine''J ·ritin:~s , t•n<I tl1 t 
corrRs1on~in~ to the Kro throe< iGtinct views nf equality , 
though onl.\' two o theo re 1!1! c.1, sod by /nint= at any length . 
In chhpter II, it ifi Rr .. ,uecl thi,t, though (:octwin bogim; RB a 
thorour:hRoing r ri ti.on •li~- t, t· ore nre a ,ifts in hia ~ -ner l 
philoso;>hical po::ii tion, anrl" thi,t., i th o&ch t·nift , :110 i,lop,s on 
truth , rut:tor.· lity l.Uld e('J_u ll lity under,;o 11'1 ortont chanee~ . 
inally, in ch• :·, ter III, 1 t ls , ruerl that there are two 
,lie tinct theories of equAlity in Bentham anc1 t a t the t nsion 
b tween th~m rem~lns unresolved . 
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I 
VIC:VIS Oi GOD 
a., , ... aine nr,r-;uao , is a er a ture ,-if tcd rri th r eason which 
ia llefirud as the ca_;.,ci ty to ~nfcr cener1.l _principles regu-
i.n;~ the relc,tionr; letwecm the oboe vccl ;hcnomcna . 'On 
t',c ,.. 'rir 1s o 'C of inn turns its attention t0 tl-ie tmiverso 
ot' · sifo, it !1 .:.!•covers order arnl re;~dari ty, and finds that 
these e..rc dt e to cert::> ln reneral lmrn which ever,rthing in the 
1. ost of the roforcncci--; to £'a.ine 's writin-'s arc to "Tboma.o 
h>.ine , Yey ·ri tin c" , edi tcd .., .r:, • • Clark, Ar.1erican Century 
~,eries , 1964. '~'hi::; iG a collection of nearly 211 his important 
works . As some obscrvr. tionn uill be ma.do in this chapter 
regar.din{l tho RCnernl 8.!)I•roc.ch chnre.cterioing oo.ch of t c:Je 
,;orlrn , it is connid0rcd r.iore ap.lropriate to ci to not only the 
pace n\l:",ber but also the spoci":.c work involved . Reference such 
as 1R.o.~.t . l. 89 1 woulc. thus rncan 'Ri ,..hto of .an, Part 1, Page 
89 '. iVhen tho work!l not included in Cla.rk ' a collection are 
referred to, the refcrence3 ::iro to I The "Tri tings of 'fhomas 
.1.nino ', collectod and editetl by • . • J . Conway, 'he Knickerbocker 
Preao , 1095, Vol~~cs I - IT . Here too , for the reason stated 
above, not only tho voll.ll'lo ancl the pa.go nuobor but the title 
of the s1.ecific r;ork ae we-11 in ci tod . 
universe acts i n confornity witµ . It finds that the uni -
verse io composed. of r:iatter , is ouotained. by moti on , a.nd 
i s re,.,.nlo.ted by .these c,eneral le.\·s . 'these observations lend 
it to asl: n nu.,bo~ o.~ l'·o.nic q_t1'"lstiono . ~;otion , it kn t"' , io 
not property of i.ntt;or; ' The rm.tural otate of natter , as 
to pence, io a. obtc of root ' . Nmv , motion means ' a chBne,"'8 
of plnce 1 , n.na. must be I the effect of nn external cause a cting 
u1Jon matter' n.s oatter cannot r-ivc itself n m.otiun , nor can 
~on n;ive it to rat'er . Unloos God an the ' creator of o.otion ' 
io assumed motion \70uld re;;ia.1.n tmoxplilned . '!'here is lso a. 
seconr1 qneotion that 1~ea.son an s . ' Everything we behold 
carries in itoelf tho intcrncl 0virl nee that it did not make 
i toelf '; it must mvc been mdo ' by or.,ething eloe , an<l this 
ago.in r:iuot V de by co ,10thing loo, n1 so on infiu-
i tely; 1 it ic the conviction c.rizins fro:;i this cvidenc that 
carries s' on , as it wcrt..) by ncc1.,;csity , to th belief of o. 
first canoe eternally cxistin 1 • 1 True , it io ' incmprehcnoibly 
difficult ' f or a man to ' conceive I rrhat n first cause is; but 
2 there is ' the tenfold. ter dif iculty of disbelieving it ' ; 
and thuo mnn ic compelled to arrive at the belief in the first 
ca.use, which io non-:- but God . One implication of this is that 
l . A.O.R. 1 . 259 . 
2 . Ibid . 
the person denyu~t the existence of God is not just ll!.cking 
' faith ' or has been denLd 1 13· rec ' or is 'confused ', but 
is ninply 'fooli_sl1 1 in that r.i~ rc"son cannot see v.-hat is 
so ~ 7.f- evirlent . God thus is ar"ived n~ by two con .octed 
but diffore.1t routeo: ti:" expla'1ation of motionJ a. d the 
explanation of the o:!.'i ·in of t hings or the need of a. first 
ca.u3C . l'he dif fcrence t,be tween the two is thio . Tho first 
argw:1cnt 13 c0nsinte.1t with the view that r;.,.t t,._,~• .!. a sep-
a.rate O-"lcl independent principle , ro1d that it docs not 
owe its existence to Go 1 : that is to say , it io compatible 
with ontoloi;ical ,. nlisn . "i'he second argument , on the other 
11and , is not . L.ocl iG the fi r~~- ... ':.L'sc ; as nothing exints before 
ruvl outside :Iin cv ·.ythin must ovre its existence to Him. However, 
either a.r&ment by i toelf in able to a.."lswer the third question 
that man ' s :-ea.son asks , which is here the general lo.ws in 
nature come from, since they are not inherent in matter and 
a.re not tion- .:.i.ado oither . God can ive motion , hich can still 
be irreeular and chaotic . Sir.lil£>..rly, as the firot cnuoe God 
may set thingo going in the first instance J but thi rain 
would not explain by i t self thoir r Je-u].ar mP..nner of existenee . 
L"'a.ine theroforo thro,1s in a. third argl°!lllent , the argument 
from design . God er ated the universe with a certain purpose a.nd 
therefore of a certain character, i.e . of a aorta.in definite 
structure and a certain definite rmnner of operation .1 
1 . IIevrton too a.rguod for the existence of Go1 on the ounds of (a ) 
the beginning of motion in the universe ; (b) the correction of the 
deficiencies arising in the subsequent natural operation of the 
1 
u t ,; ! 1 t in vo ':., purpooo? n.."1d ho-:1 do r;e find it out? 
Co ., • r. · ..• e a:::·ctes, ia to b•..) 1:no vn not through the ccri tu.res but 
only throuc;n . 13 wor'w, th"lt b .) t 1 e tuivcroe . 1110 reasons for t his 
r .. re .n,~ . r'irst , ·,:c c · .... ot 'for C8rtain ' mo7 that tho Scrip-
tur~s are :•:Lo rcvo ll'l. tiona . Second , n.ny be inc, not excepting 
C.od, ca.n nnly be lmO\m through his works : 1 he io wLa t his works 
reveal hi to be a.ld .lfrn no bein_; .uclc: endont o:. the::: , and if he 
l~o, ,·:e hnvo no Dcano of '.~no-,:int; it . 'rhircl , thio ic the only 
ra-:, to ob t ain ccrte in knm-:led :c es it io baaed on the exercise 
of our natural ro~son, nnu doc~ not require faith or ouporotition . 
'.:'r 11s, in find in; the cxi:::tcnce and the a ttribu tcs of God through Hio 
.. . sJstem; (c) the orderly r:1otio , the uniform direction and 
the complete nutl.al c.1 Juotmont of V..1.I'ious parts . God is thus 
required for three different reasons : Uc £rives las tho.t produoe 
rel;-1.2lari ty and uniform directing in motion ; He ia the (,rigino.l 
giver of r.iotion •.it .out the mediation of 1hich these oterru:i.l 
.. ,cc.,ru~ic....l ln o remain co.uoo.lly incffccti ve ; and , finally; lie 
oteps in froo time to time to correc t tho doficionoies that 
arise from or in the operation of these lawo . 
1 . Ibid . , 257 f . 
worcs , there is ,10 non·.iibili~-, of '.,einir ' 'leceivod 11 and there 
A ~.I - , 
is co1'tair.ty here not to be found i:;:ilsor:1erc2 • It is through 
a.ich a ot..idy of th, •mivo.:se t:mt God 1 ::i c:nr.itcnce is arrived 
in c,..eetinr- the unive~se and i to lo.HG axe to be rliscovered . 
vne pur ose ::e coulrl :1.avc io that He mints to dc1onstrnte 
Jis row~r to tto: but this cannot be lfis oole or ma.in 
_;urpoiL o.s it ·rill 10.ke Fiu s!,Oi,y like a. ~' .. ild, andJ wha.t is 
more, \·1e are nble to conceive other purp oes oore con-
sis tent with :Iio na ~ .re n we know it to JC . These 
ne~u.ral principlc::i a.n:l lo.woJ ,10 lmor. , arc t e condi t ions or 
our hnp iness ns ~heir aboez~ce :ill m ... Clll cha.co and sp~ll human 
r,1i sery: it io, .,, ... ·u o, norc plauoiblo to argue that tzod ' s 
puxpose is tho i.1encfi t of' r.iankind .3 This ha.a t11 aspects .. 
I'irstly o.nd atrai •htforwardly, ::e 1ants to er.ate regul ity, 
ato.liility, _predictc.bility ctc . t and thu.s make un happy . Jocondly , 
tie wa.."'l.ts to reveal tho lo: is tnat alone croa.to ouch a stability, 
and. thereby to teach us h0\7 we ohould f"0V0m our in terpcrsonal 
affairs ; HL ra.nto uo to stud· the un·voroo , dincover to principles 
q I 
re ulating i~o a~tot and act on the . 10 do this 1ill be to 1 itritatc 14 
1. Ibi 1 ., • • O •• 11. 329. 
2 . Ibid . , A. O •• 1. 258 . 
3. Ibid . , 202 . 
4. Ibid ., 286 d 2 2 . 
Hiip. , which a :nan has an oblic at;ion to do • 
• !owcvor , ever; i ' this ·,1as Con I s fr ·';on tion in crl!a ting these 
lawsJ v1hy do I havo an oblit,a tion to "Overn oy relations in oon-
forni ty vri th the,:1? 01~ r:iore generally, why should I · i tate God? What 
sort of r.:t1 obli H.vio 1 is t, is? .. hat do,:s it consi t in and ·,hat are 
i tn limi .,::; , if o.,,.'1y? A11 .. tl , v:ha t is .:10c t importo.n t , which God is 1 t 
i·11t I ar oaid to have c.n oblir;r!.tion to im.i+,n>;e? irow , Paine does 
not di,1c..1ss thecc qt..eotions cxplici:ly a.r.d Rt lenrth, and his 
answers hr..ve to be rccon.otructod for him . Ao vie have seen, the:.ie 
nro three )Ossiblc Ha..., o of conceiving God in him; r'r.t1lel.1 , t:,ere 
l'.re three Gods - God tho ori~inator of Fotion , God the First 
Cause who is also God t c Croator, and , f.:.nally , God the Law- giver 
and 1lenefnctor . Let us tclce the la.st God first as He is eany t o 
deal with . Hero I have an oblirntion to imitate 1im because He 
io r:iy beno_factor , and ini tatinJ 'Iim consists in my diacovermg 
from be otudy of t 11e uni verne the 1 rincipleo and la\7S a.cco"'.'din 
to ,1hich He benefits mankind , a.ml ac tin& on them : thio means tl 
twofold obligation of pursuin,r cie 1tific activity and of practising 
morality . One central principle of such a morality ia that we 
are to do good to all alike irrespective of their moral deserts 
xactly ns God bestowa rain , air and ounshine on al l . Paine 
evidently is not vor~ ha.9_eY about thio , and ,"Tallto to euphasise God•s 
10 
JllJtice; Go..: co-l2..J uot reG.ll trt, tt t:1e ·ood ws.:. t 1u bJ.d ~like, 
:1.£. .::..l..:t .Ju.,_1.i.:;i1 th! 1::. t t ,r ; n:.11 oo .. uzt do 11::e·,rl:3e . However, 
h .. cJ..1 .ot _::1.s::.1.:r dis )Ono of the ,irtpnent thJ.t Gou is ,lso saon 11ot 
,,:, c~1..:::..J li..)out de..:ort in d.i..,t:db..ltin~ i.., r.uteri_l .., »10fits . AB 
4 ~·o:::; 11-t, ho -~ltorut-!ly cm h!?.:Ji.~en t11e o:>licL1.t ~ • to :)ractise 
.; wtice us :::l::io t c obligo.tion to ~)rJ.ctfoe u.1 1.L"l lff ercr1ti ting 
JO .ovolence • 
. n to tl!c Joco.1d 7iou of God, thc.t i..,, God t~1e Grc .tor, Paine 
..i:..i::iort:J th·•t our obliG.::.tion to imi tato Hir:i. arison from His being 
our Creator; he doos not snow uny a,:arenoss of the objection 
-lLllllly 1:1(.dc to nuct J.n assertion tlut tho simple fact of craation 
L.oes !'lot by itself entail any obli;;-tion on the creature to da 
t .. •::i crtJu.tor. This oblig tlon> he goes on, con::iists in tw things . 
Firntly, wo e.r.:.i to otud,y- the universe and diocovcr tho laws in 
c..ccordunco with which it was cr"'a.ted, nd to create thillt:;S ourselves 
in accorua :.eo \,'1.th thoo; this a.nounts to a.n obligation to practis e 
and. promote science and technology. l:e ah.ill d.iscl15s this at 
oomo lonuth 1 ter on, Secondly, God ms created not o .Jy ~ou 
or me but all of uo, a thus there is a U!llity of origin among ua . 
:ou certain rijlts, cJ.llad natural rights, necess rily follow f rom 
titls mnner of our origin or coming into existence. l,{e 11 
therefore havs o uai n..1t".T~l rights, and our oolig tion is t o 
respect equally the tural rights of others . Thie obligation is 
different in character from the obligation t o practise justice 
fl 
disoua.oed arlier 1n conneo i n ·th Uod tho Benefactor 
in a£ much th ln tor dooa not pre ~poc any natural rights 
on th~ part 0:1' the 2.nui\'idu•:l2 conet:ir, 0<1 . 
1. 0 t God tl1a Origin 1 Oi ver of fotion , i 1 s prima faoie 
Vel'Y U'fi 1 t tc c t obliBatio11 on O"n :poeeibly hav to 
Hit, ?Cl ~ll~t t he iTJ ita t on cf Him o.n eonaint 1n. 1Vha t seoll18 
t o be at he ck of l nine• mind is thfl vi II t h'lt one serves 
eu h e &o ·uy puroui 0 11 • e 'inter...,t1t'. Into e at i s t e 
ne.tur l principle of ootion in 1 , '1.nd bJ pl ~111 i ir it in him 
God b s naured 'that mrm 111 ' movo• , muko fforto, nd 
preaerva n CJnb~lli h his ~1 t no . uhoreforo irnit tee 
and e1-v B (;od hrou puruoi 
hio o int r ost , 1,1 ·throu 
i nstit t1on nn th pr aet o:; 
purusi . o. t 0$8 int r oto. 
oblig ~inn to •Y vb univar 
' unn tur 1 • in, .. it t:ln Bl'l:t• 
(l tt~r o ob11 tion , 
o i Vin · r: r emova the 
t~ t ond in tho y 0 1 t ho 
o 1 tt r woul ' ~l oo imply n 
di ovor w t uch 
prumu." o ' on • a 
interest o th OH io notion of on ' a l'ltl r l nt thus 
oomeo to enjoy i vin notion. • •• J ntural 
d vine, and o 1m th ottvi tie. , 
n to t1 th • 
Ho~ever, the pursuit of one's interests could hardly 
be a matter of obligation as man does it J nywEJ...by the 
very constitution of his nature. Besides, it is notJ 
strictly speak.in,.!!!!. imitation of God inns muoh ns God 
i mplied here is one who imparto mot i on and is not Himself 
~ motion in a way hat mn11 is . 
One common obligation implied by all tho three views 
of God is the obligat ion to underta ea study of the universe 
and discover its pi'u.ile-iples. Natural philosophy, ' aine e,;cys, 
' i s properly n divine s tudy . I t is the study of God 
t hrough His 1or~s• . By it •we arrive a t a owled•e of 
His exis tence' and ' ain a limpue of His pe~fection '. 
!ence soienoes are to be.tau ht not 'as nocom~li shmcnts 
only' but ' t heolo ically or with reforcnoe to the Bein who 
is the author of them, or all tho rinoi~lea of aoienoe 
are of divine origin . ' Men oannot m et. em, but onn oul 
discover and apply them; a t ri an le, for ex ~lo, io 'no 
othor t han t e ima e of t he pi·inoi le ', and all i ta pro1.1erties 
•exist indopondently of tho fi •uro , and ex ... stod before any 
t r iangle wae dr wn or thou ht of b man . • l or the ea.m 
i? 
reason the ursui t or kno\1led e is t e :vor hi 01' od; ovor 
•sohool of seieno e ' i s a ' house of creation •~ and every ph1los o .. 
pher •a preaoqer •. Sinoe o.ll arts are baa don soienoc ,not only no 
l . Ibid , , 264. 
z. bid ., . O. R , ll. 334, 
sci once d .:.so .!CJ i~rt wu.lcl : i. vc ev l? (.;lei hw .... 1ot Go revealed 
.• .:.. . soil l. tho ..L.'11. verJ • 7hwi, th .. :or u \le le_rn Jout t o 
u...'liver.Je anct the .. ore .:e ,.now of God., th- i!!oro uo :Lcono cooocious 
o_' th0 r . ti tude \le owe Hin. t The Lti._;hty i::: t:10 ..,roat raccho.nio 
o~ the: crc..i.tio 1., the ... irst hilosoph r and ori£,;iml to 1chor o£ 
i.J.l . ' 1 !.>C:L0!1C8 ; science is 1 the trllo thooloi:;y '. 2 
From the ot:i.)(!poi. t of oqu.:'llitJ, thc:;o three views have 
.i.:.fforont implications., ni have different dei;rocs of do 1.1.1cy a.a 
the attempts to rovide o. found tion for it . ',Je shall discuss 
this uostion more fully wen we come to discuss the political 
implicatiom of these views of God . mi~t we may obser;e here 
is that • ~ino seems to find the views t!! t centr round God the 
Jonefactor .nd God the Origil'l.'.l.l Givor of rLOtion r-ther inadoquato : 
the fomcr bcca:.1se one of its 1I:l,! lie tions ii:. the pr ctice of 
u ,difforo ,1tiating ooclnos., to all, nd this goes ga.innt recipro-
city, that inJ ' doine s ou would bo one by' which fo one of the 
centr:1.l implicationo of o uality ao Paine un orot-ndo it; the 
luttor boca.use it doea not yield the i de of natur 1 ri)1ts, 1,Jhich 
for P,dno is insepar bly associ ted uith equality. A l' Bult, 
lo largely r l ies on God tho Creator for supportin mot physico.l.ly 
hi::, theory of equ.1lity. This is soen both in his unding 0£ 
1. Ibid., 333. 
2. Ibid • ., .a.a. 1. 262. 
equality e;-..olusively in the e uality of origin, and in the fa.ct 
that he discus sea equality only in the I fil.gh-Gs of han, art I 1 
~,here the ide~i of God the Creator loor:m very l:.::.rc.:c . 
IS 
II 
Il .J l ...,Y ·u!\L am·' 
In spitn. of the fact that the idc13 of naturtl rights and 
c.ll..'lli ty ~~every closely connected in his theory 01 equality, 
P· · ne never discusses at any langt how man come to have 
n<> tur:il ri :_;hts . Han, he says, has two sets of , tur1.l rights : 
intellectual riehts or rights of the mi. d ' , in hich a 
included ri:hts to religion, to opi'1ion, to judge, etc ., and 
the rights of actins I for hie o m com.fort and h, ppi ss \Jhich 
:ire not i jurious to the richts of others • •1 The r a.son my 
he should consider these particular sots of rightn so 
important seem to lie in his meta.physics . God wo."1ts man to 
otudy the universe and be ha::,py: tho intellectual rights 'WOuld 
rohte to th former and the other sot of ri hts to th la.tter. 
Ri[;hts are ' not gifts from one man to another 1for -mo is h 
who could bo the first giver? ' nd 1by wr.at princi lo ' nm 1on 
w11t authority? ' ' As therefore it is impossible to discover ~cy 
origin of rights othcrwioe than in tho origin of r.ian, it 
consequently 'allows that rights p ort in to mm in righ ... of 
his exiatonce only and must thoroforo bo oqu!l.l to ev ry mo.n. ' 
A doclar1t ion of rights ' is a anifeot of the pri inles by 
v' ch thoy (i.o . mon) exiot .• 2 The natur~l ri hta o said 
1. Ibid., 88. 
2. 'Fi t rinoiplea ', itings, III . 271. 
H, 
to 1 _lwuys :i.p ertn.in to ca.n in right of his exiotence 1 ; but 
he docs a.ot c ro to explnin what this . biguous cxpreos::.on 
precisely mo.ms . He could moan th lt 1 · n ho.s a right of or to 
oxiatcnce ... ran which these othor right::; could ;)C de.uced ; buli 
ne does not seem to :mean this and ., in factJcunnot, us this vill 
r.10 n man having a claim on God for eing given a. • existence, 
a1d nine does not have the motnphysi~s required for such nn 
unoortion. ihit ho could mean nnd dooo seem to mean is thut 
once a IIlllil comes into e·istcnce he has a right to continue to 
exist; becnun a nan e_dstc, he hns cert in rights, and these 
aro called turul rights aa they spri .froo the === 
exiotence of man. The r son my simple f ct of e:d"'tenco 
could inply such ri hta seems to consist in the IIlllnner of man' s 
oricin. Ian ie created by God; he ow a hio e--ist_.nce only-
to God nu not to ey other can; such, hio mtur·l or 
original st te via-a-vis othor men is one of complete i. cpende~ce. 
He does not need body' parnission to deci e wh t h9 sh l 
do with himself. . n explo.n.'.ltion very clone to thi::: in cont~ined 
in hia letter to Jeffer on.1 1Suppos twe:1.ty rsonn, str ngers 
to each other, to meet in a country not b fore inh.~bited, e ch 
would be a. sovereign in hi:; own n1tural right . His will wuJ.d 
be his w.' 
1. ' Papere of T. Jefferson', Vol. :rn. . 4. 
I '1 
~quality i ~ ' one of the greatent of "11 truths and. of the 
hichest udvantaee to cultivato. •1 All men are equal 
because ' r:l.!l.ll is all of ,ene de11I"ee •; t nat is to nay, there io n 
C$~enti~l unity among men2, springing from the fact tmt all 
a.!.i :o aro cres.ted by God and derive t heir e;dstcnce from Him. 
ai..mlity thus is ' the truth ' about r~on. This i s further con-firmed 
by tho fact th~t all religions, Christianity as troll ns others, 
noceso:irily and often despite explicit denials presuppose e,illllity 
for thoir very foundation; 3 except for the 1only 1 distinction of 
1the goocl and the bad' all religiona 'are founded ••• on the unity 
o ma.n1 • ' y, even tho lavs o GOvoramento a.re obliged to 
slide into thii: principle by making degrees to consist in crioes 
o.nd not in persons 1 ; a criminal can be ro or less guilty and 
thuc uore or less of a criminal, but nevor more or loss of a. 
rn n . Equality, further, is useful bee uoe it places tltl.n 1in a 
close connection with 11 his dutioo, whether to his er a.tor, 
or to tho cro tion of which he is p rt 1 • Inequality- ere tea 
a 1barrier1 botwean n and man as also bet,~en run a,1.d God ; 
this croatos •artifici 1 chasm', and with it •a vast dist. nco •5; 
1. Clark, Loe . cit ., ~ ,O.H. I . 87. 
2 • Ibid. 
.3 . Ibid, 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid . , 87-88. 
ti 
it n.Lo er~_ tes f .lso idoaa in a. m.in o.bout •.ii1at othcru rctlly 
re, 1,in t tlioir re-1 rclation..,hip to hi.nsolf is . .,11 thi 
tends 1 1 to Ul1r.l rn man 1 , and ma , as rooult, 1 oconos dissolute • . 2 
_n short, , n is tur lly a p rt of tne uni.vdrc, !:l.nd all the 
lne uali ties other ths.n those b:ised on t c distinctions of 
ood and b d alienate hin from it o ~ severing r.J. .... n'.l.tural 
relations with other n n and God; thi::, nliomtion opJllo 
1rti.sery1 -'t!'ld takes tey from him the h n spect of his 
existence. 
11 mon thus re 11.>orn e 1 1 b c us tlloy e origin--ally 
e 1, or 0 cause, 1to us a .ore hiomble phrase ', thoro 
I addition to this, is eqll.9.lity of 1 ,Jirth a .,v,3 .J.., • 
ho , var, aine also som times dv no .., o. r thor diff orent s i 
for o uality, which is that c lity of 11 r:i. n sprin(,.>a fro 
th ir b.Jlon.:;ing to tho s tspeci s '4• Tho orient sup--
proosion·o woen ~is tho oppression o ' one h lf o. th h n 
species by th othor '; morurchies !l.I'e condo• d bee use thy 
tend ' to det rior te the hUI?l.3.Il op ciea 1 ; all men ,.; of to 
de oe 1 .... c uoo the all b long to tho s e species. Tl 
1. Ibid., 86, 
2. Ibid., 87 • 
3. Ibid. , 87. 
4 • Ibid., 173. 
/ 'l 
could me[rn introd;.1cln3 a biolo_:icnl basis of equ.1..lity i 
aJdition to th e4rlier r0ligions or n2iritusl onu, 1nd would 
create u co;u'lict . It seems how-ever thn.t apart from the 
:>.\ssin6 e·~proasions of this ~:ind, ho doen not adv,,nce the 
biological argument w.th any acrious~oss . I3 _:,ides , even 'When 
he r:1entions the specias- relationship of man to others he does 
not tn.ke it as ipso fa.etc or-:lting a ry obli311tion; r.:en must 
1 fir::it be ' kindred ' and soon as such , J.nd this follows only 
from the equality of oricrin or irth, which dos make tham 
1".indred und makes 9qua.llty a 1divi e ' pri cipla by loea.ting 
it in ·the a.rchetyp 1 ct of Creation. 
The fact of man I s origin, s \.le ha. e s en, points to his 
indebtedness and duty to Go , while thn.t of the e ;u.a.lity of this 
origin points to his duties to oth r men. ; s to l hy ro1n should 
tre tall mon equru.ly, wh.'.lt sort of an obli ation this is, and 
whore it· 1::; derived from, it io possible ... or Pai e o 1 to advonoe 
an answer dii'ferent from tho earlier one, u.ltl.ch wo that he should 
imitate God and that this imitation consists in troo.i.. 1 •• ~ -11 
cqually.a.D God Himself does . He could now argue that mon 
ohould treat each other equally because thoy A£2. equal; tho1 
o.11 have the s3me mtural ri0 hts, nd oach must eJercise his 
with duo respect for those of others . Thia he 
ought to do because all men a.re 1 or one do ee • 
:I-
1. Ibid. 
1.0 
and there in imply no justificdtion for one n:~n to treat 
himself a superior to the rest . This o.rg1.UJCnt cotL.d 
make God superfluoua1 as the ground of obligation to practise 
equality; be it God the Creator or God the 3 nefactor or God 
tho Source of t.otion., since one can be · ked t o treat all men 
oq~lly oir.iply because 11 _.!! equal. God wuld., o course., 
rell'.ain as the ultimte e ~pla.n'ltion of eqw.lityJ as men are equal 
because they all alike are created by Him, but He is no longer 
needed as a ground to recommend or justify the prnctioe of 
equality. This superfluity of God a such o. ground is inter-
estingly revealed in Paine ' s discuaoion of m n's duties . He 
had often talked of the oblig tion to practise equality ae a 
religious oblig tion, and had identifiod it 'With tho 1duty to 
God 1 • 2 He nou begins to distinguish the tw; man I o duty 
consists of 1 tuo points •., ' dut y to God ', •_m with respect 
1 . It is not lo o ly required by the ch r cter of thi 
argument th t God m .,t e dispen ed 'With; on could argue, 
for example., t tin ere ting all men in th same y, nd in 
not getti some mon to be create in di f rant, y, snyJ 
drop from the gr y clouds, He has expressed His \.lish that all 
men be tre ted as e uala, th t n , th refore an oblig-
a.tion to practise equality. However, Paine does not choose to 
oey this, ia not inconsistent in doing o. 
2. Ibid., 88 . 
2. I 
Ol~ his neij.1 '.) ~ ur, to do 'LIJ r..o would ,JO do.1c by ' •1 The 
l ~tter is .ll2.!:, subsumed under the fornzr and, a~Jropriately 
ono'llt3h., io :Jon as involvinJ reciprocity r at her th:in 
hu.':1.'inenea:; , love, etc .. Besides , t}:.o o'.:>ll.:; tion to pro.ctise 
eqll.'.lli ty horo is not strictly a mor--11 or a religious 
00ligation but r .1.th ..)r .i r ...1.tio. 1 one; if men are equal, 
it is sioply irr.1tio!ru to tre t th ra other t han equally. 
J. s ai o;.;t 1~ ys talka of eq lity and mturo.1 
r ighto L const nt conjunction, it y be a ~ed how precisely the 
tiJO arc r el~ted for L : • ~o'W' th y mve beon variounly 
related by different philo oph rs . -.>O e h!lve taken eqmlity 
it5elf a o e o t h al rigr.ts, nd tre te the right to 
it as loGiC lly of the s e kind the right to other things 
like life., property, otc .. ..J . others have derived equality 
f rom mturtl ri hts by arguing th t oon are ua.1 ec UDO 11 
have tho sruno n .. tur.:..l rit; 1tc . So otho s h ve done the oppo-
site nd have derived tur ... l i ht tho, selves fro l eq ll y by-
ar uillt; t t ., boc e on r eq 1 Jnono ha 11$ aey 
authority ovor a other, and ~tall ara thorerore no.t y 
indep nde t nd ve t ho full r dom o 001£- ete nation; 
f rom this froadom cert i ri ts are consider d to 
follo,.r. Tho ~ i:. e se to co o very clo e to t · a 
1 . I i d . A man here ,,JOul have direct obligations to 
othor men, nd not via God sin ' the init tion1 arg .ent . 
last manner o ' relating equality and na tural rights , his 
general position seems to differ from all t he three . He 
derives both ·equality and natural rights from the same source , 
i.e . God ' s archetypal act of the 'creation ' of man subsequently 
'carried forward ' t hrough 'the mode ' of ' generation• 1• In 
creating man God established ~quality among men and thus 
related them; but at the same time He made man independent 
of other men (in terms of origin), and thus established natural 
rights among them . Both are ' divine ', and equally so . 
Two questions may r.i rise in this connection . Why should 
Paine consider it necessary and important to base quality 
as an ideal of conduct on the quality of origin? and 
second , as equality would seem to apply only to t hose men who 
are direc tly created by God and not to t hose in the subsequent 
generations , how can his theory establish equality among men today? 
His answer to t he first question would be in terms of a 
general methodological principle tha t r uns right through all 
his works , and t ha t , in turn , r ests on a certain view of reason 
and of the sort of ' proof ' or ' argument ' that alone this 
reason finds satisfactory . 'It is only by tracing t hings to 
their origin thnt we can gain rightful ide of them; and it 
is by gaining such ideas t hat we discover the boundary tha t 
divides right from wrong 12 • He employs this procedure to 
1. Ibid. , 87 
2 . Ibid., ' Agrarian Justice ', 339 . 
1 decide who has a property in a certain thing, what government 
can and cannot do, 2 what religious institutions are good and 
what bad, eta •.• As to why we should traee the origins of' 
things and what sort of intelligibility w can expect fro~ 
it, he argues that man' s reason feels at home only when it 
has thus traced the beginning of a thing, ns it is then able 
to obtain a standard by which t o determine what the thing 
ie origin- ally and, therefore, really like, hou its present 
state finally differs from this, and how this difference 
could have come about . In the case of ci vil society, we go 
t o the time when government~ s about to be establiahed; and 
in the case of deciding -matter s about ma.n hims lf, hi 
rights, his relations with others, etc ., we go ' to the time 
when man cwne from the hand of his maker ', i . e • 1 to th 
creation of man' or t o ' the eginning of time ' , •Here our 
inquiries· find a resting place and our roa.aon finds a home 1 , 
\o1hile in any intermediate stage there is •no authority at all. 1 
The very nature of man' s reason t hus entails a search for 
the ultimJ.te origins o things, and to explain a thing 
rationally means to trace its origin and re te it as it is 
nor to uhat it s then; this is th criterion of equate 
explanation for Pai ne . One feature of this pproach may 
be noted. aine is ot see a trans- t poral point of 
1. Ibid . 339, 34,1. 
2, Ibid. R, o. M. 1. 91• 
refer nee wh re to ulti..trultely anohor h n a! irsJ but nor 
io he pr p ed to oountetlllnce interm di to d toric 
ev nt llko the ettl ent of 1688, etc., or v n the irth 
doat of Chri tJ wt i doi i to tr c t 
loo to thi gs the hi impli s n 
inte stin theory of politioal t · , or> tho -:o.y in vhich 
the ide or tima ter~ into pol1ti nd role it p 
nd Bur oan 
b roduocd t o the diftoront vi w 0£ political timo t teach 
no. Ho ver, f or r , 
. ur ue 'th! inquiry !urth r . 1 
o to th s cond qua tion, ai 
'ere t.io,n I fro I go r. tion 1, 
Y• Go e tsd 
sh ll riot 
eh s tbo 
'Whila rt:' 1 s p. nt 
no t d hl11i. ver, there i no dif rono twen 
th tw otivitiesJ inc gone tio ' is only th mod b7 
which' the 1Cr tion1 •1s carri 
evory child bor into the world 
derivi its xi t fro God 
' • 
2 Conaequantly,, 
consider d a 
Th wr1d. i MY t o 
him it w.s to the fir t man ths.t nd bi 
1 i ht in it i "' th same nd. 13 
one tion is a repetition of th 
1. ln thin oonn otion e Wr1t1fl8 III. 260.. 1 1 t inoi 1 ~ 
2. lbid., ~.O• • I . 87. He doe 
archetypal act of Creation, nd. tho t ,10 h:,,va the ssme 
implic9.tions denpi to tho diff e r et100 in the time of' th&ir 
gonoratfon and .in tho immediate agency eoponaible for o using 
tho not . That Paine a ould make this rgument, give i t suoh 
an importance and di□ouas it in the s o par graph as that 
vTh r e equ~\1;. ty iG sought to be e~tabliahed further goes to 
show that he considered equality of origin extremely crucial 
for the juatifioation of aquali ty as s mori,1 and poli tioal 
ideal and that ther efire he fel t it neceo ary to clooely relate 
generation and creation so as not to deprive equality 
for all meaning and practioal application. 
2.6 
III 
a we noted o rli0r, there thr e different vi w of 
Go in ine, a the political th cries co truoted on 
their b. sin would obviously be d1.£fe1' nt. As to God th 
Benafo.otor, ovev r , p, i does not oo truet any- polit1oal 
theory on 1ta is, though he doe hint at som 0£ it 
poll tioa.1 implio tiono , \lhiohJ 
rational boi , 1 c pa le o 1 oo 
I D a. 
th ~ner l luw 
reg· ti the univero , of oelf'-co oioWJly cti go them, 
am or otting up a r tiona.l politiool. ooiety o their b sis. 
\lb:it is important nd ta ems to vorry Paine i hov 
proois ly th s law tU'e to b int rp ted. IntA"""n••" 
r co nding unditter nti ting oodn s to all, i h 1 
God is doing in o ming ll6ht n to all i. , they 
could Mrdly b a vi bl is for Political 
would, for ple, r uiro lovi 
politic~ impoa ible .1 Interpr d1 on the oth r ha , 
commanding j tioe, oh is 'Wh t God do in punishi the 
\d.ck d \1f-l.rd1 tho virtuous, th T could provi & a 
for political ociety, ut , th n,th '3' uould not 
l . C k, l.oo. oit., 326.f• 
base juatice on natural rights, nd it is this that aine 
really wants . Paine is fr nk1y puzzled 1 to silence by the 
apparent inconsistency between God ' s behaviour in the natural 
universe and tl:w.t in the moral universe . As he does not 
have much t o say on the political implications of this view 
of God, 1. e . God the Benefactor, we s 11 largely ignore it. 
On the idea of God the origi tor of motion ,a f irly 
elaborate political theory is constructed with interest aa 
its basic c tegory1 and on that of Go the Cre tor, a much 
more elaborate political theory is construote rl.th tur 1 
right as the b·aio o tegory. eedless to s ~, these two 
theories are not entirely comp tible withe ch other, and 
nine ' s political thought remains vitiated by an unresolved 
-.bonsion between the tw . e sh.all e ne the former, the 
interest theory of politics in this o pter, nd t ke up the 
latter, tho natural right theory of politics in the next . 
God has imp rted certain principle of motion to 
every thing in the univorse , whereby it moves . It is 
ravitation in tho oase of matter, ' want ' or ' interest ' or 
' desiro • in the c~se of men. 1 Like matter, man's natural 
state too is one of inortneas, and it is interest lo11e that 
a.ctiva.tee him without which ho would not move 1 fingor, and 
thus no devolopmant in field would t kc place in its 
1. ' ttraction is to matter, what desire is to tho mind'. 
Writings,IV. 437. ' Scientific femoranda 1 • 
absence . Like u.11 other principles in the univorse, it too 
is divine; it imparts motion, brings aoout mu.n • progress, 
and is unfailing in its operations ; it is the gr nd principle 
that sustains life, and its •unceasin3 circul~tion ••• pas. ing 
through its (i.e. society' s) innumernole channels, 
invigorateo the whole mass of civilised man•.1 It leads to 
aericulture, manufacture, commerce, in shortJ the vhole 
civilisa.t:.lon a.a we ?now it ; ~an huv ursuod and 
achieved it e.-ren under the most iscouraging circumstances 
like wru:J, oppressive government s , etc ., which they would not 
have been able to do had not interest ' oper ted' on them 'With 
the same I stroI1goth I and irresistibility th which instinct 
operates on animals . What avitation does to matter and 
instinct to anima1o , interest does to men. 
Ma.n ' s interest is tho satisf ction of hio ru tural wants . 
10 w these nts are uch that ho cannot tisfy them by-
hin self; he needs the help of others . Thus arises the 
hiatus between his natural nts and his naturJ.l pO\ ers , 
which ia not so t hing accidental but is part of nature ' s 
intention, which is to lead men into society; ' those YU ts, 
acting upon every i ·vi ua.1, impel tho uholc of them into 
society as mtur lly as vitation acta to a centre .• 2 
1 . Clark , Loe . Cit ., .o. t,f. II .178. 
2 . Ibid., 176. 
4 
Nnture has also 'ir.1planted in him a system of social 
affections which , tliuugh not necessary to his c-xistence, are 
essential to his happineas .• 1 It is interest, then , that is 
indispensable for the existence of society . 
Natural wants thus brins men to ,ether in socioty and 
they, along with men ' s natural affections for each other , keep 
them together. Both of t hem bring about 'a great part of 
th.:.tt order which reigns among mankind ', which thus ' is 
not t he effect of gcv"'rnmcnt' 2 but instead has 'its origin 
in tho principles of society and t he natural constitution of 
man' .3 'All the great laws of oociety are laws of nature •4• 
Bociety thun ie a natural entity arising from the natural 
constitution, largely natural ,ants, of man , and having 
'nearly the whole' of ita business ' performed by the natural 
oj.leration of the parts upon each other. 15 What is more , it 
is a self-operating mechanism as the principle of interest 
i...uides each individual member , and so coordinates t heir 
actions that naturnl 1.,_,rmony ie the r sul t . Government , 
therefore, is an outail-r to societ y . Th more perfoct a 
society, the more it reg1 lates its own affairs itself , an 
't 1e less o~casion has it for gov rnment• . 6 The laws of 
society , as we have seen , are the laws of nature, an are few 
1. Ibid ., 176-7. 
2. Ibid., 176 
3, Ibid., 176 . 
4. Ibid,, 178 
S. Ibid. 
6. Ibid.• 178 
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nd extremely simp • l ndivi ual ob erv the b cau e it is 
th r 1 i ntorest 1 to do so, •and not on account of any formal 
law their ov-ernments may impose or int rpoae• . 1 ociety 
1as its mtural oohesion,and what government tends to do is 
to eprive it of this c~,hesion by hindering t e natural 
11,otion of its p rts nd the ratural unity they would thereby 
brig about ; it gins to acquire an o.utono us and 
independent character of its own,and •a oumes to oxi t for 
itself'. Government, · on this . account of its mture, i , 
trictly spe an evil; wh~t is ore, it ecomes di ~icult 
to explain it ece~~ity. ain , ot urprisi ly., hardly 
goes into thi question, and oes not adv oe a sin~le 
se ible ent as to why the i titutio of gover et 
hould h ve como into bei 
continued to xist so long. 
t a.ll , a.nd wh3" it should ve 
1Gove ent •, hes a, 11 o 
th ew c se to wich ooiety 
conveniently oompetent.• 2 
h says i highly obscure : 
oe s y t to supply 
civilis tion re not 
t such c are is not 
opeoified. Assumi however, t the 1! able to show the 
eces ity of gover nt , tit will be r equir d to do i to 
et the orts o o sea, alluded to by ai , th th ve de 
it exist en ces y, nd it will ot in terms 
of its ow principle but i term of thos o ociety. It 
l . Ibid., 179. 
2. Ibid., 177. 
~I 
is mainly to leave individuals alone to achieve ' common 
interest• through 'mutual dependence •, and in t he process to 
develop 'common uaage ' and general practices,- -wnich it then is 
to respect . The •quantity' of government required for this 
ls evidently minimal. 
As this viow of government arises from assimilating 
society to and explaining it in terms of nature, Ye shall call 
it a :naturalistic theory of government . This theory has sona 
important general features that rrm.y be noted. (1) It rests 
on the assumption of th natural har moey of interests . 
(2) It involves sor~c sort of determinism by a. natural 
principle ; in the cas of Paine, for example, it is interest 
which 
which is such a natural principle,and/neoessaril:y motivates 
man's conduct . (3) It assimilates political society to 
nature or tho uhiverse , and requires the former to be modelled 
after tho · la.tter. Thia is precisely wh t Paine l elf is 
doing. 
ociety. 
ature is law-governed, and so must be political 
s consequence, it is laws that are to be 
sovereign, and it is the law-making org n that is to exercise 
aov reignty in the structure of gov rnment . Further, 
a ru.tion must 
•extend and promote the principles of universal society•1,and 
conduct its aff irs not in terms of ' precedent• and •authority' 
1. Jritings . II . 121. 
but instear in those of the univers- al principles that are 
•self- evideHt ' and ' entirely independent ' of their •author 
and of everything rehting to time, place and circumstance •. 
(4) The ter. ' principle ' is used h re in a way it is used 
in the scientific expressions like ' the principle of avity ' 
or 1the principle of motion'; Paine himself says that 
principles are ' like a system of pulleys ' ~ and regulate the 
relationship betwen various parts as in a machine . He also, 
howver, uses the term in a sense in which it is used in the 
ethical expressiona like ' the principle of liberty' or 
'this is a ms.tter of principle '; this,as .ie shall eee, belongs 
to tha second non-naturalist trend in Paine . (5) Equtlity 
of men consists in each pursuing his o-wn interest . There 
is the same God- given principle of motion in all men, and oach 
is to be l eft free to be guided by it. This equillty is 
sanction~d by nature, and ' when God is brought in, as in 
Paine, th re is a divines notion as 11 for it . (6) 
Interest is a primary category and rights aro defined in terms 
of' it; ao Paine says, man •acquires a knovledge of his 
rights ' by attending to his •interest •, 2 ,rhich is talc n to 
l . See Olark, Loc. cit., •common Senso18, were a mechanistic 
~nalysis of the constitution is offered. 
2. Ibid., R. O •• 11. 223. 
consist in his pursuing his occup tion, enjoying ' the fruits 
of his laoours and the produce of his property in peace and 
safety, and with the least possible expense. 1 Men have 
rights becau.e they ha.ve interest, and hs.ve ri hts to those 
things in which their interests lie. 
1. Ibid. 
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POLI'J.'IC L r .ORY OF 1; .Tl'. l, L aIGH1 S 
The second theory that is equally dominant in Paine ' s 
writings seeks to understand politics in terms f th idea of 
natural riBht e . Han ' s original condition is on of ind pend nc • 
All authority over him can arise only fro his consent; until 
it oo arises he rec.a.ins hie own mast r . 0 th whole 
point of huvini those nnturnl righto io th t man i ble to 
enjoy the conditions they ore te, and thio de end on is being 
able to enforce them. e hes , of course , no turHl pov r , and 
those re adequite for enforcing some of his n tur 1 rights; 
in such cases he is aelt-sufficient, and does not ne d any 
1rnsiotan0 from others . i'here are , hove r , others vb re he 
is not s he may>for exampl , judge that 1 his prop rty, but 
Y my nt present be in possession of it, an he may have no 
menn~ of enforcing this judGUI nt nnd gettin hin property bank. 
"hat he can do here is to depoeit thi end uch other right 
'in the cocmon stock of ociety ', and take ' th ri- of ociety , 
of which he is a part, in pre erence nd in ddi ion to hie 
ow.•
1 
·uch riehts are th n c ll d ' ci 11 ri ht' or. 'those 
which pertain to onn in richt of his bein ember of society' . 
• atur 1 righte thue pertain to nn in right of i n turel 
~xi tence ,and civil right in right o hi• civil e 1 t ne . 
1. Ibid , R.o •• I . 89. 
loi moa t natu~al rights theorists dietin0 uish t wo kinda 
of natur l right : (l) rights to speoi fio things like life 
or propert y , and (2) a right t o judge how t o cxeroiee these 
ri5h te ., or uhat to do to make t hem eff otive . What mos t of 
them consider to be souro e of trouble and oonfuaion in 
societ y is not (1) but (2); it is each individual' s ri ht to 
jud e what he shoul d do to mak his r i l t s to apooi f J. O t hin a 
effeotive tn t ia oonaidered to lead t o die ·reomenta d 
confliots . It ie thor fo re (2) t hat is to be aurron er ed , 
so that common jud oan b set up ; (l) oan never 
be surrendered both b ause then it ill not be a nntur l 
right nt all which by def nition s in lionabl e , and al o 
beoauoe th very r eon for i nvo n the notion of nuturul 
right will then h ve been defeated . .No 11 Paine hi.m elf 
seos this , tho h i n a r ather .oonfueed wo.y . Man , h 
has n tur l r i ht to j ud i n his own , but ' hat 
availeth him to Jude , i f he has not po r to redr ee?' 1 
He ther fore d posi ts this ri •·ht in the oommon otook of 
sooiety• .2 But then aine i edi tel gos on to ar uo th tit ie 
l . Ibi • t l ·, . "'his, inoid ntally , hi hli hta ... o e imp ortant 
dif ferences b etween aine nd Look • Unli!. Loo e, ho o 
not c:t rive n tura l r i hts f r om t he l w o! n ture . Further , i 
i the law of nature that, f or Loo • ne da exeoutivo Md 
j ud e ; for • aine it i s the nat ural ri to that need th GO • 
2 . Ibid . 
the natural rights to specific things (for hioh a man's power 
.1 :s .10t commens-gra.te) that are surrendered, and thisJ as r,e 
have suggeated.1 ia impossible . All in a.11 , he remains vague 
as to what rights it is that are being surrendered . 
These ambiguities and oscillations affect hie disousaion 
of the relation betweeen natural and civil rights, a.s alao of 
the ature of ' civil po.er'. ' Every civil right has for its 
foundation some natural right pro-existing in the individua1 11, 
and ' every civil right s11ows out of a. atural right or, in 
other words , io a. natural right exohan d . •2 ' Society ganto 
him nothing. · ery man is a proprietor in society, and draws 
on the oapital as a I!IB.tt r of ri ht . ' s to civil po er , ~t 
' is ma.de up of the greg te of that class of the natural rights 
of man hioh b co ea defeotive in the indiv dual in point of 
po1er and ans rs not his pur 0 ' 9 t but hen oolleoted to a 
fooua , become competent to the purp9se of everyone . 13 It a.rises 
from each depositin hio na ural right tG judge (or/ other 
apeoifio rights), and taking the arm of society ' i pr f rence 
and in addition to his o ., It is this last sentence that 
highlights the conflict in Paine ' s mind s an individual cannot 
1 . Ibid .; 88 . 
2. Ibid . , 89 . 
3. Ibid . 
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have the arm of society1 ~ as an ad.di tion to a.nd as a 
substitute for his ovm . Paine looks upon a civil right as 
a natural right· plus secnrityJ the po er of society hero is 
an addition to individual's om po er . But he also looks u-on 
it as'a. natural right exchanged', thn.t isJ as a natural right 
r.;·,rrendered to society which then returns it to him suitably 
modifi d and fully o cured; the po er of society here is ta.ken 
' in pr f rence ' t.2 in vidt ' sown. It is only in this l tter 
context that Paine ' s continual te.lk of n tura.l rights being 
1excha.n d for ci~ il rights ' can have a meaning. 
M thus has natural rip:hts nd n tural po ers; in the 
hiatus between t e two lies the explanation of civil society. 
!mu is not naturally and neoe ily led into society in 
the o of the naturalists theo iscuas d earli r . He has · 
nothing but natural ri hte a.nd na.tur l po er i hen he is 
xeroised bot this hi tus, any an r to hio problem must 
b wrought out oft a sole natural equipment of hi . He 
feels that civil society ill b an ans r hi probl m• and 
is led to ex.amino ho it can be for d out of i natural 1 to 
and po re. The in trumenta.lity through which he thin thi can 
b done is con tract . ====-- b ca e 
l. Paine m inly use the t rm ' ooiety , ' by 
text he means civil society . 
in thi con-
man ha.a natural ri ,'.;hts to secure same of which he eeds others , 
s natural po ors hioh, 
hen oom ined i th tlose of o hers , make t · s ecu.rity f easiblo . 
t r.10.kes it neoossary also provid s the criterion in t rma 
of hich ts pra.ct·cea a.re to be jud d and justified. As 
civi society ia simply an aggre te of natural righ s that 
a.r man I s roporty of . ioh he is th o ner , ever lll8.l is 
apfropriately called 'a proprietor' in it , and the gregate 
f these na. tw.•al ri hte a •ca ital' • . s a re ult of com act 
between individuala , civil society is oreatedr this i ' the 
only mode ' in it c r g tl b 
'the only pr' c l e 1 on hich it 
st bli h ' and it io 
to exist• •1 
This contr ct or co act aine call 'constitution', hich th 
is toed 2 t t government . About the nature of the con-
ati tu.tion 'ts relation t t 1 contr ct, aine~ 
cl a.r , d- adv nc o differ nt ie a . n oonstitut them-
elv into a o ociet through oontraot , d he to 
•oonstiGution' r fro to thi act or th oonstituti oft -
elve by the p oplo into a oivil bodyJ the con act i th ir 
cone ti tution. But h lso a va.ncee a rather different viow 
l . Ibid . , 91 . 
2 . Ibid . , 92 . 
that the contract croa.bes a civil society, hich then elects 
that draft a doc nt that is o 11 d the con-
stitution of that oocioty . 'The contract and the cons ti tu-
tion arc separated, and the term' constitution' is used to 
refer to a specific document .1 
As ind viduals enter into the o tract to better rotent 
their tural rights , eac i to be a oured in th enjoym t 
of his rights, and none is to be all ed ta int f!ere th 
another; ju ic is notb g but this ua.l securlty of ture.l 
rights . This is also called public good , hioh thus i nothin 
but a ual justice . A gov mm nt wedded to this is o lled 
variously 'a r publ'o ' or 
2 
of a r public' or 'a repu lie 
ton the rinoiple 
e te 'republic ' 
nt ', but 
instead to •t e urport , mat -i; r r obj ot for which ov rnm nt 
e public p that i J~ublio ought to b·e in tituted 'J r public i 
good, and plie a o t~in - -·- co st tut go soo ety. 
hon peop;i_e e ter into 'their original ea paot of equal 
justice', thy utuall r solve and ple the s lve to support 
1. Ibid., 9; . also 131 . 
2. Ibid., .o •• II .191 . For a further d ouosion of the ture 
on Governm nt .' 
and maintain the rul of equal ju tice amon them.selves, 
tl renounoe not just 'the despotic form ' but 'the despotic 
prinoiple'• they a.gre never to b governed nor to govorn 
'by ore will and power', and nev r to do certain sorts of 
thingaJ such as t o ra c t se deapotism of one or o y , the 
latter in f ot b ing 'worse ' ,. They nounc • de pot 
detestable end unjust• ' t e assuming a right of bre .ld and 
violating their engage ents, ontr ots an compacts with, or 
defrauding, imposing or ty i sing over ch other', and I the 
po er of exercisin a t any future time species o doapot· 
over ach other'. Thus , the ri ht to brea.k th oomp ot is re-
nounced when it is first entered into . It is this oanmon com• 
mitm nt to the principle of 'equal j tic I or 'the qua.l 
:i9,'h t of man I t t con ti tut I th common cam 1tin principle 
whioh hold all the rte of a r epublic to th r'; the •t e ' 
principle of rep blio is 't prinoipl' of' qua.l jus tio ' • 
Of s~oh a republican gov rnment one ee s the rationa.le imm d-
iatelyJ its le: and eaeuree appeal of hems lvee ; and; as one's 
obedi nee to them is b ed on a r tione.l per ua on, no myths 
or artificial belie ne d to boor a d to otivat an indi-
vidual citizen. all obli tions ust be rooted in on, 
one has an oblig tion to obey only the rational la , that iaJ 
the 1 s of hoe rational c act r one ia conv · ~e • tow , 
we have just seen, tho n c prinoi ~le of political lif i 
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e ual justio J only tho e laws, therefore, ar politically 
ro~ional or good that aim at ormhi v qual justice . 
imilarly, only that man la politically r a tional who demands 
t hat ~i s governme t nchi ves t he quality of r ights and 
j ustice , and defends a.nd s t ands. up or his government only 
h it conform to this dema.ndJ man anting gov rru nt 
by ' ngs is 'a.n idiot•.1 
e hav so far discussed t prinoipl on which, a.ine's 
vi w, 0, overnment should e.ot . e y now turn our attention 
to his diaoUDsion of what he calls the 'fo;,;:r::w' of vernment . 
He starts by rej ctin th traditional triadic classification. 
Th re 'can be but one el ant of human o er and t t le nt 
2 is himself' J t ere a.r not thro 'distinct d aops.re.te 
lements 1 of ' human power' and t 
distinct forms of overnm nt . 
b tl 
ms to m an 1 hat 
all po r co s from only one ouro , th t is, ma.n; and in a 
political community it O COtl. only from th people • .l!OW 
h ition cla.oeifioation of governm n plie Bi 
ther are thr e 'di stinct' souro of powers d t bi8 i not 
only incorrect but so aohievou Jae it d tracts fro 'th 
Sover 1 t y ' of tho people . As an lternative• Paine ug csts 
l . Clerk, Loo.cit., .o •• r .146. 
2 . Ibid . , 161 • 
a scheme wh re gove cla.saifi d into 'repr s tative ' 
or' ditary 1 , t e at r includi g both I onaro ya 
ari tocracy' •1 to the criterion o hich thi alas if ca-
ton i~ bao d, P ne ntiona diff r nt one at different 
places . H tal s of •cons nt' of th opl, this 
pr' tin the r present tiv and abs tin the h di 
gove ents . Ho also ntion 'fr edom ' s t enta.t v 
to d o do th sort of government i ba.ood on mo.n ' s 
overnment th y should h :ve, hile ie her di t gov rn-
ment thy ar tr t d 'pro rty' 2 orts . Ho loo 
eat d 1 an epiateoolo oal o · terion: a rn-emp ieee 
ment may b o ba. on kno le tor on ore.no ; t fo er 
i a representative go , th l t r a hereditary on • 
l'hough this l t di tinction is of 
oon e, it is mor in th nat~ 
t . 
of an a.dvant 
sha.ll 
t t 
r pr ent ti ov mm nt a~ r ditary one does not, it 
i not a orit.orion for cl i yi go mm nt . 0 
orit r on impli din hi classification ems to bet 
in hioh political po r i deri d . Th po 
1. Ibi ., 159. 
2. Ibi • , . O •• II . 215 . 
ieldo is either ' dole tod ' to it by the peorle, c is 
siillply 'aa UI:1od and usurped ' by it11 th former is a rep-
resentative go\l'ernmont hilo the latter a. t H~adi tary one . 
Sinc J all porrer lies in tho 1,oopleJonly tho former is really 
tho 1 civil ' ~overnment; the la~t r is robbery, and not a 
gov nment a.t all . It may be asked by Paine should be 
inter eted in claseifyin governments in terms of this cri-
terion . 'i'he explanation ould ae to lie in his continual 
concern with he be in of thin- a , hioh, as e ha. 
lre dy noted, ie an important methodolo cal prinoi l ins-
piring hi apµroach to any other areas of anely 1 • J: othing 
has a ~i t to continu unless it has ri t to xiet , and 
the l ttcr d pends on ho it came to exist in the first instance . 
Applying his rincipl to th cl aific tion o forms of 
government , it roul fol low tha n i ther 
through 1dele tion ' o through I sU11ption• . 
This nabl s him o an er qu stion to he~ 
o gov~-,m•nt i mot oompa ble 1th republic or th principle 
of the public . epublio, ho plies , ' i not a..rily 
conn ot d 1th a:ny ticul fonn, but it ly SOC• 
1. Ibid., 198. or Pain , gov rnment is either rep nta-
tive or hr dita:ry ith r apeot to it form, tho ,o e 
utually exolusive d collecti ly exha~ative . 
iatea with the rep 1·e oentative form ae being beat cal-
cula ted to seou.re the end for which a nation ie at the 
expense of eu1)porting i t 1 •1 He advances seven different 
arguments in support of representative government , and, in 
my view, his discussion of thero cone ti tu tee an important 
theoretical contribution to1he discussion on the subject 
of representation . His first argument is commonplace and 
familiar . Government is I the ,.iana.gement of the affairs of 
a. na.tion• .2 It is 'the property' of the hole community 
to which ' eovoreip 1ty, aa a matter of right, appertains 1 • 
''ie community has 'an inherent , indefeasible right ' to set 
up any form of government that accords with its interests 
and abolish one that does not ; the 0 1ly form of the govern-
ment that frlvee an unrestricted aoope for the exeroise of 
this right is the one resting on the election of its rulers . 
His second argument is one that is quit e handy to a man of his 
metaphyeioe : it is the on iy form of government that aooorde 
ith nature . fe.ture i u orderly, regular, law-governed , and 
oonsistent J anything tha.t is irregular or ihimsioal is simply 
not natural. no in all hereditary governments we find that 
1 . Ibid . , 191. See also Writinga . III . 265 . ' First Principles ' • 
The true and ohly oasis of representative government is equality 
of rights 1 , ,1hich ia ho republic is defined . 
2 . Ibid ., R.O.M. I .162. 
an intelligent father does not always have an intelli nt 
son, and a good king is often OJcceedod by a foolish one; 
this is a. 'natural proof ' that nature abhors hereditary 
-{Overn ents . Hio third ai·gument is a. follow-up of the first 
one . The ' principle' of civil ~overnment is public r,ood or 
equal justice , and it is best realised through a form where 
people regulate thoir affairs themselves ' without the use 
l 
of secondary means ' • 1i11e ie 'democracy ' or the 'original 
simple democracy' as practised by the ancient Athenians in 
their days of glorJ . Ho,ever, it is impraotible in e.n ' exten-
civo and populour territory•,2 not because of any defect in 
its principle but because of ' the inconvenience of its form •. 
\',e oan , however, secure such a. democracy in the la:r modem 
states by 1 ingrafting ropreoeuta.tion upon d mocracy ' •3 Th 
result i representative d mocraoy or ' representative govern-
meat' K hioh is not different in kind or pr incipl fi,vm the 
diroat or simple democracy einee all it does is to volv a 
l. Ibid.; R. O.!. . II . 191 . 
2 . Ibid . , 193 . 
3. Ibid ••••• 
form more suitable to the rune principle in the contaxt of a 
largor state . ' ,hat Athens was i r miniature America rlll 
be in ma ,.11i tud.e' •1 J.epr eflen ta ti ve government thus is only 
'ainple' deoocr~cy writ large , or, more correctly, it is 
:::-£ pres en ta tion plu::; universal f'!.'a.nc~.ise . 
His last four a.rgumentfl in auo:·ort of repr -senta.tive 
government are more intcr.Jsting . The fourth and the most 
important one is formulated in terms of political knowledge . 
'l'here is Gor:ie thine of an inconsistency in exercising power 
without knowlodceJ . cl, the exercise of porer over a thing in 
ora."lce of its/mature is irrational . ' Sovereign ower 
without sovereign knowled • . . is a something ihich contra-
diets itself 1 • 2 Government , therefore , needs knowled i f 
it is to:ngulate r tionally the affairs of rational m n . The 
lmowlodge is of two nda : lmorledge of the principleo on which 
any government ought to be established ; and knowled of the 
interests of all the po.rta .3 The formers is ' no more than an 
operation of the mind acting by its o powora ' J human mind 
here does not need to know anything outside itself , but oan 
work out tho ' system of principles ' through simple reflections . 
The latter, on the other hand, is ' of a different kind ', 
1. Ibid . 
2 . dritings . II .135 .' Dissertations on Government '. 
; . Ibid . , R.O.M. I .163 . 
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J..-lJ. iu cruci •l for 1 t ne .1r1ctice u:;i.;n thono ) riacipl o l~a 
:1.µ;11:rtnt; 'to tac v.ll'iOU.'3 1.nd n.i.f:orou:, c ircu.".'.lstnncos of a 
.. '..,rr:ior, ca.1 only oe h:1<1 throU;_;h i'amili:ir .i. ty v.1. t.h tr.o co11C.rotc 
c.Lrcw:mta Wls OJ. tho pooplo co.i.Cer.1t:d. In politicn \lC require 
SJ.en a !· no\1lod~o of tr J , cor:1.,c.erco, ·G'I'ioulture, otc ., as also 
of th.. ...i'icultiec ·1!:! t!1c proolem 01 thu various p:.l.rt;;; o£ 
tho eou..."ltrJ. Thi:.1 \nowlcdge . .:, :.;in.;lo individun.l c n h.:ive, a.a 
1 :i. t io an ao..:;e..1bl.:i60 of practical E..110ul.c<io ' ilhich only the 
: Jruons coi:u.n.~ frotl ttifferont are n ea?1 orl°'1• Tho neod tor 
this lr.ind of knowledee required for the conduct of government 
co, titutoo n argumo t in e port or ro r 0!1t: ;..ivo ,,,,,.,,lf',..,~,..nnt, . 
'l'ha knowledge, t t tho Fouoo.or or the Conati tutio r~, ker o 
tJ:i r milio.r .figuro of tl:ie zi,s tor req s 1 o.t.' th b\l ral 
.?rincip1 of political lii'e., and c, . be had o.m ,in o.ct, can 
bo&t bo ha<l through uiot · lcetio 
~ovo nt requirea for th 9.Y to "'J cond ct O- the co.mtry' s 
· '!'airs ia roclo!-'..ina. tl.y pr--.1otical, and t a on .y r-.e~ of' a.oquiring 
it io t.brou..;h tho instr;unonta.lity of ropr aentntio • 
,,ill rulo out tho po sibility· o! L'1on::u-0 oqui · 
l e 
ill th 
la o rledco ril. ui.r thro'U{;;h the i trUt.1e.1ttuitioc of tho civil 
service, tho opinion L ,4 :s, ho q • tion il: ::i , he rtoyul 
comiosio. , oto .,., a1 i oompl t ly diu .1 e \.dth a r prosent.itive 
-ov rnmont ia t cl , I s ot he iO u.d o.rgua thz1.t only 
the porso co . ., f n nJ tho p ople oa.n ve uch e. knovledg 
in 1.nv• int·::- to • l:l i"lr.,t !. ·.: ..... ·.n.;.r; ·:, lt .!.t i::; diL'icnlt 
to pro:,c thin po nt i 1 the ibne•1ec of a•17 ll t;CU!'sio'1 by 
~i ,ch 'l :u: l'lcks u.11 .1:.:10•.,.led:;o of 111 tho :;u-t.: ~r 1. 
cwy:.• th!J J :t· ra 1r·y i n--ittors -c!..1tln..: t its ' co· '· tiotl.S 
., ·r: :l' - 'I0:30 1 • 'l'h r 11or-JJ for tb.iz . · ir:;'t, e ory 
'"''.l.:1 in tho 1 :·y is of the Sf;lr.1e profoo.., · o , a tioic1io:::.- .' 
ic no o -.eo. ti,:n, :!:o, ' thoraforo ', f1n.l::., 
1 tho ,:no tlod •c n oesr.:i:ry to tho o.-rorcLic of th.e p~· ror I t -w thin 
_nte at o.no. du ; o · . 10 
' the doz'.'n n o hi co-r-9..nd.' Seco. , hin ?O or :s :i.l r.tyo 
it 3 1 i n !'1.ct, inton cd 1 o _;ivo ito o::i?acit:r for :1ct o '. 
' : ,o· vor, al 
tio .. , o!.. -11' tho lcr:ents or 
l . 1Writineo ' II 135. ' Diosertg,tion o t0 er1 ... ..ont •. 
nation 1diffor froz.a those of an aroy' . 'An arm;r ha..ci but one 
occupation and but one interest•, hile a nation 'ie composed 
of distinct . unconnected irldividua.ls , following various 
trades, employments and Jlll'suits, continually meeting, 
crossing, uniting, opposing and separating froo each other 
ae accidents , interest and ciroumata.ncea shall direct •.1 
'Another very material matter ' in which the two differ is 
•temper '. An El.l"DIY has 1but one temJer 1 - ' temper formed by 
diaoiplino, mutuality of habits , W1ion of objects and ur-
aui ta, and the atyle of military manner; ' ' but this can ver 
b the case a.man th indi iduals of 2 nation'. 
The fifth argument in upport of representative govern-
ment is in terms of politic unity . Government 11 no mor 
commo contra in hio 1 the parts of o oi ty thaa som 
unite' •3 Any politic 1 unity that a nation he.a is al~aye in 
te a of a· 3ingle oentr from rhor all its pe..rts aro overned , 
and with hich , ther fore , they must be olosely conn ot d . ln the 
l . Ibid., 136 . 
2 . Ibid • •• • 
3. Ibid ., R.o.·: . n .194. 
case of representative goverrnaent, \78 have such a incle 
centre as ell as the bond con ectini:; it , i th the various 
parts of a. nation; it thnA provides 'the etroneest and mot 
po, :cfl,l). centre that can be J.cviaed for a nation . •1 A na. tion 
here is 'li~a a body contained within a circle, having a 
common centre in hich every radius moets , and that centre 
i a formed by r pre sen ta tion 1 • 2 
The sixth and the seventh arguments in support of repre• 
acntative government are simple but intereoting. Government 
needs men of talents and ab"lities, and ' th con truction of 
government ought to be such' e.s to bring them out and offer 
them an a.oceee to po er . Every man he.a ' mass of senae •3 and 
certain' acw.ties ' ' lying in a do t sta. te 1 , hich, unless 
excited to act :on, ' ill descend ith him in that condition 
to the grave .• Thia ' cap city' 'never fai ls to ap ar in revo-
lutions ' ; r1ha.tmustbedone is o 'bring it) forward by a. 
quiet and regular operation I in peace tim s . Finally , repre-
aen ta ti ve govornm nt ha.a an L. ei e educational value follo rlng 
from its ' public ' character . It 'presents itseLf o. th open 
theatre of the orld in a, fair and manly t1anner ' 1 thore a.r no 
L 1Writin I III . 6. A Letter ' To the authors of "Le epu.blicain" , 
1791. 
2 . Clark, Loe . cit . , n.o •• :.n .194. 
3. Ibi d . 
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mysteries here an tho rea.r"ons for ev,.,ry action of the govern-
t~ent are clear and putlicly debated . Besides , it diffuses a 
•roat body of lmo,1ledi:;o fo:. .. ourhout the 1ation 'on the subject 
of ~overnment , 1 and 1 ;..hose who a.re not in the reprosentntion 
1 
mo~ ao -n.uch of the nature of h:.sinesn no those ·iho are ' • 
'Ph<-re is, as n result, a general spread of political educo.tion , 
nnd the citizens bocome more and more capable of actinp on 
,, 
'moral ' and ' public ' pri? ciploe' ; tha.t is to say-, of undertaking 
an intellivent olitioal activity . 
All these ctm la ti voly make a poworful caae for th oort 
of ;::,ov- ·nment Paine chooses to call ' representative ' 1 nega.-
tively, they conntituto a telli indictment of what he calls 
1 hereditary 1govornment . ' · t oeems less tenable , however , is 
how he wants all these beneficial consequences to issue from 
representative GOvornruent as he understands it . eine s oms 
concerned to concentrate all power in sin l e cen re , and this , 
while lonving the ultima.to controlling pow r 1n the hands of tho 
p oplo , does not seem to givo them much in tintive . People can 
elect¥ or thro out the vernment they hov eleoted, but aoide 
from this there is no scheme for a:ny continual popular ction~ 
or for any closer Lntegration be aen the peo le and their 
representativeo . Representative gov nment ia said both to 1 oon-
1. Ibid., 197 . 
2 . Ibid., 19() . 
centrato' political k~owledge et ' a single centre' and also 
to 1 dlff use 1 it ' thro,t:.:hout the natie,n ', but there is no 
attempt to rclat.e and coordinate the tt10 proco sseo. 'l'hie 
"1oseo another important nroblem as well . As we have seen, 
l:'aine takeo repro enta tive rove rnment to differ from the 
direct democracy of Athens only in ' form', t heir .1.,ri.:ciple 
~~ ~.1g tha. sa.Je . Tni s beco.1es very hard to r.ia.intain . • .~ latter , 
as he himself ::rn.ya , .. ,cant direct participation by every ci t.l-
zen in the collective deliberations and decisions of the com-
munity, while th "onner means that the role of the individual 
is confined larg"Oly to electing and removing his rulers . This 
is not to a~ that the two are inc :.ts is tent, but only that 
reprosentation , an P i e unchrs t nds it~ c£1n not be grafted on 
the direct democracy as he found in ancient Athens, the ethos 
or the ~rinciples of the two are very different . In one , an 
individual .citizen initiates policies, introduces legislation, 
and is polltically very active; in the other., the ihitiative 
~on~ not lie with him, and his oole task is to say yes or no 
once every fe yea.rs . ~/hat he next goes on to say is muoh mor 
surprisinc still . His discussion of representation , as he 
himself says , ia inspired by a deairo to make the direct demo-
cracy of Athena feasible in the lar otateo of today; and yet 
he goes on to argue that representation ' is preferable to simplo 
democracy even in small territories . Athens , by rep sentation , 
1 
ould have SL,rpas9ed her o '11 democracy . 1 'i1hero seems 
to be no im; ortant r e1.son f or this as:.ertion except) per-
haps> that such democracie~ tend to be uru:-uly and convul-
2 
sive , and degenerrtJ into sane other less desirable £0:rm 
of governmont~ or become unstabl e and gota run over by an 
invader . But evon thia will not do . ~.'hy should direct 
demooraoi s be unruly? AndJif they oan be, what reasons 
havo we to believo that representative governments will not 
b<'? /hen the question is pressed , one comes up against an 
important inega.litnria.n assumption that underlies many of 
T~ine ' s arguments~ which is that the wisdom required in 
politics is to bo found only in sam members of the soci ty, 
and that , therefore, not all the citizens but only those 
having it e.r to be elected as representatives and a.re to run 
tho government . However , though only som men in any society 
have political wisdom , these ome ar not fixed and alway 
the oa.me since political wisdom I i oontinua.lly obanging its 
J 
plaoeo . It rises in one today, in anothe tomorrow.• 4 ' As this 
is the or er of n ture, the ord r of gov rnment must necessarily 
follow it, or government ill, e.e w see it does , de nere.P9 htoigrrnme. 
1 . Ibid., 194 . It may be ob erved that Paine almost always usea 
tho term ' domoora.cy' to mean simple or direct do.mooracy , 
2 . Ibid., 190 . 
3. Ibid., 188 . 
4. Ibid . 
'i'l.ua , R3 ooliticnl wisdom · t nny giv en time CAn 0•1ly found 
in o. f vi , the :::iuo"riority o f rPore~a'!nt1•tivtll ov rn•,,en t ov r 
tilr ct democrPcy cnn not b~ one of 'form' or ' conveninncP ' 
o;ily ao '11 i ne ·rp:u,,s , but mus t be on of ' nrinci.,lf ~ s ince thP furme r 
enDur•1a the rule of wisdom whi l P- dir ct d i:1ocr1 cy, by ,,\. lng 
~~litic •l power oc eaaible to Hl l, does not . 
·,1e hn ve seen thet Pain takes r •public- r• l ono 11s th 
l ..:i i tl1.1n t forw of civil aocioty, and undor1<1 t ande 1 ~s h,.Red 
on th princi nle or l'lqunli ty of r igh ts of nll indivi<lUf lo. 
,ll C!i i.noividud is fl proprie to r in d il socisty , " c hne, 
therP.fore, rm <•Uf' 1 s yin ho !t.s u f f l'ir.9 a1•e tc, be r .gu ln ted. 
'l'.lio 1 ads to his a.dvococy of univ raol suf r l , which is g 
b ~~ on this a w 11 aa on numb r of other loric lly die-
p·1rate er.rnndR . Hegat ively, he beeins by ejectinc proM~ty 
q•.1Hlific tion . --operty has ' wings ' and c n ' fly RY y~ ond 
th right to vot too will hnve to fly avny witi1 it. ' 'hen n 
brvou-;nRr Rh 11 fortunntely pro duce o fo 1 or n m !e th t , 
by bt,ine- -worth th , Rum in question , ehall conv y to 1 ts o ner 
th riJht o votine , or by its d th, ko it rom him, in hom 
(!oes th rigin of uch' rieh t exist? Ia 1 in the man r in 
he rml e'r • Pronerty qunl.ific.: tion 1:.. al o u ed out on h 
rn t .:.om 11s t r.round th t it me ns ' tt nching r t: t o merf!' 
1. ''ritings. III . ?65ff. ' Fi:rst Principle ' . 
r ,t t:.e.r r.inc! wakint'.; man th agent of thnt rnntter. , Ile wnr,to 
t lie richt to vote to r es t lnete: d. on n ' n , tur l ' rinciple , 
,< ich t,e finds in ' ngo ; nll men ar sure to a rrive Ht it 
"nd. thus no inequ1 li 't., 1.0 involved; alno , no r 1nn C Pn t , ke 
1 t 11 ny :from I nothor ; nnd once it rriv o it '1 ~n r.ot r o 
••wsy . hn t 1a .o , it is in full h~rirony wi tli thr r. turnl 
:•roce t • of n• 'a ll.lentt.l meturt.tL,!'1. It i Preu d to d ny n 
t::':I U a right to vote l.:J to r oduce him ' to slav ry' wl'dch 
'c..;z. lete in being oubjact to th will of anothor', Anothr.r 
1 rt:u•1ent in oimilnr vein ia hnt 1ch nn x.clu ion of y 
u t.c mor -1 ch rncter of th por .. one 
exclud d.' '.1.'h re io l oo , how v r , the urrnnl utili t<irian 
i..: r G'.J. eut thnt the stren1.;th nnd tho security or a gov rnment 
· H • • oportion to th nuuoc .) f o o le interested n oup-
purt ne, it' , nnd that , ther1for , univer l ouffrflge 1s e. rood 
'pvlioy' . 
In addition to the univers lity of fr·nchian h principle 
Ji. ~qu£1l ty h e two other important i plic tions, p J11ticsl 
,md economic , W'e ohall take the conomic implic · t1on first . 
rop rty, aine s y , ia of two k.inde , natural nc rti ficial , 
. h 'or r co e from , .d includeo lan , '1ir , ter, etc . ; 
t!. e latt r io that acqu.ir d by very wi hio own 1 lbOur. 
1'o the former 11 men have qWll ri ts e th v l 
1v tur l ri ht to oc:.fort anli ha ineo • to th 1 tter, 
since all ~n hav not contribut d eau. lly nd c n n ver 
con ributr equally bec,_.twe of ni tur 0 l diff r nc e in 
ntrength , ability , industry, etc. , they 
rit!hts , und overy one 'should hold on to the :_:irolluct of his 
own l1"buur rui hia ri 0 1.i • ere ' . low , the forrr.er inpl:.ea thn t 
every man is a 'joint life-proprie tor with t l. st in the 
)rop _rty of the soil' , and that the earth 'in its !!> turnl 
' ... ncul ti v1.. ted otf, te ' is ' the con .. on -:iro pert r of th• ~.w .. m 
Hace' • .du b men occupy and cultivlit,:; and iniprove it, and this 
1.0 t. Juty eujoined on them by nature, since the earth , in it 
UI.cul tivtit d stet , can .iUp,iort only a small po •1lation ,while 
nature w n the entire .,r ..... ..Lnu popule.tion to survive and , 
there fore) provided w1 th food . .Jince this improv ment, however , 
::.~ inseparable from the eurth, oen com to a cquire property 
iu tht, _ tter as well , thoug1. , .., v• ctly, they c have property 
orly in th results of th improve ent in th land that they 
i av e f eet d througn th ir labour. It i thus unjust tha t 
tni::., .-1hould continue to ll1!l.in t n prop rty in th 1 nd, this 
vLJ lates the principl of equality; ut , th n, to depriv them 
of th fruit o their labour is equally unjust. rain ha 
Jolution. Bacn landlord has a 'right to occupy' th 1 nd , 
1·w· her, f or appropri.a ting the co!IDllon property he is to pay 
ground-r nt to the co ounity at the time of in! ~ nee , the 
au;eestion that h s inspired th idea of estate duty . Out of 
this , a national fund is to be ere ted __. fro ·11hich 15 re to be 
n id to very man arriving at the g of tw ntyon a com-
r-onsa t i on f or the locs of hio natural inhoritanoo to the 
onrth . In aldition, ~10 io to be paid per um to every 
Lan aged fifty . hoth these i:a cmts aro t o continua end-
lessly , no all i:ien , i.i the presc. t as well as in the fut ure 
generations, have a n'ltural ri!)lt t o the earth . Since all 
have this right both payments are to be made to all men, the 
rich and the poor alike . t hcr, all estates of the clear 
yea ·ly value of £50 are to be t 8... od . aine also advanced 
various other propoonls , ouch ns that ·overnment should en-
join :,arents to ae . l their children to a school and should 
p .. C4 a. year for wary child to help them finance this edu-
cati..,n , that it shogld p~ t he aunt of twenty shillin to 
newly married couples, etc . ; but these obli3ations are not 
derived from man'o equal natural right to the earth , and we 
shall not , .thorofore , discuss the at length . Ao to arti-
ficial property it is baaed on man ' s right to the product of 
hia labour . }ven hara , ho ever , as no individua.l can acquire 
...... .., .-·o -,rty thout the aid of soc ety, itD omer ' o e , on 
every principle of justice , of ·i:ratitude and of civilisation, 
a pa.rt of it to society from honca the hole came ' . s 
justifies the levying of truces as v:ell ao & forcible purchase 
by governme t of a property in the oa.oe of a 1 gaily determined 
public n oe sity. 
In the case of both the na.tur d the artificial 
property , it ould have beoh noticed that .Paine is not inter-
es ted. i n e:ny full-fle d eoonomio equality, but only in 
providing a ba:,i c economic security to all ; ' I ctre not 
how af luent some- men be, provided th4 t none bv ,, iserable 
in co'lsequcnc e of it.' he himself defe1Jds 1.is «"Conomic 
proc;r'•mrue on the - round thnt by ke"ping th!'J oo r con t entP 4 
it -dll ' L;i v to the accurnula tion of rL,.i.., , i • re~ or 
security' that Rny exioting ec onomic arr~ngement c~ n no t . 
Further , his plM does not drr,w ,mt ~he full imPlic + • ons 
of men 's na tu.ra l equril i ty of ri c;h ts, and for this h'3 w, s 
att~cked by Thomas Spence , who himself, stnrting fro~ the 
rrnL1 premise , dvoca tod that all •hr.. inhabi tnnt of ei.ch 
flri sh , v t; form a cor poration which is to o ,m i t, entire 
nd and become it ' -
'" 
rei i-n lord ' : it is tu . to l et out 
the land to farm e son c moderate rontel which should be su ch 
au to defray the expenoes of the locnl ni.c1 p'l rtly of the 
centrul administ ra tion ,including ;h t is n eded to relieve 
the poor: the rental paid will vary according to the cu ,n -
ti ty, the qu,,li ty and the convoninnce oi tr. land . l'his , too, 
falls far short of the full implication~·or a turn.l equ· lity , 
but it does go further than Paine . 
~e Ul8.Y nou tLke up the politic~l impli ·ations of the 
orincipl of equality . ..en hnve equal rights, nd this , as we 
have seen , leads to the sov reiGlltY of tho nation . But , if mm 
o · today hnve these equal righto ,men of tomorrow ,·ve them in 
no less n degrob. '.J:.111s leads to the principle of equ li ty of 
f'?!l'?rnt ions. ' Svcr:; ::;rierati,n io O'lll:l i n ri·hts to tho 
0r,11rati no whic'· :-rocC"iie i +,, b~' th0 s 10 rnl<' tho. t every 
individual is born equal in rir.ht~ \'Ti th ' 1 is comte·1 orary . 11 
,ince e"'_uali ty Oj ..acn in 'divi.,o ' equnli ty of gcr ra ti,:ma too 
2 
is 'ilivi!1 '. rhio eriuality hns three inportm t b.plicationo . 
r "'otly , ' ';."hose \~rto _flve (ll,itted the ,orld , and thooe ·1! 0 are 
not arrived in it yet, are as remote from ch other ae th 
utmost stretch of oortal imagination can conceive s rh.at 
possible obligations then can exist betreen them •••• ? 13 Pre-
c~dents qua precedentg have no authority; each goneratio i s 
to "SU.late its affairs in a manner conducive to its inter-
eots, and has no obli tions either to its a.noestors or to its 
posterity . Sacondly, each gene atio i a unquestioned ster 
of its polit·cnl dasti y , 1d io free to determine it olitica l 
arrangerronts as it deer::a meet' . It can cho.nge both the rul ers 
it find itself govorned by ad the form of government it dis• 
cover i· z lf livin un er; it is thia of the form of 
government t hat he calls ' revolution'. Thirdl y , al l form of 
hereditary vernrnent are ruled o~t .4 For someon to a.os on 
1. Ibid .,R.O.~.I .86 . 
2 . For a fuller tr~atm nt of the concept of ner tion and its 
t o sen ea , 1 natural I and I legal '..) s 
Principles' , 
f/ri tin III , 262 , ' Fir t 
3. Ibid ., 63 . 4. Ibid., 143-5. 
his power and authority to 'ia successor is to imply that the 
sucreeding generation has .10 right to determine its own poli-
tical des tiny, in s doing one f enere. Lil'!l is pratending to 
be u ' ,stator ', a.n,l to thi:J it :-ins no rirht . 
: ow this third i . lication in fairly 3trairhtfor.-rard and 
unexcepti nable . 'fhe first one raises some tricbJ quest,; 1ns 
which I-aine does not ,c;;o into . If all generations a.re c1ua.l 
it should follow that the present peneration must take into 
account the inter,,:-,ts and the needs of tho genera tiona to come 
w ►10 J too, have an eq_•,al claim to the resources of the country; 
this would mean that the present generation ,h!!! obligations to 
the future ones . Simil a.rlJ, it also has obligations to the paot 
generations who have a r.1,ght to see that their a.chieve ents are 
1ot frittered a\la.J or their records blotted cut b.r the present 
one, who , despite the fact the.tone is l iving and th other is 
dead, doer, nevertheless remain their eq ual . Thie raises oome other 
problCJIS a" ell that are mainly connected with the second implica-
tion, to which e now turn . · 'fhe present generation ia not b ound 
by the ag.reeoents entered into or tha a.rrangeoentu not up by 
tho past ones . i)a.ine attacks the Act of 1688 in which the 
English people a.re considered to have surrender~d their rights 
for all future time to the king and all his successors , and 
says that 'All sue~ clauses , acts or declarations •• • • a.re in 
themselves null and void '. Thie does not mean , Paine a.r es, 
~I 
tha t ench gener tion must throw away its heritaee d 
1 
o t'9.rt everythints an w; all it 'l' (!tmS is that aothine for 
it has authority unless it, thP- finRl source of all authority, 
ch Jones to confer it . The problem however remnins : ,:c.i n 
n in embly concioting of a n~tion'~ dr 1 ~~Rt ~ lt~r ~ 
•x1 ;ting conJ titution? P,iino's answer in ' i', o', ·1 n'i is 
'l" ied on the di tinction h twe" "' ' the nu tion in 
~ 
" · r'cter ' a.nd 'th., ,,~ tion in its ori-inal c-hr1rPcte~ ; 
.. ..; embly speci fic·,lly co •tV(sned to draft u con· ti tutlon 
·• rr sents thf'l n· tion in ito latter cap cit., 1 1 sul:J" ouent 
, t . t . / The . 
n, v • 1 e r'C!f)re- s en 1. 1.r th- former . a utnor1. ty of the 
t,10 is 'differ nt' in r,s I uch as these Mure · omblies are only 
to qct accordine to th principles laid down by the former . 
"i.'hi::. Jiu tinction , however , L, "" ... fficult to u t in , 1.,iVen 
rrline ' a mphnsis on the equeli ty of g ner tions , ach assembly 
nfte r all is as much a repr sentative of then tion os any 
v r , and , ther fore , has as much sov~r , nty . he cenJ of course , 
:i.·•- ily that in on case the nation has u tho is~d the ssembly 
to ' .,ake' the constitution , while in the othe · it hns 
1. \'lritings . II . 147 . ' i)ie'ertations on Governmu t i ' It is a 
'va e , inconsistent idea' th t avery elect d assembly is 
fr e to reject all the pr •sent institutiont ; ~ · will make 
every 'new election ' a '•new revolution • ' 'It would be 
declaring en as .· embly de potic for the tim being', and 
would not be ' a gov~rnment of established principles' . 
2 . Ibid., 93 . 
(, 2 
authorise l it si ply t o act wi t nin the frar.1ework o f t his 
coistitution~ Th:.s , however, only sifts t he problem to a 
li fferc.:n t l evel: is t :,e nation fr---e to r eject t he existing 
c ·,:,sti tution nni give itself any other t hat i t likes? 
1'aine 's answer, as we have seen , ii·, ' y ~s ' a.'1 i 'no' to t he 
fjrrner , an l 'no I to t he l atter part of t he quent ion . I f Fl 
e n stitution is b 'ld, t he na tion can nnd ought to t hrow it 
off t hrough a 'revolution '; if good , it can not and ou ht 
not to , as it can give itself only t he r ight sort of 
constitution which already exis ts by definition . But, it 
may be aske i , if the nation is fully sovereign and has 
complete fr eedom to do what it l ikes, is it not i nconsistent 
t o say t ln t lt .::: on ,--,t k ccrt.slj ~ sorts of things? This 
is , in f tlct, the old t heolo.;ical problem a ; ~0 e ring in a 
poli t ical g•.1ise: i f :~oi is omni potent , why cannot he -lo 
what he likes , including wha t is unjust and irrational? 
There ia, in fact, a grea t r elevance i : drawing t his pa~allel 
because Paine docs un:ierstnnd peo. le in ter ,,,s of the a t tributes 
generally ansi6ned to God . People are in civil societ y whnt 
~od is in t he universe . They , like Gol , have the ult"mate 
creative anj controlling power over a . l t hings political. 
All a uthority emanates from them an1 is regula ted and ultimt:t tely 
removed by them . Again, like Go1 , they are self- suffi cient 
in and do not need t o depend on any on e else for the 
wisdom t hey requi re for regulating t heir affairs . Wh tis 
more i mpor ant , tl.ey 'lre to ex•~rcise t li 1Jir sov•--rcign power, 
,1gni n , like Go 1, i'"' n~cor b.,ce 1-li th ' rencon ' nn i 'juntice ' 
~nl not 'will ' anl ' ple~sure ' ; thoy are t o act on a s t enly 
1 
' pr inciple', anl not on a fickle 'temper' . It ir:; in t iis 
t 1 at the answer to the question we h,ive just asked. i:3 to be 
oun l. Tbe i, dividuals in their oriEi'111l C•1r1 trrtct can so t up 
only a rep11blic . It is t heir c ommon loynlty to t••e pri r ciple 
of equal r iehts t hat unites t hem and ccmstitutos them into a 
c i vil boly ; equality is t .c principle of t ~eir civil 
existence or 0eing. To Jeny or to reject t his is for an 
i-1 i.ivi:iual or a. goverm,cnt or a nation t o be arbitrary and 
irrational, anJ tot· is it has no right, while it has positively 
u duty not to J.o ti,.i.s . 'l' ,ia binds all gunora.tions alike 
and o.cco:nmodates the idea of equal:l.ty between t her.1 , the 
equality cons:.sting i n t he equal obligation t o r espect and 
2 
uphold t he central pr i .ciple of t he r civil existence. It 
1. Ib'.i d ., 149 
2 . :;ee Wri tinf_';s II. i.lr7. ' )iseertnt1ons on Governm nt ' . See 
a l so 111.262. ' First i nciples ': ' though co~tinually exi sting, 
(a n~tion) i s continually i n a s t te of renewal and succession ; 
it ia n ver stationary, c.very day producos new births, 
carri s minors forwnrd t o mat urity an1 old persons frol'!l t he 
stage,'; ' t here is ever runnin,;:; flood of goneratione •. 
Despite these ' The state is s till the aruno state ', ' a p~,rpetu 1 
permanent bo<\y , always in being and still t he srune' . Thie is eo 
because al.l the changing generations rule by the aame 1es tabliabed 
principles•. 
rii:ty be a.sl:ed if, in ta.kin[" this position, ?lim was not 
rejecting his earlier vi0-w that no v,eneration c 1.11 ever 
bind another. The answr is in the negative . P .... ine 
wuld be c "'ltradicting himsoli' if \.lh'lt he had sri.id o'l.rlier 
meant that the first gener ation has tne freedo 1:1 to decide 
whether or not to ho. ve '.l republic; but he h.is :nid nothing 
of the kind. All generations are equally obliged to 
1:iainta.in the republic and operate within its t'enor .'.!. l 
framework; consistently with this, they all ..u.ike ,u-e free 
to introduce a.ny changes they deem I convenient 1 • 
To conclude, what w have t ried to show in thio and the 
last section :ts that in Paine ' s wrks two different theories 
of politics are discernible: (1) the natur:.11i;.; tic and 
(11) the r tionalistic . I n the former, interest is the 
principle of action in man~leading him into society: society 
io seen as organic and interdep.andent . Ea.ch individual is 
considered to have certain obligations to society that 
nriae from his nature ,o.nd are not contractual or volitional 
in ohar~cter. Further, society is able to ta!10 cire of 
itself because of the r ogub.r oper ,tion of its b.w:.1 th.:lt 
digest its various parts into a h~onious fr L ... o:.J:•~: ; a.s 
auoh, govornment ie superfluous and even dangerous. 1 
~;ociety ie the product of i ndividuals puruaing their 
interests, 1 •• entisfyi their wants; it is the ooonomio 
principle that thus gives it its existeno and unity. As 
a result the equality that i s moat emphasized is the equality 
jn the pursuit of ono'a interests, since it is this pursuit 
t hnt is int egrally cormocted with the natur of manJ l mv, 
if it should exist a t all, muot exist only to secure it . 
In order to ensure that l n o s this the la i-mllld.ng body 
must be composed of the repr ant tives of 11 the citizens. 
This leads to the advooa . of univors 1 suffr ge which thuo is 
ju tified int rms of individual ' s 1ntere t. Inequality i 
2 
condemned beoau e it is ' out of nature ' and hinders the smooth 
1. Here , howov r, there re t possible ye of introduoi 
th institution of government, should this b considered 
nooesoary. One my argue t hat, though aooiety .!,!! fully nelf-
ouffioient in principle, to not be oo in praotio as long 
as oortain e:d.sti ovil institution oontinue; government ' s 
rolo is tor ove thes nd, th the, ite lf • .Q!! one may 
argue that the chin of society ne ds 000 s ional rep re, a 
remov, l of clots that y et built up into its riou parts, 
etc., ad th t government is need d to do th so jobs. These 
rep irs , howavor, are to be.done and oan only be done in term 
of th principles t t nl ady r egul te them obine. 
2. Ibid., 79. 
fL.>w of , ..... t re in sociuty; once it i& renoved, J-,wr .. ':l.Il 
... 1tu.r;., , , h:.1 1 is not uJ.· i tsel.J. v.i.cio..w 1J •,ill &. ie tr nd 
·u,sert it::;elf . ·,n individu.Ll is to jud 0 e everytt1n__, in terms 
oi. Lis int ,rest ; he exa~.1lnes -4:.he co , ;.d co .. p.u-~ it ith 
the advar,t eos . 11 Tho criterion of poll tico.l j UJ.l . nt and 
cvalu*tion iu thus mainly economic in ch1r1ctcr. 1 " ery 
i.ian wishe.., t0 pursue his occup ,tion nd to enjoy ..,h' fruits 
01' his L;ourn und the produce of his property in peace 
J.r. saf uti ., J.na 1Ti th the lea., t o:... si ble expon c . lhen 
theso tr.ings n.l'e accokplL.he:, , all the object ... :or w:uch 
_:overument ought to be e tabllshed are nsuered. 1 
As to (ll) , i . e . the tiona.11,·tic theory of politics it 
t 1 au tw f'orros in him., the first of which is ul ost ignored2 
nd tho second much more fu.lly developed. ( ) In ito 
the 
first for.ii., /individual, as a ratioml ere ture, J.;;, co idered 
able to discover the general principles regulo.ti.., the 
universe., ad has an oblig tion,arisi froo hi~ o ligation 
to imit~te Goa, to dincover and act o then. "'cie tific 
st of society becom s very import 1t, since O r·tio 
ction l!nl.'3t be based on knowledge . Ther o is eterminisn 
s is plied in the M.tur li:Jtic theory; man is d tinguiohed 
f rom other el ments in the univ · o i t t tho~ ss ri 
and utom.=.i.tic J.J.y act i cert n r u1 r v , .'il ho ct 
1 . Ibid., . 1.. . 1 ... . , II. 197 • ., J.lso Ibi • 211 . 
2. i.e. the theory based on God the Benefactor, r eferr d to 
in the opening p..iragraph of section III . 
in consciou:. . ..::1re on.., ol' tue la\JS re.;cl tir..., h.ir::sclf .... nd 
tnc nature 01tsiclo. 1,.,._·, o.Z its polit.ic-1 iL1pHc•t:i.ons io 
th.atJ sinca nun as a r1tional oeing is actin,; c0 1sciouslyJ 
tne resulting harmony of 1.nter~sts is nut rutu.r 1 hut 
rational in ch-ract r . • s auch , th,.n e is a. Doc::.dbilit of 
ct.ishar:nocy an.l o occ sioru.l brco.kdoun, anu t. i::l l"l. .. ';cs the 
c,,.1creeacc of govermr.~nt easier to e ... iluin. (,)) In its 
aecond form , the r .tionJ.li:Jtic th ory a poara i.~ a theory of 
itural rights . Hunun roa.00 .1: restless until it re ohes 
the becinnine of thin.., wh re alone it f els o.t hone, 
cliscover:.-: that men wrc nll cra:..ted e ;ua.J. at tho beginning 
of ti e, o.nd that this equality applies with eqtw.l con6ency 
to all men born since. Deaides, to edstence pertain 
right : to nitur l existence natural ri hts, nnd tJ civil, 
civi •• Thase have to be secured~ nd he e the need of c1vil 
oociety th-t is ba ed on eql.18.lity. In this • _)rO'lCh the 
kind of equality th~t s significant is the equal ty in 
natural rights and, o. a. matter of secondary importance., the 
oqua.J.ity in civil righto since only throu h them can th 
equality in tural rights be secured and safeJU!U"'dod. 
Further, (,"OVernment here acts on the principle of republic 
and ims at ecuring the ri hts, nd ot on the pri iples of 
society a& in (1) and 11 ) . Governm nt a not ' a badge of 
lost innooence 1 , nor an iMtitutio ere ting ineqU!llity, but 
~:n~e in tho st.tc 
,;titution of civil nocicti :i....; for t:.c. 1mr._:ot,o o:.: u.kin.:1 an 
cqU;11in 4tio.1 oi' l)owers th..1.t shall .>e ,) ~r 11101 t,,, nd a 
._;Lnr·, ,toe of, the e u.ility of rie:1ts' •1 
(1) .,1 ·· e~ , J..,_ne ver-J clo .. e to \dau .Jr.rl.th; (11·) to 
~odwin or sou of tho .uei.:;ts, dopendine on ho\l r a ~son io 
.)recisaly understood; nd (lL 1) to the loo<lc.·n' 1. .tura.l 
Joth 1) 1nd (lLt) ro im licit i 
.Jeism, wllic.1 is ,uneru.olo to t"WO differ:! t interpret ltions: 
the wu verse as a mechanism can )0 concoi ved to bo so 
tJ.rra ed th.it each part necessari functions i:i certain 
way luJ.c.in.., eventually to ultim'lto overcu.l ru.tur:il h mony, 
~ one Nay dL,ti __;uish ,-lit n it man fron oth r olenents , 1.nd 
o. ect hiG, ~o a rational bei , or e~join on hir1 a dut , to 
~ct consciously in terms of the gen-r41 princi los ~nd the 
elicited intention.a of his M'iker. 
vor-J different manner of thinki 
from tho Deists. 
(llb) ro rcocnta a 
und distin uis os aino 
l ow, nll these t~ ;;;ie are to be ro in P Le "S ,10 h.:i.v 
noted earlier; they e , further, to • 1 • ,...,,. _,, o una. in ...... r...., ..u..,. 
his -works ,and can he seen lyi ill at eas in the same 
1 .. i ri tin,;;,13 , ol . m . 272• ' irs i ci les • . 
1 p ·i r ~ra d anJ , c1e1 , t he :• a.file se 0 tence • If , howev.r , a 
fairly broad generalisuti<Jn be per1r:ittod , one c ould say that 
( 1), i . e . the naturalistic approach to politics in 5eneral 
rul'l to equality in particular io reflected in ' The Ri.;l ts of 
Man ' pqrt 11, (11a) in ' The \Je of Reason ', anl (1 1b ) in 
' The Hights of Man ' part 1 s far as its political 
ir'1pl ·cat '. ons are c omcerncd, anl in ' Agrarill!l Justice ' so f nr 
ns its economic implications are c oncernel . In moral 
terms ( 1 ) will lea ·l to the morality of interest , ( 11a) to 
the morality of hen!icence or justice , depending on how 
Gol tho B nefactor is interpreted , nni (11b ) to t hat of 
rigl ts and justice.2 Even when (1 1a) is interpreted in 
t er ns of jw-, tice, it will be different from ( 11b) in as 
much the practice of justice here is entailed by the goodness 
of the a6 ent and not by any claims arising fro ,'.! the righ t.a of 
those treated justly as is the case with (11b); Go , for 
exa1n1 le , treats all men jus tly not because men have 
rights t hat God mus t respect, but because God is good . 
Similarly, a man ought to treat other men justly because 
- ---------------- -----------------------
1. Ibid ., H.O. L. 11 . 212; Laws der i ve t heir authority ' from 
the justness of t heir pr inciples~ tho intereot which a 
nation feels therein .' 
2 . In terr'ls of the three Gods we talke of earliur, ( 1) here 
will correspond , broadly speaking, to God the original giver 
of Motion, (11a) to God the Benefactor, an (11b) to God the 
Creator o Man . 
., 
vv ,, .,o ~oo,.. .r:i. es frou the _;J:do:.~ obli.;c1tion to i .it""'to 
"rod.. ...-<l ( llJ) ., on th" other h..mu.., trJ..1.t::. n._; otLJr~ j U~ tly 
. t . C Jd.Gl.S Q .: .. -1 The:.;e 
1,r wtise ju...;tice c ..... 11 u.ri.,e .:rom tLl, s.:.n_,lc : wt t:.s.t u.:a nen 
,n·e o:1i.l'..ll , aaJ th..i.t ao 0ne is <1 1,un .in uiy 1 :,u_ l,.cior docr~c ' . 
_,;: tliv o!:llit:,.ttion to pructi:.;o justice. 
:i. n terr,,s of the tr.0orieo of t.Ki c..,li ty they ir.iply., all 
tlrr,:ie see,.i iruuoqun.to to r,10 • , • ., to (1) , oq...:1.lity 
. aro centres rouru.l tho idea of intare..,t; but intoro..;t is 
j~t ..:.i. .,.'or,J th .. t tho t;;c.ier,,l i.Jri:iciple of 1Jotion ta~.es d. it 
The ;irinciple of :.otion equally obtains 
iii the uni-.rer..,e ..1t l.iri;c , .ino.1~ in.:1.ni,:ute objects ( where it 
... .J the _)rinci_,10 •.J' ~rmri tation) ,s o.lso anon:3 pl mtn a'!:1d 
u. tl~il:.i.ls; oesicles, it a.;.)pears a.non.,; u.,tlm..11s in precisely the 
SJ.:ne for1:i as in menJ si:1ce a.ri.m .. ls too have want::; which 
notivate their :ictions . · hy then should e un.li ty of 
tre.;;1.tment 0e confined only to men? and i,hy sr.ould w not 
tu~'-e tha interests of a.ni.mn.ls as of equal importance i,ith 
our ow This is also true of (lla) . God howers Eis 
,Je:1efi ts not just u on men but also upon a.nima.l.s and pb.nts 
1.:1d mountains and rivers ; why should a man, thon,confine his 
7 1 
( l.L. '· ) ; ,. nl, o , , .. ~ ct .,_ o _._ 11e ) -v ... \,, .... ..... _._ .) J u v • 
.. . Fl ur e equal .Jecc1::se of tLc t.H1,-,li ty of 
t,;teir ori._L1, ~tnd h3.vo :...turul ri~)1ts i..,suin_; p_·cc1sely :.ram 
1.. i:., f u.ct . .Lt --1t1i nls , ctc . , too .. ro the era ,tion of God, 
n:1d thw., shs.re equn.lity o.i' oriein not only :itL. mD another 
out e..lso ,r.i. th men. J 11 this doeo not mean th .. ::.t P .. ino is 
not j U3tL'ied in ta.i.Jr...in6 of equality o.f nen. 
houevcr, ..ic:.n is that tho vorJ i,;r ound on which thh equ.tlity 
r estLJ requires that other elemants , or , rorro\Jil\:, tho field, 
oth0r '.Jei'1Gs in the universe too should be con.niJ.-:r-Jd equal 
not o:ey m.1on~ thonselves ~mt aloo w"ith non, a... thJ.t P.ino 
ca::mot accept one im licution ind rafunc to nccopt the other 
::hich too follo\-ra from precinely the same genoriJ.l principle . 
ln the a.::.,sei1ce of any discussion by him of t his queot1on, the 
o...vis,rer to .it hc.s to oe reconstructed out of \.mt he Jays in 
other contexts , and one can only hope trut he 'I.Ould have 
oeen consistent envugh to give some such answer . He could 
say that man is a rational creature, r eason oaing the 
property distinguishing him f rom the rest of t ho creationj but th9t 
anim3.ls do not have reason ,which thus could provide a basis 
for drawing a qualitative distinction between men and 
animals . Even this, however, would create difficulties . 
I <liots1 mad men and others lack reasoI?,; a.re they not ,then, to 
--------------- --, 
be denied e r~uality uith oth(;r nen ,ar!d tre').ted on par 'With 
non-.• uJ1 .... n ..Jeing::i't 1:-1.in<J doas not ·,rJ 11t to no.J thi::: c.s he 
recomnends kinc.1ness , judice, etc . , to .ill men 'l- ike . 'hit 
he could, an<l I think would., say is th1t reason ch1racterises 
man as a s~ecies, and that, therefore, mn as a species is 
superior to other species; this ,~uld mean both th~t oqu1.lity 
wuld !10t nsod to be extended to non- hum.1n bei. '"'LJ in the 
universe, and aloo th:lt even a mad r.ian could not b3 tre t~d 
on p r with :J.n anir:.13.1 since, though mad., he is still a i:J. , a 
member of the species mn. Even uhen, ho v r, .:,.n 1 wcr 
on thes lines is .:;iven it remains unsatisfactory. a.ina 1s 
6eneral coount of e w.lity on such an answer uill r t on 
two sep1rate principles, the principle of re son and the 
rinciple of specie3 . ~. as a species has re~~on, and, 
therefore, o mlity or beneficence is to be confined to men 
onlyJ all men bolong to the same species , a.nd ... re o. titled to 
cq,1ality a.mon0 tl 0. 1Selvos . In Jhort, the pri~iple. of 
reason does the negative · ob of e ·clusing non- hum:i:1 beings, 
and the principles of opecics does the positive job of 
establishin.; o ualit among nen themselves . hOW1 it is 
not clear wh t reoise relatio1 hip obt ins bet~~on these 
t,ro principles . •urther , if e uality of men roots on 
t eir belonging to the a.me species, th re imply is no point 
in t all'..ir of the ua.lity of ori in as the basis of the 
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tL_t .:.t i..., r cisel this e11u.1.lity of ori ·::..n t ... t L ,1c nt 
b:; s inJ t .. '~ t men belo,1..; to the s,i.:1e ::; 1Jecics • 
•. ..;wevcr, ·..rould not clo in that all thv ei;1.;s in the universe 
::~::love tho scJ..we oric;in_., a 1d y1.:t do not u :.01\; to t .e o'. e 
::;_ ecies . ...,ono principle or urounc otlur th .n the e ..t11ity 
c:' ori i.. ,Jill have to be introduced; a"'ld Jth ) l,he 
cqu.:ility of men would come to rest o. it rather th non the 
c uality of oriein. Finally, since t_1e exclusion of o 
h man Jein,_;::; co11es to rest on reas , the tur.1liutic 
t·1eor of )Olitics th'.1t we ho.vo :ilr dy noted in uno will 
be purticcl<l.rly imd uate in as ~uch a_ it is i. ... tcrest th:it 
./ 
.:s for it tho doni.ru.nt pr·inci le of h n li.1. o_,, '1 r 3S on 
pla.y3 onl suboidi role . 
V 
IW1.'.::,RP~1..'.,TATiOld Ol PUdE 
In the li;ht of this discussion,ue may examine, from t he 
standpoint of equality, tho three mD.jor interpret tiona of 
P"Line that are commonly advanced, and that see him either as 
a f'rimi ti vist or as a Deist orJ finally.) as a. Quaker. All of 
then have been advanced with considerable f orce, and nearly 
all the commentators on Paine can be interpreted as 
subscribing to one or the other of these three . Hha.t each 
of these claims is that it is primitivism or Deism or 
iua}cerism that is t he central principle of unity in Paine 1 s 
system of i deas , and t hat it i s this alone t hat offer s a 
coherent and adequate expl ~nation of all its various parts . 
Lois l.Jhi too/ advances the. pri..mi ti vist inter retation of 
Paine . He understands primitivism as the belief that the 
earliest condition of man and of hun~n society w o the best. 
Paine 1s ' panucea ', he ar gues, ' is t he characteristic 
primitivistic one : go back to ture, study man in the 
earliest st'lgea of his erl.stence; fim out the laws of 
nature; simplifylt 2 Further, he •uses nearly everyone of 
the primitivistic presuppositions s the sis of a 
prophecy of unJ1mitcd progross,• 3 these bi the nature-art 
1. ' Primitivism and the I dea of Progress •, 1934, . 
2. Ibid., 227. 
3. Ibid. 
distinction, the faith in simplicity, tho di approval of 
novelty nd inventions, the negative character of evil, th 
natur 1 ha.rmoey between 's reason and Truth le ding to 
the prediction of the ultima.te triumph of the tter, etc •• 
ov, thi interpretation of nine can be ~uestioned on 
a numb r of unds. Unlike the _rimitivists, Paine rejects 
the idea o£ a tat of nature; what is more, he completely 
separat s this idea from that of natural right which ho does 
accept . To establish these rights he appeals to the primordial 
fact of the coming of th first man from the nds o God, nd 
he does this eoause it repres nts th first emergeno of man, 
also th first aIXi the last dir ct link bet en and 
GodJ there is no ppe 1 here to any fir t state of the histo-
rical xi teno of man in the primitiviot sense. This is 
further confi d by Paine I e insi t nc that the Cre tion or 
th first mergenc of man 1 not process t t oocurr done 
and for all, but is in te d continually repo ted in the cs of 
h individ 1. Besid s, what he gt out of this rcise 
is not n, hi torical oondi tion to -which n e to return, but 
at of universal norms wherewith to val t a reconstruct 
the xi.sting societies . a result, ts is that 
1th principle of r p lie ' tr ctly er t o; thi 
t e highest politic 1 value for him, a.nd is not 1 c ted in aey 
pr soci 1 or pr -cont ctual exist no of man. n the 
other F ine, the rutura.lfot .. s we luve c.tlled him, i not 
cU,1e 1.able to t' e primitivi::.t inter retation. .' s 
w.tur..1.list, he a simil tee nan and society to nature. Man 
th'J.t -ire 
act on the principle /n ..... tu:rol to h....rn , ... nd t t '""re in d.irmon,y 
wit' those regul.ting t c J.niverse; s to society, it is to 
be org ni ed in a that leaves completely undisturbed the 
operations ol' the :n...tural princi ples in ma... . There is nothing 
primitivistic a.Jout this . o far ·· s e uali ty is co earned 
an ttempt to eat blish it in society, therefore, do a not 
represent an,y return to sone p1·i ti ve e :ili t, ria.n nner of 
existence; and the stan · of eva.lu....ting existin socin.1 
inequalities is not found in ouc pri.r.ti.tive existenco, but 
r ther in certain universal and ti eless principles. 
1~e now turn to the C...uaker interpret tion of Paino, 
whic 1 i ildvancu by s blest bio 1 ap. er, Com-my. He 
argu that ina emphasi es, like th uakers, the.., credness 
and the inviolability o.: I!lan, and ma· es it tho b sis of his 
theory of e lit.; . Like the , gain he understands reason 
as I tur 1 li ht vi hin1, and its oper tions as intuitive 
rath r t 1 scu ive in characte • H too wants freedom and 
democracy) and reduces religion t o mor s as they do . Now, 
1. ine, h: say , io ' explic ble o~ by the intensity of his 
.• uakerism', '1. D. Con-way: ' Life of ain ', 'ew Yor ~, 1892, II, P. 201. 
urthor, ' aine ' politic principle wero evolve out of his 
early ' :ua.kerism. He vas potent ial in George Fox•. 
77 
there i s no denyinJ the fact th:lt t .. ero is much th1t is 
co on between him and the uakers . ill.a fa.thor was of ' a 
.Utlker profess ion• 1, and ho himself ~rofessed deep admiration 
2 f or the •moral and benign p rt I of the ·uaker thought . He 
sru d maey- f eatures o ... tl.~ir thought , such e their 
humanit ri nism, their belief in the fatherhood of God und 
the brotherhood of all me~ (though with some reoorv~tions) , 
their concern for equality of all men ( gain with ome 
reservations) , their toler nt attitude tooth r sects and 
f iths, 3 their concern for the dignity and the inviolability 
of the individ , nd their rejection of the clergy as the 
medi tor betwen man and God. However, the differences are 
much gre ter, and.Jeven ~hen there are agreementsJthay largely 
follow fro ver di£ erent philosophical premises . e may 
state some relev nt biographical detail .. first. Paino ' s 
f ther 1marri out of meeting 1,a.nd had been ' expelled 
i'l'om the society14; he himself ws never actively affiliated 
with the uakera, and they had refused his ple on death-bod 
to be uried with their brottr e n. There is also a 
difference in tho ethos pervading the tw syst I!lS of ideas . 
l . Clark,. Loo . cit ., A. ... • 1. 273 • 
2 . Ibid., 276. 
3. Ibid., 326. 
• c. 0 :' Life o Thomas aine ', London, 18J.4 ., p. 33. 
~uakerism is broddly churacterised bJ humility., gentleness, 
Godf aringness., concern 'With the i'ree om from slavery to t ho 
flesh., preoccupation with sel:f-conqu st., etc •• The tenper 
pervading uine 's ystem i s almout the opposite., and his 
attitude to the existL _; 1 stitutions, nearly all of which he 
considers evil; is one of intolerance and arrogance . His 
intellectuo.l appro ch to the men wose i deas ho disagrees 
with is rude and abusive . Besides, he both attacks a.nd 
defends the uakers on the Deist grollnd., saying th.it hi 
ound for preferring uakerism is thi t it 1 pproaches the 
ne rest of all other3 to true Deism11, but that 'they have 
contracted themselves too much by leavi . the \JOrks of God 
2 
out of their systeru, ' and do ot appreciate ruture as the 
revelation of God ,and taKe a very con:fined vieY of Him. 
a.ine re ks 1 ••• if the taste of o. uaker could have 
been consulted at the creation, Yhat a silent and dr b-
c ~loured ere tion it would h ve bee I Noto. flowr 'WOuld 
' have blossomed its gaieties nor a bird been permitted t o sing. 
The main differences between the two s they rel te to 
equality seem to be as follows . The ers do not seek t o 
secure the inviolability of the individ equality 
among these individWJ.ls , through the notion of tural rights J 
1. en 'When he is thus a ~ er, he i so because he is a Dei st . 
2. C rk., Loe . cit., .o. • I • 2!76. 
duty, not right, i::i the import. nt categor of t eir thot;.,_,ht . 
Josicles, tlu., i 1violabi.dty is esta.blishod through the 
.;1.1c1·udnes of the soul, and) since e ch has a svul 'Which is 
oqu.a.J.ly a.crod, all are equal. aine, s we havo seen, 
or.phasized the equalit., of origin, the art o rg ent the 
"uakors do not make • or the , e ch individual receives 
.:.iJht from Go; Christ, the spirit of God, existe greatly 
in Jesus, 1 out it had always existed in men,; for mo t 
uakera, this light exists in equal measure in all men, 
is of the sa.oo qmlity or nature in the believers and the 
unbelievers alike . This points to a. further difference, 
i.e . an epistemological one between the t\.lO• 'i. owledgo of 
right and wrong, for the ~'llakersJ is obtain d through the inner 
light , which oper tos when man• s mi is sile t , nd hence the 
sanctity o silonce is emphasised . P ine 1 s epi te logy, on 
the other hand, em hasizea ratio 1 reflection and empiric 
OJservation,and, as such, he can cl.im to offer 1 . tural 
proof ' o ny of his th sea . Thou.ch he does sa:r, not unlike 
the 1 ors, that ' knowledge ' of morality ' exists i every 
conscie ce ', 2 he does not seriously maintain it as it 
is t entirely in harmoey with his predominantly ratio ist 
ethico . Connected with the uakers• vi w of silence is 
1 . ilip s. Belasco : 1 uthority in Church and .:>tate • , 
Lor.don, 1928. l4f' . 
2. Cl ark., Loa . cit. , A.O. R. 11. 328. 
their emph sis on small me,. tin ·s w e-·e ~ senero.l s onoo of the 
meeting ' c n b o mo!'e -:.!::111 ;,r rrivcd at LnC: wh re members can 
more adequate l y subrli t t hemed vcs to ' rh vi r o guid noo ' nd 
deliberate in th!'!t r.•pi r i t. One of t 11G c __ , > fl:riae of th 
emphaa o to cons9nnus i 3 tht t vo t i n~ is r \l~d out as a 
mech .,, nic?.l coll:1 :,i on cf f orce f: in ;:hicr ' ';h 1 rge ma ss' of 
i ndividu 3l s , ev~il ~ and 1h0r e f or e~ n \ ~3otitu e decides the 
i s sue; the, ker s r e therefor co 
the ' sen e 1 01• thn 1 vai ,ht 1 f th o ccti 
an intereetinr in e~lit"ri~n im li,a io, . 
t0 disoover 
Thi has 
Tb h all 
members in n:r n eti , have an n.l orrt o,1 ... rinaaure of 
inner light, i t i clcmr or in omo 'lbn o~ o.l'io more 
c~pable of eli ~it 1~ and rpr sai n, it · to these wiser and 
more :x:peri nc . rne b r fT "t r ·,r : ht i~1 to be given, and 
this i s w. /'\ t u ti:ni' iioeo not do . p., ino ' n nd .:irstanding of 
equality, on t e other .nnd t i c mo " r lf voting ie 
emphasiz ed , and vi t h :i.t t he prinei -;,l o m .. o i ty. Ha, 
of cource, ahl" r e t e <;.u leer erop o i G and wants the 
wise t ~ i eld po1er ; thi i, 1 f act, the reasons 
un erlying hi reference for repre"'on , tivn ,overnment, :But 
he r ej ects t e e" cf zivinc dditi on 'l .:-, i t;:ht ge t o their 
votes. There -; . ono o t e diff erence szi '1 J. that arises 
out of this . S nee Mnnensu so rtRnt to the 
ker vie of olitics, an indivi ~l n nb 1r who consistently 
and oompletely di ssents from the deoisions of the meeti is 
'o I 
to be I cliso.med I by 1 t . He cannot be forced or condemned, 
andJ et., unanimit must be preserved; 1 disownir1J ' l him 
·Jrovides n way out, as it preserves the unanimity, and abaolvoa 
the individua.l from the responsibility .for tho actions ho 
disa es with • ain- has othin,g to do with this . 
.i.._'-l.j ority binds all concerned, and minority IJIU5t ud:, o-wledge 
as its o,m any decision m.:de by mo.jority. Firutlly., so far 
as his view of re son is concerned., ~~ine is not ~nd c~n ot 
be a consistent uaker precisely because he is also Deist . 2 
The universe is a book where the i tructions of God are 
printed; ma needs no special ' inner light ' ao his senses 
and reason are enough. Besides, r eason operates in a 
g~omotrica.1 manner, i . e . it pprohends general principles 
1. 3eloaco. , Loc . cit . , 116 ff . 
2. See in thia connection Tinda11 s criticiso of tho ~.J.'l.kors in 
' Christi nity us old us ere tion' , Lo on,1730 -p. 161-2. The 
vuakers., c.ccordin to him, treat ' light uithi ' as o. ' principle 
of action distinct from reason y hicl ill are governed in 
rattero of religion.' Though Ti 1, like Pi , ad res 
tleir 1 good so e ' , hc \JU ts these ' onseleos notions ' to eo. 
His criticisms ro In!linly three : (1) tho r U!.1.kers are right , 
men ' destitute of all re son1 should .·now all ttors of r ligion; 
11) 1 \.lhat it (i . e . light within) is or ho~ it op~rates ' io not 
told; (iii ) the uakors deJ t e · ottle t e_r o.u.tters , not 
t hrough any such light but through rea.son, \\1hich t hus is the 
highest authority even for them., tho h they do not openly acknowledge 
it. 
deduces specific moral norms from them; this ic very 
tlif.'erent from the nature of the '-'uaker •inner l ight• • 
. ~e may now turn to the Deist interpretation of uine , 
advanced mo..;t forcefully by Clark~ and which, in ny view, is 
more adequate tha the o·: .. hor two . he ~eists were not a 
close-knit band of people with a unified system of thought, 
and widely diso.greed on a number of import111t mattoro . 
v:hat I propose to do is to identify a set of general 
philosophic~l views that nearly all the Deiots held ,and that 
gave them a certain identity,distinguishing them from others, 
particularly from t hose they war fighting against . I shall 
then go on to elucidate the theory of equality implied by 
these views ,and examine how and in wh.3.t respects Paine ' s 
theory is at divergence with it. 
Deism took as its starting point not the ides of God 
(as with the Chriatians) , nor the indivi ua.l himself (as with 
tLe Cartesian rationali ts and the 1el ssic 1 1 ompirioists 
ouch as Locke, Berkeley and Hume), but the no.turo of the 
universe . or the Christians the universe ia int lligibl e 
only as a creation of God, who thus io l ogically prim:i.ry. For 
Descartes, Locke and others we do not have a complete 
certainty aoout the existence and the nature of the world, 
the 
while we do have such a certainty., in\ case of ourselves, be it 
1. H. II . Clark., Loe . cit ., Introduction, :m., XXI. 
through our 'idoao ' or ' sensatio '1S ' • The Deints did not 
shar3 thi::, scenticism. The wrl, in there for us to ::me; 
it is not an illusio nor its e:;iste 1ce matter of inference. 
.L 1 short, t.10 had a realist episteruolocY• As ma~ is a part 
of tho u..'1i.vorse and is ::..,1 . ul.lest epistemological hamocy 
,rlth it, he could observe and study it vi.th hio n'ltural 
se.l!Jcs and re son, thouch the empha"is was norc on re oon 
than on senses . i.Jith tho help of these, and without the 
need of any personal revelation ;ma.1 cli.,covers tho e.dstenco 
of God. For some, he co uld o.loo discover Hie attributes ; 
1 others were doubtfi..J. . t they all aGreed a.bout w.s that 
He was the creator of the universe, 2 ws sep- ate fror.i it, and 
1. Tolland in ' Christianity not ?•;yotorious 1 says, 1wo 
con rehend nothing better than his (i . e . God ' s) ttributes 1 
( . 86); but see Paine, ' I~ason can discover the one (i . e . 
Jod ' s existence) , but it falls infi. · toly short in discovering 
the whole of the other (i . e . His attributes ) ', Clark, Lo'c' .cit. , 261. 
2. Thia is how God was understood by the Deists, and not as 
the first intelligible principle like the Good of Plato, or as 
the self-thinking Thought o:f Aristotle,or as the infinite 
substance of 3pinoza. 
ws good and wise . Many thought th:l.t once having made the 
universe, He never interfered with its operations; others thought 
he did from time to time. This involved the Deists in an 
interesting controversy. God is r ational and cts according 
to natural laws . Now, our knowledge of these laws informs us 
tru.t, by the very nature of things, a perpetual motion ma.chine 
can never be built, Even God, therefo e, could not build it, 
and will have to step in from time to time for repairs, o.nd 
thus cannot be a completely I idle spect tor1 • This view, 
r ather than the ona insisting on the complete subsequent with-
drawal of God from the universe, seem to be more compatible 
with the general Deist position. Some even argued that He 
could not be invoked to guarantee either the validity or the 
op ration of moral 1 we, and emphasized the rational eloment 
in the oblig tion to obey them; others; llke Voltaire>understood 
God as punishing evil and rewrding good nd thereby guara._nteeing 
the reign of moral laws, and thus emphasized the religious 
element in the oblig tion to obey them. As to the nature of 
the universe, th D iste generally arg d that it s a 
self-contained mechanismt and could bee lained, onoe its 
origin was cone ded, in terms of its ovn regular lawJ the 
usual analogy- was that of wa.toh.1 This involved a 
l . This would imply that the Deist v:5:ew 0£ God as the creator 
or the great Mechanic or the ster Craftsman we something 
most likely to follow f rom man' s image of himself as eeeential:cy' 
homo r ber, 
rejection of tho const.J.ntly interferin;; 0city, ' ·· local 
ousybody ' in favour of one who is □ore like ' an absentee 
ln.ndlorcl 1 • 
All t his in terms of its social and politicr:l or sinply 
human implications neant, among other trd.n6s , conferring a. 
great r espectJ.bility on science., identif:rin;; religion und 
ci.orallty, anthropomorphising God where what God \l.'.l.S like 
and vlhat He could and could not do was determinad in tho 
1i6ht of ~h1t man ws taken to be like in his 1. turc and 
abilities, 1 knowing tLo ru.tu.re of a thing only through 
ascertaining and observing its achievements and opcrations ,and 
dismisoi _; any aspect or fe turo of it th t lacks this 
. 
tangible embodiment or publicly observable dimension, 
insistence on the possibility of a science of society, a.."ld a 
plea f'or un integration o.f man with naturG and enjoining on 
him a positive obligation· to achieve it . Most Ceists 
i ~10isted on the uniform possession of reason by ~11 men. 
Reason was seen as nomethinJ fund .... oontal and const.::.nt in the 
generic constitution of man, though its exercise could be 
obscured by prejudice, self-interest, or false nosociations : 
the :rneta.,.;hor b.rgely oi:1ployed wEJ th .. t of a ' li~ht 1 
temporarily obscured by a ' veil' uhich, when tri.ken off, pormi t t ed 
1. It means reducing the difference betwee1 man and God to 
0~1e of degree, and rejecting t he customary one of '.kind. 
the li 0 ht to ' ~hino ' .;r.in • Since re on ::i.s i ,lentical in 
.:.11 .::en :.ey i10ulu all cone. up \.1.th the so.rte tr ..... th. 'l'h.i.s 
.LI'!plied an ultiroto u.."liformity of the r:oral ic.leal, .md I de 
..1ll differ~n.ces suspect . Cowrersely, nothin[; ws 
considered valid and tr,to that waa beJoiu:l t he comprohonsion 
of I the phln man' ; truth nust be I level with every mn' s 
::.other-wit 1, .J.lld bo proportioned I to the mounest underst1nding ' •1 
This led to the emphasis on sir 1plici ty nd th roj ection of 
all intric.1to rea.sonin..;, and required that all expl nations 
and justifications of evo ts and actions e given in terms 
of general principles as the7 wore t he aim lest to asp and 
enoiest to de 1 with. It is import nt to remember that the 
oquality in reason thut is attributed to all men is eqUll.lity 
in practic 1 reason or reason as necessary for pr ctical 
purpooes, and not in theoretical or sciontific reason in 
which nen differed very uidely; not a.11 wore believed 
c pable of becoming philooopher::; or scientists . God is eood, 
w.;1.nto his creo.turcs to be happy, a.nd therefore has endo d 
t hem all alike ,nth reason adeq\l.3.te to t s purpose . ~ en 
in the porcoption of sinple and goner pr~ctical truths, 
however, ind:u.ctriouones3 , leisure, prejudice- free rnind ,etc . 
are needed, ~nc.i those not all men have at present . They 
all are, of course, to have theo eventually,but., i tho 
1. Bolingbroke : :Orko, 1793, Vol .V. P. l0J-4 . 
.10,rntl.,ne, .;one tr..10 are uorc equipp.ad are to le:ici :ind guido 
t.ne roat . 
Tie theory of eq'U-.!.lity tho.t follov from thcne vjo rs 
;ould have; t.1a following features . (1) A oolicf in the 
ease 1tial e _uality of 2.1 ... e in pr.:ictical rca$om 
11) 'I'hc universality oi t1oral prL1ciplef , or t.hoir being 
tnc oru:ic for all men at all times d in all .1 cos a 
111) Comprehensibility of truth to all minds1 thm implyin::; 
' co:.100 . sus ;entium' as the standard of it. lV) l '.ortl 
uality of all .en coQsi~tine in all big ntitlcd to cq 
resp~ct and consideration (V) p~raistont tcnde. :r, 
thoUGh ever fully artic.ll1tod, to est blioh eq lity bet\.1Cen 
1 
•• 
0 n and God • God is bound by tho turo.1 hws os man is • 
l . A colL'ir.;ii t.1on of this !ll.J.Y be foil! d in tl o f. ct that most 
answers to the JeiLts Here inspired by a desire to est blish the 
q t'lli tati ve superiority of God over nan, "nd, with th:i.t, His 
inscrut bility; justice s His at'bril:mte m.s consequently 
underplayed, o.nd the view tmt . n c n and o ht to imitn.te God 
vas rejected . 3ee e . g . • 3rowne : 1"'hings oupcrru tural o.nd 
JJi vino concoi ved by analogy ui th Things N turul and Human', l 733, 
p . 2.37, 269 o.nd 3.33. Browne, it uill be rene!:'lbcrod, as 
a 1swerinc Tolland ' s 'Christianity not 1~ terious 1 • This concern 
.'..3 also revonled in .\rchbiohop IJynge ' . Sllor to Tolland in 
appendix to his ' A Go tleI!la!l' s ligio ' • 
·.,_rue, Ha is the original Do.;;ii:;nar, and hence h:l;:; , or uettor 
ha.d, cuporiority o,.rer men; . but, ove".1 in thi.; rospect., His 
su1)oriority is not that · r r~at since ,:1an, in desl~ning 
a.chines, is ucti~ on the same pril"'.ciplos as He unce did, 
and thu..:; is re )eating o.rn.l continually re-Jn~ctin:.; His original 
anu archetypal act . As Paine said, ' The man who 
proportions the oeveral parts of o. nill uses the mi.r.~e 
scientif'ic principles '.ls if he had the power of construct ing 
a u..."livorse' . In fact ., there see .:S to be an underlying 
assumption that making machines is tho mo;:;t God-like activity, 1 
and that man is er.forming u religious activity and discharging 
a religious obli ution in makin_; tools nd mchines , in as 
much a.s he is apprehending and acting on the gonerul 
principles of the universe, is giving them a concrete 
existence through rel ting various objects otherwise totally 
unconnected with e:...ch other, a d all t · n with a view to 
b.)· efiting manl:ind. (Vl) A refusu.l to extend equality t o 
o.theists . l early all the lleists were a'"rroed in calling 
atheists ' fools ', s Derham said, 1 so nanifeat a demonstr tion 
of a Deity are the J,:otions of the Heavens nd ""' rth that if 
:men .9.Q. not sec than, it is a sign of great stupidity,; and ii' 
they will not sea, nd be convinced by them, it i s as lain 
l. This may go to reinforce the point we made e:trlier about 
the relation bet woen man ' s sell'- inugo a.s homo faber and his 
view of God as the 1 ster Craftsman. 
1 ~ wign o~ thBir prejudice .'.l.Ild perverse css .• 0uch men 
.;ere ot to be tolerated, a.nd e ualit was not -: o 'oe extended 
to them. 2 (Vil) An insistence on tho I rule of law'. 
mitation of God consists in promoting eneral ~ood o.s this 
is wm t God lirulclf does; besides, an God doeo t l·rl.o according 
to general luws ,ma.n too i s to promote general r;ood according 
to general l_ws . This leads to ,mat has come to oe c lled 
1rule-utilitarianiom• . , 11 inequalities in society are to 
be justifi eu or condemned in terms of general good conceived 
in terms or general rules ap~lied inp rtially to all. 
oliticully speaking, all arbitr ry ule, tyr nny, despotism , 
etc . were ruled out, and the government of laws became al l 
important . he Dei ts, however, ,-rcre not as united in their 
positive preference for a particular form of government. 
Some nted a 1 mixed government 1 wh re diff'e nt parts stood 
in a de init relationship t o one another, and created concord. 
ome were more happy with an ' enlightened despotism• understood 
us a ~orm of gover ent in which a mon~rch ruled accor ng to 
t e general laws discovered by him from the study" or the 
univ r e; this w.a believed t o resemble the w-a..y in which the 
universe its 1£ was eoverned. Soma few i nsioted on tho 
pr sent ti v gov r ent as alone consistent wi , t he Deist 
metaphysics . 
1. ' Physico - Theology•. 1715 , P • 70 . 
2. In t his oonneotion, see Tindal ' Rights of the Christian Church', 
p. 12, wher e he says t hat the social contract gives t he legislator 
a right to punish the 'Wicked, and t hat he is, therefore, j ustified in 
chastising at heists, blasphemers and profane persona . 
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in society, or to an initial setting up of a political 
mechanii:;m by a Legislator uho, then, completely disappears 
never to return. The l atter, on the other hand, would imply 
th~t a government is to set up an initial framewrk of laws 
that all the members of the society -would abide by, and then 
is to intervene from time to time when repairs ar called for . 
This latter viev could also drav, witho t1t creating any 
significant difference in the nature of the argument, a 
distinction b t en the First Legislator who will set up the 
political machine, and the subsequent govermnent ho will then 
conduct the neoess ry rep ira in the light of the laws laid 
dow and the purpose intended by the Legie tor. Now 
Paine I s theory of government, mainly the one b sed on the 
idea of mtural rights, cannot be fitted into this scheme . 
Government for him is ·the result of a cont ct entered into 
for securing the natural rights of individuals; this 
determines the nature of the activities government is to 
engage in, as also the scope of its authority. The idea 
of natural rights is central to Paine, but not to Deism. 
Besides, eve \.lhen a Deist does talk of such rights his 
ma. er of deriving them is vory different f'rom Pine ' s, and 
tho implications he draws from them re, again, very different . 
For Paine, government is not only to make laws, provid security, 
etc ., but .is also to impose taxes, and distribute the money among 
the people in such weys as are consistent v.i.th their na.tur 
_;_~i..;hto • ,i. Deist does not assi_; 1 ouch o. role to govcr•·ne.1t . 
.. •urt. er, , ~ei:Jt looks :1-c the univor:;c, infers the oche11e of 
.JOC:, n determines uh t rights a m 1 nu:.,t Invo to ru1:11 his 
.:..1t01 dad role . P;1ine too does tnhi, .:>Ut then goes on to 
c.Jpeal to tho creation o.: r:1.a.n or the be i.mi~; of ti .. o, n.nd, 
,.Jh...t is r:ioro, seos each act of birth 3.S .1 re-c'1!l.ctne:1t of this 
origirol ct . Besides, it i~ the ri~'ts thus derived th:lt 
re priruc.ry, a.ltl evorytn.in...; else, duties, 1 ws, oblic tions, etc . 
follows fr•:H:1 them. For a Deint, on tho other h.:i.. , the 
universe is an ordered whole . " n individual r.u 1 is o. p rt 
of it,and has certain dutieo towards it; like God, he is to 
promote general good, nnd this is his h:i.~hest obligation; the 
emph:isis thun is on man' s duties rather than on his rights . 1 
1. Jee e . g . Ti'1dal, I.oc . cit . p . J,31.ff . He quoteo t length 
Clark ' s SUill.l ,12:ry of th8 Dei:::;t ponition where Chrk :;hows how,, 
f)r a Doiot, non are ' to pronotc the h ppiness of other s ' 
' .:1ccordin::; to the e ::tent of their oovcrul .owero and a ilities t; 
Tindal a.ddo, ' The Deists, no doubt, irlll own th1t the Doctor 
has done them justice ' (331) . He himself a.mph, sizeo man' s 
duties nnd not rights (IJid.) Soe also Bolinubroke, ' F cments 
or ·11nutes of Es:;nys 1 , pn-ticularly . - XVI : he rejects the 
idea of contract,and finds the origi of society in fa.miJ.3'; he 
·"· urther, does not t alk of right::, but <? duti □ , and \f.l. ts man in 
society to bohave tow.rds e ch other as men·crs of a r ly. In 
'The Idea of a Patriot King•, he even speaks of ' a patriarchal family 
where t he head and all the members are united by one common i nterest 
and anim::l.ted by one connnon spirit.' 
'lhis iu J.lso seen in tho lJeist attitude to eqmlity. Tindal 
u...;rr,cc wlth '.:;lal"l: 1hen the latter ta.' .. es tho Doiot position 
·,.o ir.iplyinc ttn.t a no.n is to 1 suboit to his superj.oro in all 
t ju.Jt ,.nd ric;i1t tluncs for the preser-v,~tion of aoc::.oty •• ft , 
1 ju::...t J.rul ho.1est •.• in . .:J.l hio dealil'lt;S with :us eqll1.ls ' 
1 
~nd tow:rc.~s hio inferior□ to be so 1tle and 'dnd 1 • Jeism., 
ihou,)1 co.1cer:aod to est~blish a moral J.nd a bn.sic <lei:;ree of 
i 1tellectU3.l equality !l.f.101-ig men, h-:i.d no intorust in uey 
:,rocr::i.r:u10 of social o.nd economic c u•1.lity, and even the 
:-.1oro.l oqunli ty was not rooted in ~ rm.n I s ' riiht ' to be 
treated equ:tlly with others . .:e h,r,e ::io much corac to 
a.ssociate the idea of nechn.nism with tho idonn of \1.i.11, 
contract !:!.nd the prirJacy of rights that it may seen to be a 
st:r.an e a.radox that Leists should genorally be emph• s.tzing 
duties . This ,rado'. , however, can 0e resolved even within 
tlus eneral ex la..1.:itory franework w: ere the ideas of n:echani m 
Lud rie;hts uro normally associated . '£he uni verse as a 
mechanism is not sometlung that men thc□selves bave set up 
cti ;f on their own volition. It is set up by G-od , ansl,1 like 
ull o.a.chines, set up for a en.era.l purpose transcending the 
machine concerned, and according to certain general laws. 
Eo.'.l a.re parts of it.1 a id, like o.11 pirts, have o. definite 
place antl a function; the juotification of their existence 
is that the general purpose of the 1.!,Iliverse requires it, and 
t' · t of their s ecific ntture is that o then can they play 
44 
,~ r.::ic. im cot up volw1t:.:rily to 
;.;Jc ,~·o 0.tc 1 ~ ri,; ,t3 is very .diffurc:nt ..:'l'(..r.i the on0 w: ere, in 
1,:.0 :1.,rnin; of one 1 s co 1sciousncss, one finds oneLclf 
iILL GODnN 
I 
Godwin Ma been variously intoppret d. ~ e ve 
1 2 
seen him ao rationali t J others s utilitarian J 
some other na r ntio3, and nm.ny ooro vo interpreted 
him as oho any t\ or all of thoA,1 Gtrando of thought 
and have tbwJ con idor d his eyot intoot d with ab oi o 
inconeietenoy. onro, for x:impl, a utilit ian 
with some rationaliot t tur e1 Orylla, a a rat1onalist 
th some romnntio f Bture 4 J and etloy oo a h1 mainly 
aa a rationali t, drnts tho onat o of utilari teatur , 
1. Herb rt R ad1 G d dn' , by O org 
ood ok, London, 1946. 
2, D, H. onro, 1 God ' a Uo al Philo pb;r', o.u.P.tl953• H 
th Ood n•c rk hnv ~ rationaliat 
f atures. Also, D. 1 ahora ' tudy in 
Liber li ' , 1951. 
3. A. E. R , ode 'Oo n d. .. o ge o Tranl'Jition•, 
London, 1952. 
4• . R. O, ryllst ' 11111 Godwin and Iti orld', London, 
1953. 
1 
manners of expression. It seems to me that most of these 
interpretations, with the qualified exception of Priestley' s, 
seek to impose an unwarranted degree of unity on God\'tin' s 
views, and, in so doing, ignore oertain of their impcrtant 
features, and overanphaeize oth a that o relatively less 
~ 
important. t io more, ~odwin is looked at from a wro 
historical perspective, and is made to fit into a set of 
oategoriea that are alien to his thought, nd is made to 
answer questions some of b.ich he was oimply not a are of, 
and when he as, he did not consider of gre t signifioance. 
t I propose to do in this chapter is to interpret hie 
views in a way that seems more f ith:t'Ul to the textsJ a my 
1. F. E.L. Priestley, eds ' quiry concerning politioal justice, 
and its influence on orals and Happinoaa by • Godwin' , The 
University of Toronto Preas, 1946,Vol. III, Introduotion,p.15. 
' Enquiry concerning Po11tioal Justice' (hereaft r referred to 
as •P.J. 1 ) is Godwin ' s moat f ous ork on Politioal theory, 
and Priestley' s is the best edition of it. P.J . passed 
through thr e editions in Godwin' s lifoti a, i . e. in 
1793, 1796 and 1798, and in eaoh oaa he nde important 
revisions, the most important ones being in that of 1798. 
Unless oth r se stated, all reforenoes are to the 1798 edition 
and are given by book, e pter and page numbers, thus ' II . 4~200' 
means ' Book II, chapter 4, p. 200' • No page numbers are given 
when references are made to the 1793 edition. 
main preoccupation will be to relate them to his theory of 
equality, it is t e latter that will constitute the 
principle of unity and organisation in my interpretation. 
Before we de 1 with anyth1 e muat know what its 
real naturo is, and base our conduct on this kno l edge J 
else, we are aoti on ' illusion' or falsehood'. In our 
dealings with men He are to disciver man' s roal nature, and 
build on it the nonns of our conduct . It is not only t he 
man and the anioal and other things in tho univ rse that 
have a naturof notions too hove a ture. An action ' by 
the necessary and unalterable laws of o~'"istance ' possesses a 
certain tendency which i s ' peculiarly its own'J and i t must 
be dono or refrained from so ely on the b sia of its 
natural tend ncy. It m~y come to h~ve a different tendency 
and mey lead to dif erent oonsequencoJ as n rosult of an 
intervention by the oxi ti institutionsJ to do it 
b oauae of these consequ noes is not to do it ' for its 
l intrinsic excellence' or natural tendunoy but for some 
additional inducement or motiveJ and this is not moral. To 
2 be mor 1 i s to bo ' exposed to no other in.fluenco' than that 
of th real natur f the natural tendency o n aotion as 
'fruth or reality alone ia to aot on m n I o min and det ermine+-
1. P.J ., II.61172. 
2. Ibid.,173. 
it . This alone, God'Win argues, guarantees the right of 
private judgment as o •a mind remains uninfluenced by-
any human interference, and is left free to e age in a 
direct and unmediated encounter 'With reality-. 
About human reality or the real ru.ture ot man Godwin 
asserts three 'truths•. (1) Man seeks ple sure and avoids 
pain; pleasure is the only good and pain the only evil for 
him. 1 (11) Man is a rational eing. He is capable of 
discovering Truth,i . e . has reason or •talents' , 
acting on the Truth so perceived, i . e . has virtue. 
nd of 
It is in 
these tw that he differs from anir.11s. (111) All men e 
a common human nature . They all have senses of ' the same 
denomination 1 , find pleasure and pain in the s e things, 
are subjects of 'sensible impressions ', have faculties of 
thinking and feeling, are subject to the law of the 
association of ideas, have their passions excited by- similar 
means, etc •• s ' All organised bodies of the anioal or 
vegetable kingdom are cast in a mouJ.d of given dimension and 
feature ' that all belonging to this ola.ss share, nd by means 
of \lhich 'the class of each individual is determined ', so 
also all men have a certain I f orm' 1 - 1 certain complemont 
of limbs, a c rtain internal structure, and orga s of sens 
and certain powers of intellect ' • 'Hence it follow that ' men 
1. P.J., rv.9.440. 
1 
a.re ' like ' and 1 equa.l ' to each other. ~!ithin this general 
similarity there can of course be •varieties •, but the 
siml~rity is logically prior and QOrally more significant. 
From each of theoe truths certain ir.iplle:ations follow, 
From (1) it follows that in our conduct towrds others what 
we should aim at is their pleasure From (2) it t'ollows 
that man is to live a fully ratioml life, 'Which consists in 
his improving his understanding and acting on his ow judgmentJ 
in t :.i.., lies his individuiility or ' independence •. In 
filling to act on my ow judgment I 'a,nnihilate rr,y individuality', 
have no ' integrity', ' by so much I bdic te the most va.lua l 
pm of the ch cter of m n, ' and become t an nilll'.l1 ' • • ¥..an 
is the ornament of the universe • only ' in proportion to 1 his 
individuality, en this is see in connection ~Ji.th (1~ it 
would follow th ... t man·. really can, nd ought to, find ple sure 
only in things suited to his ture . This lea.de to what 
Godwin calls •scale of happiness t 2• At the bottom 1 
the life of daily drudgery, highly routinised and dull and 
char cteris d by ' the contemptible insensibility of an oyster•. 
Sligntly higher is the life of the ple sur s of p te, 
elegance, show, riches,etc •• Still hiaher is the life of 
iot-ellectual •nd aesthetic ple eures . in.ally, t the top 
1. ' Thoughts on Man', 1831. Essay IJ . P•24- 5• 
2. P.J., rv.9.444. 
( 0 0 
is the life of benevolenoe, disinterested generosity, etc. , 
in short, of ,,irtue. The .first t wo r epresent liv~s sui tad 
to ' only a better sort of 'b r11tea 1 ; in thB third I we 
ck:nowledge r.omething of the fo turns of o~n• ; in the fourth 
we seen truly hum n exiet9noe. Not surprioingly, Godwin 
goee on t (J offa~ :m intellactuaH.st A.Ccount1 of sence 
plaRaurAe P.nd ~rgnes thnt they re not ~lennures in them-
r-iel vef'I , but b come S(I only by get t i c; coml,ined th ' the 
ple4sures of jntellect ~nd cultivation'. ' Reduoe them to 
their nakedness, and they would be goncr ally des~iaed' J 
remove, for ex:1mpl a pl s nt oom ,miom1hip from ~um tuous 
dinner, nnd th~ 1 tter ha no tt otion for man. All this 
is fully consistent with the gener 1 primaoy of mind over 
bo~y i n his metapbyaioe nd ethics, 3nd 1 r flaoted in his 
oonoe~tion of the per feotion of 
complete oontrol of mind over bo 
an a~ oon ieting 1n the 
2 
ooh that m n conquers 
sex and other ' appetit s 1 , slaep, and GVAn de~th. These are 
not specu1at1ve la!)see, but are int gral tc, his basio principles 
as they are to many other imilar r ntionalist systems; 
besides, hAving stated them in the 1793 edition of ' Political 
Justice• , he excises them in the oubeequent editions, but 
restores them in hia later work, ' Tho "hts on Man•. 
1 . P.J., I.5-7lf:f 
2. P.J ., VIII .9. AppendiY-. 
I of 
From (111 ) follows equality of all men. 
equal becall6e they share 'the -me ' ruture . 
All men are 
Men are equal in 
things that are humanly real, i . e . things that are inherently 
and essentially hum,an and that m ke nnn a m1n and not an 
animal or anything else, nd 1re, therefore, entitled to 
equal treatment . A a corollary, they are so entitled only 
in those m1~ters that are humanly real . The real nature of 
ru.en, as we have seen, is to i mprove their understandine, act 
or. their own judgment, and in so doiDJ find their true happiness ; 
in these matter~, therefore, men are to be eq 1, this 
equality b ing the most approprL .. t - to their huma..1 station. 
All men are thus to be tre ted equally because they re 
essentially or ultimately alik , or, crudely, because they all 
belong to the same 1class 1 ; equ lity i thu rooted in 
similarity. ur oblig tion to practise equ.:ility follows 
from the oblig tion, entailed by our ratioml mture, to treat 
things according to their re 1 nature; if men are really 
similar , why should w not tre t them similarly? :en, of 
course, are dissimilar, and this too i ot to be i nored, 
thou hit must be remembered, says Godwin, t t th 
simil rities are mor in number and r more import nt1 
because it is they, after all, t t make l men belong to 
1 . P. J . , III . 7 . 24,0 . The differences in ' h.9.oits and t ast es ' 
are t r eated as ' accidental varieties 'J and it is implied t hat 
t hey are to be eliminat ed. 
( 6 '2.. 
the same class and thus make them men. He oscillates a 
eat deal between treating _these diasimilariti s as the 
products of environment alone and tre ti theo as hereditary 
before final adopting t~~ latter view. 
But what justifies equality also justifies inequality. 
All meri are capable of a truly human life, but some. a.re more so 
because of their superiority in talent .. , and virtue; from 
this, inequality arises, wich, like equality, is rooted in 
the human reality,and baa, therefore, thee ,e justification. 
Correspondingly, only the inequality that is so rooted has 
this justification; all other kiIXle of ineq litJ Jthot.-. is ; 
those not springing from talents and virtue hav no .. uch 
basis , and lack all justification. The ' genui ' inequality 
that Godwin s admitted he calla •equity' , ' a. term derived 
from the same origin' • as quality . Though quity is in 
•some sense an exception' to the principle of equality, it 
is ' friendly' and not ' adverse ' to it int tit enhances into 
every man •an emulation of excellence•1• Besides, it is 
against ' wisdom and reason• that me of gr at merits and 
virtues should be regarded with the som 1degree of 
complacence ' aa others . Godwin does not ap 11 out the 
first point at aey length, but seems tom ant t the 
recognition of inequality- will inspire men to emulate t h•ir 
superiors . 
/b 3 
Tb,.,.re ::.ro some im;'lort~nt fof\tttre f Goe wi.n ' t heory 
of e<;_ualH:~ that may .., noted. 7 i rtl~ , t'hl~ ni inl 
asrum tion is in f~vour of qu~l1tyJ i n~q ·lity i z an 
exo'5pti,.m, tho _;h, of course, a justi i bl " one . t is 
more, quality, in . , cry iopo~tan~ Ge.~oe, i s more 1 natural ' 
tc nn n; it ' i-;, :lo:: a puror theory o: ... ppiness thun 
ineq lity•1 ac, unlike i noqll.:llity, it rules out the pleaaurea 
1. P.J., VIII . 5. 478 . In this connection see, St .Leon 1, 235• 
~nrguerite za c, ' A goncrou spirit, Reginald, delighto to 
l ive upon equal term:J with his aaooci ates and f llo a •••• 
Equality i s t he soul of 11 real d cordial society ••• How 
unhappy the wr etch, the monster rather let me e y, that i s 
without an equ l; that ••• cannot find a brother ••• ,. But 
e:rlet only betv:een unequ la e.nd not ' where the par ies are, 
and are felt by aoh other to be, on an eQuality•. The 
reason for this seeoa to be that between quala there are 
f ear and r eeorv, wile b tween wiequalo t -re aro trust hich 
imp ~i s 1 ck of foar, and op nneas whioh implies lack of 
rcsorve . Inequality, owevar, i c not to be so great ns to 
r le out communioation, and i s in all cases to imply 
•rec prooity• and mutual do endenoe. 
of superiority, of ostenta·tion, of t t us, of ow r, etc . I 
t hooe pl e:1sures th"lt are in·~egral t o ◄ situat ion of inaquali ty do not 
ari□e in and go well with t hat of equality . Further, 
t uo respocta in which men ar o equ 1 are more, d are more important, 
tha~ those they are unequal in. Moreover,whataver degreo of 
inequality does eltiet is ultimately removable, though Go win 
como to doubt this moro and more in hie later orks . 
Secondly, he rejoot3 the Pl atonic and the ristotelian 
undor stan ing of equality as proportion. Fo Plato nd 
Aristotle only t he proportionate equality is e~ualityrp and 
the ' fl , t • or • compl ete' equnlity ia not equality Rt all but 
instead inequ lity. For Godwin, on the other hand, 11 
proportions or dovi3tion□ from complet e equ~ ity ~ inequal-
ities, thoueh they my bo juetifi ble. The if renoe 
betvrnen the t rm apr>ro:\chos i a one of the m aning of oquality. 
Equality moano propo ton or Arfotot e , \Vbi a fo Godwin 
all proportion means inaq ality. This d s not alter the 
moral ·nd t ho polit cal reco endations made, but only the 
lnnguage of expreoaio11. Giving more to a more l orthy man, 
Aristotl e woul nay, in oq_uali ty, \Vhile Godwin woul d oay it 
is inequality; both, ho evor, would gr e that it i~ justified. 
Thi s di~ or enoe in meaning, it eeoois to me, ie not eomethi 
contingent an a rbitary, rus lting from a oh ohoos1ng to 
employ a term in his o discretionary o~ atipulative y, but 
i s integrally oonneoted th their respective metaphysics. 
.L wo reasons ~y ,c a v .cod for holclinr this viou. (1) 
1
...:-:iu.....lit;.- 1 is ·0101"1lly ·-1. tor o.r cor.. e1dati.011, ' inequ"llity1 
th:..t of ce ,r~c~tion. vllC u:)Uld, thu refo c , 0 • 1cct, that ,h 
t ... is is nc,t, lo~c -:'.. lly ncce~sa.ry, th1.t 1 i)hilo~op'1c1~ 10uld 
u::;c the terr.: 1 .;1qm.lity1 for 111.t he con:.d ·ors ec~rtble . 
:-re -ice, .r.:. totl0 1 s use of it to r f' Jr to proport:on, , . 
C:-ocl -'_•1 1 s to it~ absc co • (") ' Ecuality ' , loJic uly, io a 
. )():Jitive term, '1.nd I ineql.i.'.lli ty ' 'l "0"'1.ti c o. _ c10 it i .plies 
.1.n n.:iso1co 01 cqmlity ; t.:ero is, t.1ar for- , a lo'"ic"l 
ju.,tification for '.lSL; 1 cq lity1 to refer to ulnt a 
nhiloso hor t hrn s os tive or ,J., r1l or rlo , 1d 
1 inequ:ilit s t to :-:Jfer to t!°. l t .1ich i., , .. r1.s tic on it, nd 
inexpl cabl s vein terns of it . For ristotlo, J. 10 
principle of prc)portion r ,., o.t cs tho · ' · rcrso, 
ortl.cr by di~cstin~ v rious p~rts of it into~ 
s:rste'12.tic ::-ehtionshi ; it r:3~ 1tcs ot only ",; 
us uhole ht~~ c.lso every ~nn.11 p r t of it . 
• . ., rse 
proportion i:ap cs inequ..~lity, a certain r ti n ... hip O.i. 
superiority and inferiority; no cor lhr:;, it · c ine _ ty 
(as it is conmonly understood) t .h.;1.t is central o ju~t co; 
oqu::i.lit is dc~incd ~n term of juctic , ich c th, rior 
to equality. God r.i.n, on the other h id, is by 
the principle of equc.li ty in te s of 1 ich he , ldor:.t r:rlo 
uni explains 01·dor 1.nd hu...."T.!ony -vhcravcr. t ay a1~a found ; ho, 
t he re_oro, t 1..:-:os cqu'ility s lo? cally prior, <1.. def.i os 
justice in terms of oq ility. 
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The third £Gatura of Godwin' a th.cry of equality 
co mat a criterion of ino uo.lity. lten £ dif erent 
;orth e to b treated eif~erontl, nnd •;orth is considered 
to lie in vir e '1bioh io th ... prnctico o • t· tioml benovole.noe ' . 
Rational ben vol nco oo. nts in ,onfarri , on others 
beno i to th.'.lt ore co · st nt d th h :.ian ture. The 
':. i ghost qunli ty o~ man ic virtue, nd ho ore ' the most 
precious oon w- onn bosto ll"POn h ,; 1 vi ~us•. Our 
bo .... ·-1olonoo she ld thu.a t , th 
to liv 11£0 of v1l-t o and, oine vir 
·nO?u giJl6 other 
d ndo on 
kno vledzo, of 0r1,o •i~ o ,le " on , ,n fL icl!).rovi!l!: their 
und ra tnndi •1 4hio, inoid nt 11.,., hna II o adv m nge of 
harmonieins individual nd 001.nl "Pl' 
individual' s o. bl oot ppin 
bonevol anoo :ihioh alco pli e th 
n inc 
pi.noes of 
other s . It ta y bo · e d what our ;:r;o .. ' oe ia to bo to 
man \'tho livo ll h h :r m or 1 
' :J[l, , 1 0 oath tio 
pl asuroo, but do o no·i contribut to on r 1 od. Ood n' . 
r eply r st on 'pri Vt~t t 3lld blio 
Ol" ociri l ori eri 0 2 orth . cap--:.oity 1:or a bi her kind 
par onal h. ppinooo i a pri v. t orl t ion, ile that or 
promot1 d i publ1e on 5 and, in a political 
and ooial con .xt, nly th 1 t o, b r le nt. 
2. P.J., n .2.127 
ot 
/o, 
Fourt hly, in the ina~1ality he a r ecognised Godwin 
soe no danger s and 11 advantaaea, Vhat the latter are e 
have already seen. As to hy there are no dangers he advances 
a number of reasons. Those □uperior in wisdom have a.n 
oblig.<1 tion to 1mprovo tho understandings of their infer ~.ors 
and gradually to rai se them up to their own l evelJ ' this ia 
the t rue equalisation of mankind' 1 , and an inoqu lity th t 
contributeA to it i n to be welcomed. Moreoverr the 
recognition of t heir ouperiority does not entail giving t hem • 
aey reward.a in the f ormn o J;)O\.,er, weal th or At tu , since 
this VTi ll mean int r oducing arbitary inoentivsR an 
detracting from the intrinsic excellence of the action. Vb.at 
ia more , the nature of virtuo i s oo vastly different from 
suoh mundane thi o that there i o simply no commensurability 
between tho tl O• The onlr re\vnr appropriat e to the se i e 
that t heir merits and deeds be acknowledged nd appreoi ted 
by their fontemporari and bo r emembered by th ir posterity. 
•ifthly, Godwin ' s theory of equality implies the moral 
uflifonnity of all men. Becauua of tho unity of humnn n turo 
•t ero is but one perfoction to man '. at benefits one 
benefits all, nd t improve tho understanding of on n 
al so improves thet of othora. The perfeot men are all alike and find 
l-n 
their h ppineas the same sort of life, nd the conditions under wbioh 
" 
perfection can be achieved are also the same for ~u. It is 
this that provides Godwin a· standard by which to attack 
slavery even when slaves are apparently happy with their 
condition. Theirs is not 'the fit and genuine otate• as 
they are not 'brutes •; 1 re they contented? I am not 
contented for them. •1 Our duty is to argue with them and 
their masters, and strive unceasingly to alter their conditions, 
though never vi.th foroe, as •conviction of the understanding ' 
is 1tne compass which is to direct our proceedings in the 
2 general affairs . ' 
FiM.lly, Godwin's theory implies a certain equality 
betwen man and God. 1any theories of equality asoign man 
a certain dignity and inviolability and thereby establish 
equality among men, but in so doing they treat man as a puppet 
or a slave of God, as if a man could be an equal of another 
man only by becoming a slave of God. Godwin avoids thia, 
and insists on ma.n1s equality with God just a.s much as he 
does on a man I s equality with othor men. He achieves this 
in severttl different a.ni not alwys consistent WSJ'S • To 
start 'With, he denies the possibility of knowing anything 
about God. A mind can attend only to one thing a.t tim • 
We simply can1ot have any conception of a mind that attendD 
to· all things at the same time; we may, therefore, behold 
1. P.J., IV.9.443. 
2, Ibid. , III . ?. 24l-,4_ , 
mturul p_1enomena and admire their ha.rmony and r.mtu..1.l 
adaptation, but are not to ' erect an hypothesis under the 
idea of ma.d.UJ all things easy. 11 There is also the USUll.l 
hJmanist argument that ' our proper concern is with our 
iellow-creatures and ourselves ' ~ ann not with a~y so-called 
1 mysterious power at work on all rides ' • However, the 
irguments on which ha mainly relies are two . The first is 
the usual rationalist argument tha t p~Gs immutable truths 
above, and considers them independent o£1 the will of God; 
God 1 s existence) ' if necessary, was necessary only as the 
se isorium of truth and the medium of its operations .• 3 
He interprets Plato as saying that the •trut s of IIP.thematics, 
metaphysics and morals ••• taught the creator of the worl d 
the nature of his materials, the result of his operations, 
the conse"'uences of ·all possible systems in all their det ail. •4 
The rol e of God 1is less that of fabricating than conducting; 
••• but the serving ns a medium by which truth, the nature 0£ 
-which is unalterable, might beoome an ac~ive and operating 
1. 1 Essays ', Essay XIV. 
2. Ibid., Es~ay III, p. 88. 
3. P.J ., 1716. IV.8. 
4• P. J •• 179.3 . rv .4. 
flO 
principle. 11 As to the precise nature of these 'truths of 
ge!1eral 1tlture 1, he is va.;ue, and says that truths ' preced cl, 
either substantially or in the na.t·u-e of t hings, the particular 
e:dste'1ees th t ::;urroum u.1 and o.rc indencndcnt o.:: them all . 12 
3ut for tho qualifying clause beginnine :-rith 1 either ••• • 11 
thin is straightforward trunsce dentali·n with its seoarate 
~rld of universals servin~ as fori~l causes in the process 
of creation. In the human conte··t , this would mean that God 
nust have had a pre-e:dsting nodal of human ro.ture before He 
created r.ien. There is much in Godwin, p:.irticularly early 
God rl.n, t hat supports this interpretation. He f-requently 
talks of 1t he reality of human nature '. \ at is most 
strikinG, every time he speaks of the unity of human nature 
he invokes J!lota.phors from tho realm of crafti..nnship. Minds 
of nen are ' framed ' upon the same 1nodel 1 ; others a.re only 
n•1• multiplied11 ; 3 and an analysis of one mind is valid for 
all minds . He evon argueo th1t mere this fails or where 
it is denied, 11t is not easy to suggest a procoading that 
shall supoly the deficiency.4 This 1modsl 1 netaphor, along 
\Ji.th varioun other cognate metaphors5 like ' i nstrument •, 
1. P.J ., 1796.VII . l . 
2. P.J ., 1793. rv.4. 
:; . Thoughts on Man , "::ssey xrv. 
4• Ibid., ssay XXII . 
5. e . g. Ibid., Essay XVIII ., also Essay, II . P• 25. 
I (I 
'specimen', 'copy' , 1 form ' , and 'mould' is repeated at a 
'II\, 
number of places. He expunges many of the transcedentaliat 
'\ 
passages in the subsequent editions of 'Political Justice ' , 
though this d~es not apply to the metaphors mentioned. 
The second arguement he relies on to ensure man' s equality 
with God is a predominantly moral one. Our creator, ' if 
we must imagine something' like that, must ' retain the 
characteristics of a bei vested with rights aa well as 
duties.• ' He who made ua what we are by so doing contracted 
an engagement with US••• J he owes his creature justioe•. 
The term ' meroy' is ' meaningless• , the creature is ' in 
equity entitl ed ' by his ' real merits ' to a proper treatment 
from God. If asked why God must respect man' s rights 
Godwin' s answer i s twofold. God, given His nature, must be 
wanting men to be virtuous 1 but virtue can not be compatible 
with craven fear J it requires a free and independent decis ion 
on the part of the moral agent , and this can only be based on the 
considerat i ons of justioeJ that is to say, on the belief that 
his action will be judged on its own merit and will be given the 
treatment it rightfully deserves. Se6ondly, it is man and 
his gignity that are our main moral conoerns1 our view 
of God must fit in with thisJ or, else, it must be re j ected. Now the 
dignity of a rational being like man oonaieta in judging things for 
himaeli'J hie individual judgement ie therefore inviolable and ·"ust be 
respected by God. 
.:o rJUY now turn to Godwin's theory of ju.stice, n.nd 
T:ar.ine t::, r3l.1tion to hi.i theory of cqmli ty junt discussed . 
He mentioned earlier the three- fold truths about run that 
God\rl..n h'lc er !lCb.ted; ·. · '1 into.:r- 1.t"d, they ·ive ·1 full 
~nd adequ~te view of the real mture of tl.'l.n ,or of human 
reality. Justice consists in conform·t nr: to hun.m reality, 
'lnd 1s defined n.s 'th.11t inparti<1.l treat,r,1ent of everyman in 
~~tter s th~t r elate to his happiness , which is measured 
solely by n consider 1tion of the ~ropcrties or the receiver 
and the ca:xi.city of hin 'Who besto • 11 Imp11rtiality is 
8'."'phris sed ·-~c~use it is an implica.tion of equ lity; 
ha. ness boc use it is taken to be the nature of mn to 
de iro pleasure ; the ' properties o the receiver' has a 
r ference tc the recipient ' s wort 1, n wort r r.Jan to be 
preferred to one who· is less irorthy in decidinr, whom to 
be"lefi t; n.nd, fi n.lly, the cn.paci ty of the " ~r actor is 
import~nt 1s, othen1ise, ~enevole~ce degenerate& i nto sentiment-
alim:i. It will be noted that one ' s persona rel~tionship 
th the receiver is t otl'l.1 irrelev:1nt; ov 1 if I myself 
or my f~th r is involved, I should have no heoitation in 
aubordi~1tine rr13 or his interest to th!l.t of 4 superior 
bei ne if t s i n 1t nn ioparti consider tion of the 
clai lI'.3 of each requires; ' what m:igio is ther in the pronoun 
II 3 
' my•'? Zaal1 sh,uld consider hi m elf ' an impartial 
s eotator of an angelic nature' beholding t 1inss 'from ~n 
elevat ed station', and 'uni.nf'lucnoed I b.,, any ' r, rejuctiooa '. 
r,very individuul ia to be considered eolcly a.so. human being , 
and the .: inly rclevunt ..;onsideration io his worth , w11ich alone 
i~ tak•~n to c ,.rnsti tute his hum:- nn<;!G6 . 'l'o Lr at a M of worth 
ae if e na uono , or ic e versa, is ' !,~li;e .. o..)d' , wid 
oonstitutes a denial of the realitJ as it is; it is to 
reat .• im as if le is not ~hat o really i...; , . nd ., if e is 
somevno or sumet in0 els . ~ c is to be trentc ' oxuotl ' 
as he 1 deserv us' uinoc i l on -S full justio . ua ic 
thus entails an oblit o on me 'oon t · ntl au Ol:U'cfylly' 
II 4 
t o oxum·ne esert s vf ail t · oa it ' oonneoted', 
akin·, of oout· e, ' a oertain 1101 nee f or 
of \,Ullan judg ent• . 
Justioe t hu undora ood h t r e i , O t 
irstl., , I . to b gr teful to my bcmet otor 
bav been orthy of this b nefit; if s o one 
or tby nd my ben f otor kne, it, l ehou d not 
at "ul to ,. but o oul osit ' v ly oenaur 
is note tis i ed ev n ith this . 
at all, ev n if I am tho mot orthy pr on in 
l i · 11t.,. 
t .J. p1 · 0 tlona . 
oaly if 
lee a. ore 
only be not 
m. \.iod 
r teful 
l vcn 
itu tion? In tre tin, m ae ho id m:, b not ctor has mply 
--iv en me my du ; , h t ho id \ u right and t e1•0 ore is 
duty t o do ; 
from othors . 
d fo r Jong one' s duty no Grat i t ude 1 u 
.:iec o 1Uly, the langLUJe o.r . , .:... CJ~.h. .. ~ un. r fir r:J.JL,vi., . 
lUghts, he o ' t\ro id 1 I .lC ii/ I ' i .. ~ . 'to do d< s, c.1.r us , 0.5 
we 11:.i ', a,:i.d 1pa.::;si·re 1, i . e . 1fo•o or <,;.,;,:,i ta e 0 
ot1 er men 1 ; md strictly s 
" 
Ki t,. u j I l. ,.i I should , 
apply only o ti1e form r . Jus ice i:llt,>lie1:3 til...i:i everything 
ve do must oe done in tne light o wu ther or tit will 
pro ote general happi as . 1 .e have_ realit y nothing 
" that is strictly speaking our o _;, ... everything h s ' a 
tlesti1 tio prescribed to it byte im:nutab~~ voice of reason 
and justice. 1 ~le thus a nnot hav ri ts to a.o as we 
like with ourselves ., our time or our rr:o ey or our opportunities . 
Rights understood in the active sense , i . e . as 0 essive 
cl1'.ims I are incompa.ti le with justice a. the real human 
nature . ,·,e have only duties . Wit our charge. of them 
no one is to interf reJ in this neg .... ive s i..ur nce ,w :f'ind 
right in its passive sense. thers nuey critici se or advise 
me when I am making a wrong use of nzy- cul'- .1. s, but they are 
never to impose the.ir views on me or to coerce me in aey way. 
It: aey- one suffers as a result of my action, he ' nuy justly 
complain'; 1in a p ssive sense ••• , his right is as complete 
as if he had my bond in his possession•, but he has no right 
otively to advance his claims and interfere Tith m • What 
1. . . , 
• I' id., l 2 • 
he can do is to remind me of my duties but not of his rights. 
Similarly, I have no right to freedom of conscience, but then 
societ y , too , has no riaht to interfere with it . Thus my freedom 
i s as secure as ever, except that the mode of securi 
it is different . Not to have a right to a thing does not 
mean that I should not have itJ everything I have or do 
must be justified, and everything that I can be justified 
i n having or doing I must have or do . If I do not have it 
I am not to assert my claim, but instead I am patiently to bring 
it to others ' notice and to try to make them conscious of 
their duties until they come to see and give me my due. In 
short , my right s spring from others• duties , and these, in turn, 
spring from the principles of justice or right . 
At several places, however, Godwin fonnulates the distinction 
between thu two kinds of rights int rms of that bet en ' ri ts• and 
~claims', and, though h still \7allts o expunge th vocabulary of 
rights, he seems cono8I'lled to retain the vocabulary of olaims, 
To the extent thio i s only a different manner of sayi what he 
was saying earli r, ther i s no inoonaia ency involvedJ 
but there i a aloo a difforent undertone suggestive of a sneaki 
attempt to bring baok the lan ago or rights, though not exaotly 
ol the kind earlier criticised. en do not hav ri ts but claims, 
and it ia desirable to~ of one' s olaims and not just of others• 
duties, since this will influence the conviction of mankind, 
I I (, 
remind them of their ·iuties , an.l gradually influence their 
con iuct. If all t hat is meant here is t h"lt we must adopt t he 
langua,,e of claims for utilitBrian reasons without actually 
believing in it, t his is insincerity , ani Godwin can not 
recomrnen i it 1 . If , on the other hand , Godwin -ecomm nds 
that we shoul:i sincerely believe in it , it i mplies a .. ,light 
shift in his position in t hat the locus of morals is no 
longer oneself with one ' ... 1uties, but instead another 
person with hiD claims . 
Thirdly , justice and uti lity are seen as coincident, 
and no conflict is envisar,ed between t he two . Justice 
obtai ns between all percipient beings in matters involv ng 
pleasure an ci. pain , ::!'ld lE. eE:en b consist in t he i mpartial 
treatment of all with a view to ' the production of the 
greatest sum of pleasure or happiness •. 2 It seems to me 
that Golwin is mistaken in assuming such a complete harmony 
between justice and uti lity . There are many non-utilitarian 
features of his thought t hnt mny be pointed out . He insists 
on the goo:iness of a motive, an1 believes cer tain motives to 
be intrins i cally goo~ . There are many v lues other than 
1. Insincerity i s one of the worst vices in his moral system; 
t his is because it is practical falsehooa , while sincerity 
is truth 'in a practical view'. ibid., IV . 6. 327f . 
2 . ' Summary of principles ', IV i n F .J . 
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plcasU1·a t h-,.t a.re intrlnnic~1. lly goo ... , for x~ple, ::inoerity, 
irrlivida~lity, and pri , ta ~ • {:Cl nt . Tho 0011:;ation to pursue 
. .w.;,pinoau io not sui t~ .aris, ut rocul~ from the o 11 tiou 
t.o puro~ truth• Ho raj ct tho syoto:.::i of rov-.1.r ·.:n 
~mni hrnent o.s ma::i..,wr of got,t,i : :on to puroue hen ral 
h.'l ,pi r;:. , • oh iru;t,Jad is to be p -n · only boo uoo 
ono OUl it i.) -o i thine: if one d.oo rot pursue g r. cl 
happinooo for its own. ak , ono i to ':>o • ·guod · th, .; not 
conditioned or coercod into doairing it s 1ntri icall7 
, .. o rth'While . l:'  :tna.J.1:r, uca.tion !a to o.i at o tivnti g a 
child I c oity £or Judtti nt and neo .ag .. ng its oxorci e, 
·• !'.d not u.t building up t corr .... et' acsoci t i ons i , hls tdnd. l 
Howaver, to go on to argue, , l·Tieatlol does, th.•tt Godwin ' s 
1~rko do not dio lay a ' .itllitarl, ' re ture , o:r- tho.t th y 
can be oxpl "nod 
io a vuguo tvrr.;, nd c .• n .l n 
a ~ .:;take. Dtili tariail1om 
r o thing . Lot 
cowmente.torc on Go wit , llOt or.copting rlostle , lnv 
oi1uatotl it vith tho form it t.:: oa in the hll.lllis of 3e 1th m.. 
Tl'l c n oot be j tiri d, but, eve. 1£ it cone od for tne 
·oplc.y 
utili tar nis.~,. 
f I <g 
• +. 
,_ uc ....... lv ( ..,,., a ._., 
ho .. , l1ll oL ,.,.1d..,e .... ·e ,._;_:,cerniblo in 
a na.turali~ .,rend in hi. • ;re h, t.. ;.1edo.:1..,-~, _1articularly 
., 
i.1. hi~ lJ. ter \-1ork:J . -1.. 
l ..... ter I'i.Ot..ify • .is 110 ition. i t.. .Lo L- vez. a.n a.s::oci1tionist 
accoUI t of how icteas _,et 1or111eu and cor,10 to acc0m_ 1ny or 
f ollov1 on.c another . as to his ueru, _tionaL , , e shn.11 h1ve 
n gre:.1t deD..l to so.y later on. The conclusion ... ee:1s 
inoscaL1a0le to 1'.le th ... t two very a.iffero t tro .. d3 lie side by 
side in uis wrks 1.nd form a vory uneasy pd.rtn rship . 
~ 
1 . Comp1re, for example, Bk. Iv. Ch. 9 of the 1793 edition 
of P. J . with the chapter that replaces it in the .;ubsequent 
editiona . 
2. P.J. , rv.x.425. 
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POLITICAL D4PLICA'l'IONS 
Equal1 ty or • equal adm1as1on to the m s of improvement 
and genuine happinoss• is as 1'19 havo seen, tho oentral ideal 
of politioo.l 11feJ all our efforta r e t o be direoted 
towards ro lising it, and all our actions and aotioea are 
to be judged by ita at dard. 'e sh,'\ll now exnmine some 
1mpl1cationa of thio view. t doeo it meanJfor oxample, 
in terms of pc,li tioJ.l obligation, politioal nuthority9 
politionl knowlodgo etc . ? and horr do o bout achieving it? 
Every eooioty needa a.n element of order. This io usually secured 
through tho inatitution of Oovammen"t mi.ch proscribes and 
onforcee ' r aeulatio '• For a numb.,. of r~ ona that we ohnll 
oono1d r later, Godwin oonside.ro gov rnmont evil, and visualioos 
an ideal oiety hero it will not axist. Hin aearoh is thus 
for a non-govcrrmonta.l form ot polit1 ·:u. 1 a oan a 
community, he inquires, deo1de ito o affair without hnving 
the formal institution of go•1emt1ent and all that goeo d th 
i t, suoh as el ctiona, repreoontativoa, l d judioiary? 
en with thie £orm of polit1cnl l o he ia not alwayo happy, 
and goes on t o imagino a kind o:f htmian orlatenoe ere ,ill. 
forms of polit!cal life are unnecesoacy and. nbaent. In an 
importMt senao this ia ant iled by bia rat ionaliorn hioh 
ta.lees reason lo ao tho eaeonoo of and leads to a 
p .o 
persistent t endency t hat can 0est be described as a desire to 
turn man into God. ' Han . is a God-like being1 • 1 1 Hind 1 or 
reason is the essence of man. ' The body i s the prison of 
the mind', 2 • nd i s ' the hou2e of cl1y ••• poorly fitted to 
entertain so divine a euest 13; the ideal a man is to ain at 
is one in '\Jhich his mind may come to transcend the limitations, 
such as sex, sleep and death imposed by his bodf. 1Iot only 
i s J 
that a mind should be independent of matter ,that/d body; it 
can be and should be independent of other minds as ~,ell. 
It c u.1 discover the highest truth and act on it without any 
help or inspiration from others . Ideally, society is not a 
necessity for man but a luxury, and he enters into it solely 
out of his concern for others . All forms of cooperation5 , 
such as marri ge, orchestras and theatre companies are 
disapproved as compromising mind' s aoveroign independence. 
The upshot of all this is that a fully rational man will be 
self-sufficient, will huve conquered all the limit tiona 
imposed by matter, and will be benevolent to othors not as a 
1. T. O. M., 1. 9. 
2 . Ibid., 10, II . 
3. Ibid., 4. 
4• .J ., VIII . 9. Appendix. 
5. :ibkl-, vrn . 8. Appendix. 
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natural necessity of inclination but as an expression of his 
/ 
rational goodness to others J in short J he will be ' like 1 
God . Such men create no mischiefs and have no conflicts 
with others. Politics can have no plaoe here . This, a.s 
we have said, is one of the logical implications of his 
rationalism. Godwin, ho,,.;ever, is not a consistent 
rationalist; he not only modifies it but also adopts a 
different position i . e . naturalism, though never completely, 
,I 
and always keeps it subordinate to his ratiomlism. Socioty, 
Goduin now argues, is ' mtural ' to man, a necessity of his 
nature; he has no meaning outside it. He has a natural 
feeling of benevolence tow.rds others .J wich leads him to 
prefer oth rs ' happiness to his own. Ho can not discover 
Truth unaidedJbut needs the cooperation of others, nd 
depends on them to -supply him a motive , i . e . their appreciation 
and praise for undertaking the arduous pursuit of Truth. All 
this implies a different view of man1 and his relation to 
others, a view that may b called the ' human view of man' 
as distinguished from the earlier ' divine view of man'. n, 
on this human viev, is a creature dependent on other s, 
incapable of complete self- sufficiency, t i ed to others by the 
1. See 'The nquirer', P• 244 • .fn.n is nov enjoined · o 
develop not only his reason but • every p rt of his n._ • e •, 
including muscles and delicacy of ' corporal tact •. 
natural bond s of ' syr:ipat ny', and .sentt)'lc.ed to live under tho 
condi tions imposed by matter of whioh hi own body is t l!c 
r epresentat i ve nearee t to him . Given ~uoh human bein a , the 
need for .,oli tios und , even, government becomes easier to 
exi-' lain . 
Until man beoomes God the ideal human exiotenoe o not 
be achieved, and politios will have to c ntinue1 furt r, till 
ruan so i mprove that t hey become oapable of non- ov rn ntal form 
of poli tioal life,ev n the inatitut.i.on of ov r ent will have 
to continue . No r whilo politios continues, it must, l ike all 
other human aotivi ties 0 be based on truth, on' oli tioo.l t r uth' . 
As politics is an aotivity undertak n by um boingo th above-
stated thr ee truths about hur4a.n nature in g noral continue to 
appl y to it and constitute its ultimate found tions . Th se three 
'tr uths', it will be remembered , ar that mlln s ek happiness, 
that they are rational and their actions ori innte in their 
opinione,and, finally , that they d.l l shore a common human nature . 
The i.m ;lio iona or the fir s t and th t nird tru ha are fairly 
olear and have alr ady been discussed . From tho fact t hat 
man 's act i ons orig ' nate in Lheir opinions God in deduc a 
f i ve •oor ollaries respooting politioal t r ut h•: 1 (1) 'sound 
reasonin and tru t h, when ad qu tely oom.:nmicated, muat 
always be viotorioua over error'; (2) they ar 1 oap ble ot 
L. P. J . , 1.5 .85- 6 
being oo c unicat edJ ' (3) ' Truth 1A o::mipot ent ' f 
(4) ' The vices and □oral eakneoa 0~ c•m nro not invinoible' ; 
(5) ' !inn 1 perf~ot i bh ' or 1 mu:.,e rti b :!. -, of por petu:,1 
i mprover:iont •. '.rho ' kno;,l odgo of polit ic \l t _ t h ' toll o 
ua ' wh tare tho hopoo and proopoota of h 1 "'n improvoment ' J 
it destroy:,; tho f ou1ld. •t1on of p s ,,ioi sm, r inforoos opt imism, 
nnd i s thuo noo aoary for p~"Omotin, · ' th9 t:ruo i nt reat o of 
' ) 
mankind . 1 .:. Thoe • €Al1orul t ruths do not 1 hnwevor, oonatitut e 
al l the knowl od{;o uired i n Polit i co. A politi c l 
activity occurs in speci f io context and in r el at ion to a 
opeoific i ndi vi u 1. Ne , t her efor~, nood t he knowl odgo of 
ooncret e si t t i ono 9 voll . Gonor ,1 p0litionl trut hs 
t ell us whnt a.ro to bo t he gen r al "m a of politi ca l ction, 
how we are to go bout r ~11 ta , ate., but :in attempt 
to r ali se any ouch nd l r.ayo oeouro i n a up oifio cont xt• 
and r e uirea c. lcul t ion o cono 1u co::: and an awar noes 
of individu l circumet nco . !o 0 1nnot thua doduo 
ot ions fro g erol t ruths, a in t h at i o • Pol itic l 
knowl dg or 
political activity i thu t ho kno io 
i ntelligont 
of the opooifi c 
oiroUlll3tanoe of ind1v1du 1 c a , nd tho kno l do cf 
en al trut in t o of uhioh tb s o are to 
be interpr t • •l o Ol.\bl or i nt elligont poli · 10 l 
1. Ibi d. 
2. i bid, VIII.9. 536 
activity is thus an activity based on general truths seen in 
the context of specific circumstances. 
This means that eaoh case is to be judged ' on its own 
merits ', though not in its o,u terms, and a decision is to 
l be taken accordingly. All general rules are suspect • 
They aeleot some average aspect of a sit1Jation and distort it 
by reducing it to types . Epistemologically speaking, they 
are posterior to concrete decisionsJ and are parastic and 
misleading abridgments of the latter. They are not, 
ho\.Jever, e tirely useless . We ca.n not always think out 
the detailed consequences of varioua alternatives every time 
we have to a.ct J general rules provide · ' resting places '; and 
direct our attention to certain important features of an action. 
Their utility, however, is far outweighed by the pernicious 
1. To avoid misunderstanding, the distinction betwen ' general 
truths ' and ' general rules ' needs to be emphasized. General 
truths point to the real na.ture of a thing and its relations 
with other things ; in the light of them, one bas to decide 
one 1a response to a specific situation. Unlike general 
rules, they do not ' require ' or I enjoin I anr specific kind of 
action but instead, constitute an overall cognitive 
/ 
framework within the context of whieh specific decisions are 
to be made freely- and unencumbered ~Y' e.ey general rules . 
/'(.5 
effects they produce. They are st~tic, and arrest our 
knovled eat a p...;.rticular state of its development; our 
knoYledge may increase ,and yet w may remain stuck w1 th rules 
representing an earlier, relatively inferior, state of 
knovledge. What is more, they may i nore or underemphasize 
the most important aspects of a situation in their concern to 
stress onJ.Jr the general and the average. In terms of the 
psychology of conduct, Godwin goes on, actions b~sed on them 
are only ' imperfectly voluntary ' in that we do not fully and 
adequately reaaon things out every time w ct, but do so 
only imperfectly, relying most of t he time on such generalised 
averages; they thus involve an element of ' prejudice ' and of 
lack of rigour and alertness in our responses to individual 
and oonorete real situations . Every action 1ha.s its 
appropri te result ' , .which must be considered ' closely' and 
minutely, and not ' from a certain distance ' as general rules 
do . This is ' the true dignity of human reason.• 
This implies a certain viev of poli tioal or moral 
of · 
rationa.lity,i. e . / the manner in which reason operates in 
politics and morals and arrives at jud ents or deoisions 
concerni the wrth"Whil nass of speoifio ctions or practices 
or institutions . Reason a understood here is a c lcula.ting 
faculty; it "Weighs the evidence for v rious alternatives, 
judges tho probability of consequences, and arrives at a 
decision most likely to lead, in a given context, to the 
ideal end of human oonduct, justice. It 'Will a.void all 
•resting places ' and ' abstractions' , and decide each case 
afresh and •on its own mer~ts ', irrespective of how it or its 
like was decided in the past . Political or moral situations 
are unique, and the only rational response to them is to treat 
them individually. ' Every case is, therefore, a rule to 
itself. •1 Political judgment is •~ot arrived at (a) 
deductively or by deducing it from gener al rules; or (b) 
inductively, i . e . by asking what has genero.lly boen done in 
such like cases in the past, extracting a general rule, and 
extrapolating it to cover the present situation; or (c) 
analogically; or, finally, (d) in terms of precede ts . 
It is the result of an examination of a specific case in the 
light of general truths arrived at independently by philosoph-
ical reason regarding man• s hwna c1 nature in general, and 
political nature in ·particular. 
This view of political rationality leads Godwin t o 
eliminate both laws and institutions from politicnl life • • 
L1:ws are general rules, and the arguments a ainst the latter 
1. This is not the position he ha taken in the 1793 ed. of 
. J •• See, for example, rv. 5. 296: 'Je are to act on general 
principles, and 'must perc ive in the pr aerv~tion of that 
general principle ba.l nee of universal good, outweighing 
the benefit to arise in any instanc~ from superse ing it.t 
I~ '7 
will apply to them a.swell. As to his anti-institutionalism, 
one ba.sia of it has already- been suggested. Ma n' a mind is 
to be guided exclusively by the natural tendency of the 
action in question. If institutions reinforce this 
tendency, they are superfluous and even dangerous as theY' 
create a new motive, thus detracting from the natural force 
of the action; if they go counter to it, they ar e evidently 
most unnatural and pernicious . Another basis of his anti-
institutionalism is this theory- of political rationality. 
Rational behaviour is possible only were men do not get 
tixed into any specific mental grooves t their mind.a must be 
pliable ardrcady to appreciate the uniqueness of any new 
situation. Besides, they should have no bia.oea or 
prejudices or specific oommittments, and it is just these 
that inati tutions generate J they fix us in one particular 
moment, require absolute loyalties,and create partialities. 
The very nature of institutiomis totally incompatible with 
the nature of human mind z ' it is the inalienable tendenoY' 
of positive institution to retain that with 'Which it is 
conversant for ever in the same state •, while 'it is one of 
the moat unquestionabl properties of mind to be susceptible 
of perpetual improvement.• 1 
1. P.J ., VI . l . 
We may now turn to Godwin's views on political authority 
and obligation and their relation to equality. Truth alone 
can have authority over man. Conversely, man ' s primary 
obligation is not to aey other man but only to Truth. 
ubedience ' is an act of the understanding or will' , and ' can 
have no legitimate connection' with force ; ' I am therefore 
bound to truth and justice ' only. Since Truth alone has 
authority, a human being is to have authority only when, and 
in proportion to, the correctness of his opinions . There 
will always be men who can do a given job better than I; 
doctors and carpenters, for example, :tnow their job better 
than I do . I may have confidence in and respect for them, 
and may justifiably defer to their judgment and thus accept 
their authority. But such a situation normally exists 
only when a specific- skill or competence is raquiredJ it 
does not obtain in politics where ware concerned with 
'cases of general justice which are equally within the province 
of every human understanding. •1 True, there are lil8.ey' men 
today who la.ck such understanding; but this is simply a 
consequence of the present sooiet7 and must eventually be 
eliminated, and along 'Iii.th it the need for confidence and 
respeot,as •confidence is in all cases the offspring of 
1. ibil., III . 6.237. 
i I 1 gnoro.nce . ·:hen eoch i11 i vi rlual increases his ' \Jisdom 
·m-1 virtue ' the need for c nfider.ce in otl'iers ' juJgmcnt 
will .iecrease , ani he will obey only the author i ty of his own 
reason ; t ,is will be 'the true euthanasia of covernm•:•1t ' 
anl of all l i t ierto necehsary forms of polit ical inciualities . 
In t he me ::rnt i me , the guvernment will continue rm 1 will ie·1 imd our 
obe".iien·e . 1e a e t o obey only those of i ts menoures t ha t 
a1·cord wi t h our percepti0n of 'i'ruth, since ur obliu"¼t ion to 
it s _rings exclu3ively from our ob..1..igation t o Truth 
anJ h.:l S no o:.,C,i-,·irate pr ~nc i 1)lc or s tatus. i. olit ical 
ob i Gntion t his is si~ply a speci os o moral ob i gation , 
obtaining 1·hile the institution o f governemen t lasts . 
Theo l i~ation t o achieve equal ity through continual 
' political i mµro veinent' i s the highest ' political duty '; in 
other words, .i..t is the duty t o practise ' political jul3tice '. 
Political obli t,ation or duty2 is thus not seen exclusively 
in ~overnmentnl t er ms; the impor tan t question in connection 
with political obl i gation is not, ' ~~hy shoul l I obey the 
gov1:rnment? ; ns is its cunt ,)mary formulation, but instead is, 
' Hhat can I io to acr. ieve the highest kinl of life for all 
1. i bi ., 111.6 . 237. 
2. Golwin uses t hes e two terms interchangeably , though mostly 
he uses the latter. 
men?' Now running right through Godwin' o writings is , as 
we have seen, a distinction between some t ype of elite1 and 
the average masses of men; as such, Political duties of eaoh 
will obviously be different. The latter have the duty (a) 
never to abandon their omi judgment and put unreasoned 
confidence in others; and (b ) positively to continually 
improve their understandings and keep their minds open to any 
now 1ruth that may come their \18.y. The duties of the elite are 
more string0nt, and consist in the sustained pursuit of truth 
and feurlegs and sincere communication of it. They are to 
address themselves to 'the rich ' v,hom they are to try to 
convinoe of the evils of their pursuits, of the impossibility 
of r esisting truth, and of the usefulness of maldng 
conoeesione in time. Theya:-e also to address t hemselves to 
' the adherents of equality• whom they are to preach the 
irresistibility and annipatenoe of Trttth, pati enoe, oalm 
persuasions, abjuration of the use of foro~, and the 
desirability of having good will for all , the rich not 
excluded. Truth di scovered by the wise will thus spread to 
all other seotions of the community and will persude them to 
a~e things as they real ly are. As a result, Men will come to be 
' estimated tor what they are, and not for thoir accidental 
appendages '. The attractions of r ank, statue, etc., will 
1. See his refer4lloe to •men of genius ' , ' the long-looked-for 
saviours of the human _race', in ' The • quirer• , London, 1797, 
P• 10-11, 316-7. 
I ti r 
loue their appeal, a:rrl t he men enjo.{ing them wil l no longer 
be respected . entually, all attempts to fulfil 'love of 
distinction' through these channels will cease . Tho 
moveme.1t 1tOW'J.rds eqm.lity' i s 1 inevitable 1 since our 
1 knowledi;e of truth 1 , on uhich all improvement deoends, is 
boti.nd to increase . The knowledge of its inevit ility is 
very important as it gives us confidence, pitience and c. lrl 
amidst setbacks . 
But hoy are these wise men to go about their business? 
Godwin at different stages toys with different ideas . In 
the first edition of ' political Justice •, h thou~ht theJ could 
get into r epresentative assemblies and use them as levers of 
influence ; but he emphasizes this lees and less in the 
oubsoq nt editions of it and also in his other subsequent 
works . He now argu.,es that the whole institution of 
representative assembly is un::lesir ble . These asserablios re 
concernsd with arriving at decisions r ther th n with 
discovering Truth, a.nd, the ref ore, r ely on voting.. which is 
mechanical, creates fictitious unanimity, terminates 
discussions prJmaturoly, and i gnores minority, etc •• T s 
re jection of representative assemblies, coupled with the 
e lier rejection of the institution of govornment, means 
that polltico.l chaanels aro no longer avail ble to the wise, 
thus making the question of discover.in other suitable ones 
vory acute indeed. Godwin thinks they might get into 
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l perpetually increase. ' The wise are not to f orm parti es 
or associations for reasons we have already suggested; at 
beet they may combine in ad hoc and infonnal groups, but 
they are mainly to be on their own, touring the country and spreading 
the message. No wonder , Godwin oalls them ' missionaries'. 
Ideally, they ar e t o be motivated exoluaively by ' disinterest-
edness', but, f or most part, their motive will be the ' love of 
2 distinction' or the ' thirst f or fame ' which isJ after all, the ruling 
passion' of man confinned by our own experienoa as well as by the 
vnr ioua examples in history. As to the masses, he does not 
think they should have any difficulty in apprehending the 
Truth communicated to t hem. The di soovery of Truth is, of 
course, a very difficult process, and only ' the enlightened' 
oan undertake it as present, but this is very differ ent 
from saying that tho masses cannot asp it when it i s 
presented to them, particularly when it i s stated in a few 
clear propositions . Truth i s essentially simple and self-
evident, and i s comprehensible to every mind. 
l . P.J . , 3. 296 . 
2. ' Defence of the Rooki "";ham party' , quoted by Poll in in 
' Education and Enlightenment in the works of W. Godwin', p. 213. 
Also, P.J . VIII .1. 427 . El sewhere he implies that , even with a 
man of complet e wisdom and virtue, thi~ love of distinction will 
' certainly enter into his consideration', though it will not 
be ' the first and l eadinE; motive.' The Enquirer. p.281 . 
/~4 
Fim.lly, who o.ro to be these elite?. and how do ye 
identify them·, They are to be 1oen of s t udy and reflection11, 
pos.:; essing leisure and suhsta 1ce, and not e.1g~ged in the 
occupations of traders (who cheat and seek profit ruthlessly') , 
lawyers (who, among other things, m1.ke money by chicanery and 
deliber ~t el y delaying justice) , the clergy2, etc •• The lower 
class a~itators are also condemned as they l ack moderation 
and balance. In 1812 he writes to a f rie nd, 1You and I , 
who a.re of course among the enlightened ••• 13• James 
lrn.ckintosh, his intiill£lte friend, says in ' Vindicia G.J.llicae ' 
that the philosophers a.re ' a distinct nation in thn midst of an 
unenlightened multitude ••• The multitude have attained 
sufficient knowledge to value the superiority of enlightened 
men. 14 They, the philosophers, have escaped the corrupting 
influence of the degenerate society they live in, and are the 
sole sav}urs of huma.ni ty. 
1. The elite needed for ' the regeneration' of the ' species • 
(P . J ., 1793, IV_. 2.) matures in the soil I less that of action 
t han of inquir and instruction' (P. J ., 1v.3. 298). 
2. The Enquirer, Essy v . 
.3 . Kegan Paul: 1W. Godwin', II . 195• 
4 . New York, 1866, p.459 and. 461. In t his connection, see 
a.lso Uary Wollstonecr~ft : ' Vindication .of the Rights of 
\ oman' , London, 1929, p. 21, note . 
E,.,\I0 1~ .,uLOGY a .u2 L J. ~YC&,LOGY ,J) r~ tuALITY . 
,:e have disc nesed Godwin 's theory of equality at some 
lengtt; . ]ow there a:-e two general q..iestions that arise in 
connection uith it, and what I Tiroposo to do in this section 
is to elucLlate 8odwin'3 answe c"s to them and assess their 
adequacy . 
(A) He has based e -1• tality on the nature of things ; but how do 
we lmou the nature of things? If we do not and cannot , the very 
foundation of his theory of equality ic blc19ted . \'!e have thus 
to enq· ire into the epistenolorical basis of his theory of 
eqllali ty . 
(n) Ia it possible for men to act on the principle of equality , 
and practise justice? Or is the practice of equ lity oade impos-
sible by the way in which Godwin understands man , morality and 
equality? The inquiry here is concerning his moral psychology, 
and is intended to .scertain i f it io such as to make equality 
an operative principle . 
! 2 Godwin li:ts three sources of kno ledges self- evidence , 
-
deduction, and observation and experiment .1 Thero are important 
1 . 1 Essays 1 , EseS¥ X:V . 
shifts in the degree of importance he assigns to them. In 
' Political Justice•, though observation and experiment a.re 
mentioned and discussed, it is the other two th.at a.re 
consi1ered more important; in his later orke, particularly 
' Thoughts on Man ', it is the other way roimd . Ile himself 
1 
says as much. Deduction and intuition, he argues, are risky 
as everything depends on one or two principles, which, if 
wrong, lead to t he collapse of the entire system. We are 
instead to be much more cautious and rely on minute analysis , 
gradual collection of facts, etc .~ This shift, as we shall 
see, is partly explained by hie declining faith in the infal-
libility and certainty of reason, and partly by his changed 
view on the nature of truth . 
The assumr tion of the s lf-evidence of Truth underlies 
moat of his arguments in 'Political Justice •. Truth is self-
evident . When present d , it compels assent a.s it has ' force ' 
. 2 that is irresistible.' 
of compulsive Truth' . 
I ropoae to oa.11 this ' the theory 
It has certain important implications 
1 . ' The Enquirer', Preface . 
2. P. J ., I . 5. 91; ibid., IV . 2. 276, ibid ., v. e. 7a; 
also, ibid., 1793, IV . 21 ibid., IV. 4. 300 . It is also 
orth noting that in describing the nature of Trutt, many 
light me taphors , auoh as ' light ', 'shine ', 'beam', 'bright' . 
and 'lustre ' are used . Truth op rates in a m er similar 
to light ; it is sudden, self-evident , irresistible, forces 
open our eyes, and commands our assent . 
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predicament of man, and argue that an eventual uniformity 
of a.11 views can be achieved if only there were ye t t::1ore 
information being nnde available to all; or if men could somehow 
be pernuaded to empty their minds of prejudices . VThen this 
theory i s taken as an epistemological basis of equality, it 
would come t o be argued that equality of all men is a self-
evident fact; it is self-evident, as Godwin, for example, 
says , t hat all men have the same 'fo:rm' and belong to the same 
' class', and hence are equal . 
Godwin, however, does not seem entirely happy with this 
position . It makes his defence of private judgment less tehable . 
It also makes it diffioul t to ex lain the failure of mankind to 
have pr ogre~sed so far, as also the persistence of disagreements . 
Ha changes his ;')osi tion and comes to interpret the nature of 
Truth rather differently . In a footnote added in the 1796 edition 
of ' Poli tieal Justi ce 1 , he says that truth 'has atrictly no 
existence but in the mind of him who utters or hears it', and that 
the immutability of it means 'nothing more ' than predicting ' with 
greater or lees probabili ty 1 and s~ing, ' This is ,;;hat I be l ieve , 
and wha.t all reasonable beings , till they shall fall short of me 
in their degree of information, will continue to believe .' 1 
1. ibid., 1798, I . V. 
Tr uth now is a belief based, of course, on evidence; but this 
evidence has to be cxa4~ned by the individual concerned and is 
to be assigned r;r"a:ter or less ""robabili ty . This r...eana that man 
is no lonrrer a drw:i inevitably responding to the irresistible 
beatings of self-evident Truth . 
his impact . !Ie is 110,1 active • 
Ee ap;ears in his own and makes 
He wei.hs evidence and is not 
overw}1e l:ned by it; he dec.i.des how much proba,bih. ty to assign t o 
various shreds of evidence; and, finally, . ..:.-.•~- L, . the exercise 
of his ovm .judr;ment, he comes and is not compelled to a conclusion 
which is always tentative . 
of peraua.sive truth' . 
I pro1ioee to call this ' the theory 
This shift frotl the coopulsive to the persuasive view of 
truth ina.u -urates sone oignificant changes in Godwin ' a system , 
and a.lr:iost alters its character . There is less confidence now 
in the oower of 'l'ruth: 1 our best reasonings ma.y betrEcy", and our 
1 
wisest conclusions deceive us . ' ·- Besides , it is man who seeks 
truth, weighs evidence for a problem, etc . ; and he , not being 
a disembodied reason , ha.a hti.s ovm failings I ' whore ia the man 1 , 
Godwin now asks, 1who can ea.., that no unconsciouo bie<J has 
2 influenced him in the proCTess of his inveeti tion? 1 In fa.ct , 
l . 'T . O.ll . ' Essay XIII , ~59 . 
2 . Ibid . , 247 . 
ha now advises us not to ' immediately ' assent to any proposition, 
however specious, when i t i s presented to us ' for the first 
time', a.nd suggests that we should instead consider and r eoon-
1 
sider it , and that egon then ' 'v7e can •• by no means be secure 
2 that we have at tained to a por fect result .' Human affairs 
now come to be seen in terms of ' probability• 3 and not of ' inevi-
tability'. Further, the platonic insistence that Truth is ' at 
all times and i n all pl aces t he same•4 and that 'only one • of 
the many opinions on a given subject ' can be true• 5 t ends to 
disappear , as is seen in hi s excision of such passages in the 
subsequent editions of t Politioal Justice•. The :possibility 
of a disagreement and of failure to oonvinoe other s i s no admitted. 
His aooount of human conduct also undergooo a ohange. When 
141 
Truth is considered compul sivo, the lalowlcdgo of it ia conaid r ed 
neoeaearily to lead to action, since theory of compulsive Truth entails 
this kind of r ational determinism. n, on the other hand, truth 
ie considered persuasive• there oan be a gap bet oen lmo ledge 
and aotion. As a corollary, the perfectibility of man and the 
pcesibility of aohieving full equalitypeoome less certain. 
1. Ibid., P• 2:i( 
2. Ibid. t Eeeay XllI. p. 
3. P.J., II.403. 
4. Ibid., 1793 , rn.7. 
5. Ibid., I .4. seo.I. 
.E.ven when there is pro8rcss , it is reoarious . 
."1 However, s ince 
t e ~rerun of ultimat e ~crf ec vion r emains, the need for r eat cr 
effor ts on the p ~rt of ul l , es eoially the elit e , boOJmea v ery 
muc h gr eat er , as Truth is no longer omni_i.lot ent nd needs man ' s 
elp . a un imperson l princivle , th"' t i s , 'ruth becomes less 
do.DL.nant and p owerful , the por s on<.,1.l elem,mt , t at is human 
activity becomes more nooessary . This now int ell e otual oonviotion 
is ver si ,in i fic nntly s ymbol i sed in Godwin ' s lat er d · symp a t hi e s 
f or Zoroastrianism wh re , in t he strug a be t ~een the two 
principles of •ood d ev·1 , t he forme r ne da human oo- operntion . 
This shift tha t we h ve noted still keeps hi within the 
general framework h u had eturted with ; it i s a shift ~iihin 
his overall r . tioncliet e ist molo y . But,alongsid.e t.hia ration-
aliet epiatemolo r,he al so adopts v ery diff rent e istemolo , , 
that a , empir icism or , mor e str iotl · , eensat ionli • t is stated 
in ' oli t i oal Juetioe • , l but its ol carost stat ement a pears in 
' Thoughts on Man •. 2 ' s mind is bl un a t birth ; ext rnal impres s -
ions make th ir impact on it, produoin aebs atlono tha t are assooi-
nted aooordin t o oner 1 1 is . odv,in does not a w t h <- se lo a 
are . As t he bas i o sensat ions that -a mon f eels o.rc thos e of pl easure, 
and pain, one i,ould expect that the asaooiatlon . would be taking 
p l a o~ in terms of pleas ~ .nd ain ; odw n almost imFlies this~ 
L. I V . 9: l . 4 . 2 . 319 f . and lt44f . 
3 . x . J . l '/93 • I . 4: also , Ibid . 1?98 . l V. 9 . 
71ind can com!1rehend onl;;- a. sin,...le iden "'t time, though this 
need not be s simple idea . 'Jon!-lci mMess is of the nature of 
thought, ann is nothin.g but' 'a. second thou~ht '. Mind is 
simply :he I serier of thoughts 1 ' linked to th. ' , and the""e 
is no un~erlyin~ substance . Furth r, ' if there be P.nything 
that we know mere certainly than another', it is our ' sen-
sationa 1, 1 They a.r~ also infallible, ' e are not deceived by 
our senses , but dece ived in the inferenc ~R.ke from our 
2 Jenoations . 1 If we infer from the sensation of colour t hat 
there is something outside us corresponding to it, a.nd if e 
are urong, it does not ollow that ' our senses eceive us '. Godwin 
introduc a distinction that is crucial to his thaory of equa-
lity. 'nd and matter a.re very differant in kind . er is 
' deaf ', ' inert ' 1 inoxor ble ', etc . ; mind, on the other band, 
anticipates , calculntes , eto •• It is , the efore , ' in a high degTee 
unr ,asonable ' t o mak reasoning concerning matter ' a s ta.nda.l'd 
of what e ought to think respoctin . the phenomena. of mind 1 .3. 
,\ e can not infer from our sensations the nature of matter ; all 10 
C kno is st of 1henomena followin ro lar o r . 
1. P . J . I . 4. 
2 . T. O. • t ~79 . 
3. T . O •. J. , 450. 
/ 4-3 
But e ~ infer fro: our sensations of other human beings 
their precise na.tur,, . Uur knmvledge of matter is inferential 
and unreliable,while our knowledge of mind i cc~tain . Besides 
there is ' a preoise resembla..~ce and analogy ' between mind and 
ar:d 
mind,and , therefore , we can have a certain/ reliable knowledge 
of other minds • Given this , Godwin I a a.ocount of our knowledge 
of the uniformity of human nature is more or less on inductivist 
lines . I know what my mind is likes I receive 1 i mprossions' from 
my intercourse wit~ othere,and I infer from these that they too 
are beings like me . ~ think , feel, fall sick , reason , and so do 
others1 from this , I arrive at the . idea. of human nature and am 
convinced of its reality . I extend it to other men whom I have 
never seen, and conclude that they too are ' s:peeimens ' of the 
1 2 
same nature . ' There is such a thing, therefore , as human nature ' , 
and I know its 1reali t ' 'for I feel the particulars that con-
stitute tt within myself .' 
Strangely enough, he goes on to deduce the existence of other 
men from the uniformity of human nature . Because we all have the 
same na. e ,the impressions I get from another person are I a 
commanding s_nidenoe that he .. s ::i real being, having a proper and 
l . Ibid . ,Ess83' II . 24 . 
2. Ibid. ,Esaey XXII . 446 . 
/44-
independent existence . 11 This is circularJ s inoe, in order to 
know tha t t :1ese impressions come from exi s t .. ng human beings and 
are not m:y dreams or fan tasies , i t must firs t be shown t hat 
other men exis t . Besides, impressions also come about men who 
are dead and t~ne , and a criterion is needed to distinguish those 
that necessarily imply the existence of others from those that 
do not . Godwin himself is no t very happy about the adequacy of 
t his argument , and goes on to advance two ot hers both of which 
are closely connected , t hough diff "ring in their logical struc-
t ure . In bo th of t hem the exis tence of others is a poatulate; but 
they imply different views as to the precise philosophical char-
acter of t his postulate . In one a rgument , the justification for 
making such a postulate is that it 'explains much 1 • 2 sensa-
tions have no meaning and are reduced to ' a senseless mumc_ery ' 
unless others are ' believed to it~ t •. These sensations of o ther 
must have come from somewhere , and -~!1e best poss ible answer is 
that they come , ' exactly' as they ' speak ', from other human 
bein: s . How , further, can you explain ' sympathy', ' history', etc? 
1. T • 0 • l • , 446 • 
2 . Ibid., 448 . 
The other argument is prai:;raatic orJ rather, utilitarian . 'l'he 
'belief in the existence of our llo:- men ' oakes virtue and 
morality pos . ible . In the absence of this belief I will lave 
no reason for undertakinJ the arduous puraui t of '.1.ruth and for 
striving to dis se ·nate it and t ereby i prove other men . All 
that is disti ctly human will be gone andJalon ~ ith it , the 
reason for my orm existence; ' take a1ay the existence of 
mJ fellow-men , ••• ' Yo u take ,JY life , taking the t hing hereon I 
live .• 1 As if realLsing that all these a.rgunento are highly 
u: satisfactory he t hrows in a very different consideration . 
,ilosophical truths are differen t from practical t ruths or 
truths of practical life . It may be proved philosophicall y that 
other men do not exist , but this will not a.f ect our ' a c tive life ' 
even i the slightest . ·.-,e may '"t ink with the learned" 'J but 
' must al ays act ••• "1i th the "VU.Lb._r" when , e come abroad into the 
2 Vlorld . 1 hilosophioal truths ' can never form the rule for the 
intercourse between man and I 3 
• 
It is interesting to antrast 
this with one of hie argumenLa in defence of determinism that this 
' philosophical truth ' vrill make us more charitable and patient of 
others ' ;eaknea~es . 
1 . T. O. :. •J 449 • 
2 . Ibid .J 455 • 
3. Ibid .) 439 ; also , 241 . 
About these a1'g1.Wents for the existence of others, one 
point~ be made . ... , the firs t arguoent,1.e. on baaed on an 
individual's impre ssions or sensations, other man tg existence in 
a0111e sensct depe1 ds on the individual having the a ~ .,tions of 
them. Thie is not to a~ that their exis tence is oonatituted 
by his sensations, this ie not Godwin ' s position. Ho VJ • it 
ia the perc.:.,:-•i ,nt who enjoys epist mological primacy ov r others . 
You exist becau.s I, among oth~r~, have eeneations of a certain 
eort about you; in very important s ns , I confer existence 
on you. In the other .. J.·gument with ito tr..·o riations, it is 
a 
others that explain my sensationa , give tbem/me&nin8, enable 
to distinguish them from illusions, and in this sense, ooni'e:r 
existence and. reality on m.e . It is others 10 enjoy epi temologioal 
primacy. Both raise important problems that Godwin eh.on no 
awareness of, and nei tber implies the episteClOlogioal parity tween 
the individual p1rcipient and the rest which an ad.equate theory ot 
equality may have to have aa its epietel.D.ologioal ba is . 
!!, God in begins by rej cting the ll•known Lockean account or 
conduct. 'he motive behind any action can not be one of relieving 
a. feeling of ...... cs.sinessJ ince t latter 'implies the d sire itself' 
as the anteced ut and pnrant of uneaaine a. It is because I wieh 
m.y neigllbour•s advantaee that I am une y at bis miatortune•.1 
1 I should be ,10 ore uneasy about this than about the number 
of syllables c.nt2incd in the present paragraph if I had not 
pt'evio .sly loved it for its o·,:n sn'~e . 11 Pleasure lies in 
1 iniul2ing the des.1.r2 1 , that s.J L."l do int:; w'.lr. t v;e already 
desire; uneasincrn:::: or :pain 'is t·1e ap~rehension of any obstacle ' 
to the n.esire, ann. is ' onl.· r:enerated by ob::itnclcs to the 
attainment of o..u- desires' . Iloasure and pain thus are 'not 
the authors of my tletcroino.tion'J as they arc contingent O".l my 
desireo. which are formed inclepenrlcatly of pleasure and p .. i.in . 
i1ov1ever , they ' Lmd:: btedly ter: l t0 1x,rpetua.te and stre1._;t.1en 1 
d0.;irea; a man acting benevolently ·.vill find great happiness 
and harmony within himself , and this \Vill tond to confirm him 
. h. b 1 · t 2 1n ls c·1evo ont i,rJ" ensi ., • 
_., w iesire is the product of opinion . .i,i.an is a rattonal 
being, 1nd does nothing unless he is convinced it is right . Take a 
murderer . !Ie oa.y oscillate and succ b to the solicitations of 
diffe~e~t pa~sicns at different ti.Ir.ea before he decidoe to murder 
someone; but 1wnenever his ::::-esalution is fonned • it. is fonned upon 
the ougrestions of the rational faculty; and ••• he is then most strongly 
impressed \7i th the s:iperior recorar_endations of the conduc t he pursues ' •3 
1. Ibid . 
2 . Ibid . , 430 . 
3. P . J. , I. 5. 62 . 
' Voluntary actionJ 01 men originate in their opinions' , Godwin 
asserts . It will be observed that he is confusing two different 
is., 
things here1t~at/ doing an action after careful consideration of 
its consequence:3, which is how he defines a. 'voluntx:-:r ' action, 
and doing it because at the precise moment of d -.:in g it one feels 
convinced that it is the right t hing to do . 'i'his distlnction can 
be indica.tc1 in a different way as ell . Since volw1tary action 
is t he preduct of rational delil,,,~ntion ,we should be ready and 
abl e ' up0n all occasions clearly to announce and fully to ouumer-
1 
ate ' the reaaonn tha.. led us to it . A murderer, on the other 
hand, can hardly do this . lfuat he oan do, if he is ii telligent 
enough, is to explain the psychological process he passed through, 
his os cillations , the passions he felt, etc • .,before he finally 
plunged his dagger into the poor neighbour ' s back. This confusion 
l4~ 
on the part of God ·ltl is seen in a number of other places as well ! fol' ex-
am;pl~., nis account of the experience of the crusaders in the Holy 
Land . In general terms it springs from a. failure to diatinguish 
between the rationalist and the asaooiationa.list aooount of 
conduct . 
'a actions, we have seen, are the r esult s of his opinions . 
But how precisely are opinion or reason or knowledge and conduct 
r el ated to each other? Does .opinion immediately lead to conduct? 
Or does desire intervene at any stage? when? and in what f o ? 
Godwin seems to give four different answers to these quentions. They 
oan be grouped into two , one of which may be callod rationalistic and 
the other naturalisticJ both correspond very broadly to the two dif-
ferent epistemologies that we discussed earlier. His f irst answer 
i s th . .:. t knowledge by i tsel f leads to conduct . Man i s rational; 
when he kno s somethi ng i s right he just does it, and there 
i s s imply no reason why he should need any mediating prin6iple. 1 
In t enns of our earlier analysis thi s i s entailed by his theory 
of compulsive Truth. Tho second answer is related to tho first , 
but i s yet qui te different . Reason is indispensable for conduct, 
but i s not by itself able to generate it J it needs the assi s tance 
of imagination which helps it to acquire a full and complete 
1 . He defi nes knowl edge as ' a clear and undoubting apprehension 
such as no delusion can r4eist ' , and insists on distinguishing it 
f rom pale recollections of ideas and fleeting opinions (IV.2. 276)J 
it consists in seeing 1 a thing in al l its enormity', i . e . as it 
=eally i a. (ibid) . 
knowledge about a particular situation . Such a full kno\7ledge 
generates a. desire for doing something about t his situation, and 
i t is this desire that leads to conduot .1 To gain full knowledge 
r eason alone i s inadequate . An act of ' imagination ' is needed, 
so that the subject thought of 1cOID8a before us clo thed in flesh 
and blood and pr .· nts a set of fea.turos and a ae sible reality ' s 
. 2 
then ' our passions a.re r oused through every fibre of our heart •. 
The Knowledge here must be the knowledg of details , and must be 
such as to cre_tc 'sensible' and se1 ous images in the agent ' s 
mind. Before , for example, he does anything about poverty in 
another country, or even in a o , his mind must have vivi 
ima8ea of sta.rv men , crying children, amanoiated bodi ~s , e~c . J 
these images will create in him a. desire to do something to remove 
poverty , d this dosire will lead to an appropriate action . A 
mere kno ledge of 'abstractions and e;eneralitiea 1 ill not do as 
it is totally incapable of produci suoh an off ct . 
No i.t' it is desire or feelui; that is the immediate cause 
of conduct , ey not say that feeling is the principle of 
otion in man? eason oan then be bro ht in oi thar as the regufa.tor 
1. ' Thoughts on Ma.n ', Essay xv . 275 . 
2 . ' !andeville ', E burgh , 1817, 111 . 45. 6. 
; . Godwin equates desire with feeling, and opinion or kno ledge 
with reason; the problem of the relation between opinion and d sire 
can also , therefore, be stated as the problem of the relation between 
reason and feeling. 
of feelings, or run~ simply be dismissed as superfluous by building-
in the regulating e bd0nt within the structure of the feeling 
itself . Godwin says both these , and they pn. i~c his rema.ining 
two answers . ' 'I'he voluntary actions of men a.re under the direc-
tion of their feelings. Reason is not an independent principle, 
and has no tendency to excite us to action; in a practical view, 
1 it is merely a comparison and balancing of differ ent feelings' . 
Reason ,in thi a:11:r-7er, is still important and continues to provide 
a basis for the belief in the improvement of man . His fo t h 
answer is very diffe t , and contains nefl,rly all the elemento 
that usually go ith the sensationalist epistemology i . e . e 
' 
ism, 
hedonism and a.ssociationism. Man is a creature of pleasure and 
pain; by tho ver"3 neoessi ty of his nature hA desires ple-9.sure and 
avoids pain c if he fore sees no pleasure or pain, 'this will exoi te 
no desire a..~d lead to . o voluntary action•. band 'necessarily' 2 
stretches out when I see plea.sure reeul ting from an ubject . Thia 
would lead to considering man a.a simply a ma.chine . Godwin is not 
at all worried about thia , a.nd, in fact . insists that man is a oachine . 
V/hat he ts to a.void is man ' s being assimilated to a ' material 
mecha.niam 1 or 1iving a.n expla.t ation of his oonduot, like Hartley, 
l . P .J., ' S'Ullllll8.t'y of principle 1 , VI . 
2. P. J . , IV . 9• 40} . 
in terms of vibratious of the body , Man, he argues , is an 
1 intellectual mech£...,.~,.,::1 ', a mechanism whose movements take place 
through the medium of 'thought ' . Thought as un"'"arstood here does 
not have the co ·!1i t iveness and deliberateness implied in the 
terms 'judgment ' or ' opinion' , and is just one link in the lotl8 
cha.in of aatecodents and causequents . Godwin a.dda to ti,i::; an 
egoistic account of human conduct . I cannot desi ro anything but 
my own pleasa.nt sc 1aations , and can never desire others ' pleasure 
1 
'but as the means of agreeable sensation' of mjr own. Later , as 
in the case of a mise 1 0 pursuit of money , others ' plea.sure IIl83 
come to be pursued for its own sa.ke , and then what , to start with, 
was e. r-.eans to an end may be come an. . end in itself . Godwin however 
is not entirely happy with this associationist e:xple.ne.tion . Assoc-
iations may get built up between~ two sensations a.nd they may 
not be right . Besido w1 they are accidental and infected with con-
tingency; is there any support £or them in the nature of man? As 
he cannot answer these questions within the a.ssociationiat frame-
work , he tu.ms to rationalism for an answer . Ne come to desire 
others ' pleasures as a means to our own. but soon ' reflection 
confirms' i t ' · a sense in r,.. .ion it never oa.n confirm e.ey of the 
2 
f a.o'titious pa.ssions ' 1 we find that men a.round us are 'of the same 
nature with ourEel ves , and that our own pl easures a.re ' of e.s much 
1 . T.O.M., Eseay V. 105 . 
2 . 1 . J., IV . 10. 427• 
value ' as ever-;rbod;y else ' s . '1'hi s offers us the criteri on with 
w,1ich to select ri[;ht assoc1.utions :·rom wrong ones . J:leoides, 
t:1e pursuit of o ~her:::, 1 pleasure th.1s cotnes to be rooted in the 
~niformi ty of hu;;1n.n .ature , and is no 1 nger contengent . 
l'o r<::cupit 1.late, 1Jodwin ' s f 1Jllr answers to the question of 
the relation betwoo11 reason and conduct are these : :,~,~" son 
.,GvOS.Jarily leads to cond 1ct; reason leads to conduct only when 
aided vy ioagino. .,i :m ; fee lint regulated by 1w Gv 1 l :ads t o con-
duct ; and, finally, feelinp: can ta~e care of itself and r eason 
has no role to play. ,, e have seen how he finds the last answer 
most tL~sa~isfactorJ , and reintroduces the directive role of reason , 
making it thereby almost indistinguishable from the third answer . 
ll ov1 thi 'J t 1,ird 8.!1suer raises an ir.11 ortant problem; could not 
feeling ' defeat .,~e tardy decisions of judgment? 11 ; r eason will 
recommend benevolence, but feelinp may refuse to f ollow, and 
there would then be a 1 perpetual hostility ' between tho t,10 . One 
/ s-4 
way out is to argue that man has a ' natural' feeling of ' benevol ence ' 
for others , and this is precisely r:hat Godwin2 does , l it tJ.e reaming 
that this meant roJccting egoism he had earl ier insisted on . \ih.a.t 
reason exists to do is t o regulate the operations of th i s na t ural 
feelirlf, and prevent it from cle{!enE:rating into simpl e sentimentalism . 
1 • . • J ., 1 . 53 . 
2. T.o.:•., 115; P. J . , IV . X. 433 : ' If self- love can be the 
only principle of acti n , there can ·be no such thing as virtue .' 
To return to the question we originally started with, 
it seems that each of these three answers is capable of 
providing a psychological basis for his theory of equality, 
and that thus his moral psychology is not a.t odds with his 
moral and political ideals . His fourth answer,ta.ken as a 
thorough-going asaociationism,is not so oapableJsince, if 
men a.re left a.lone, some of them might end up with ' wrong ' 
associations and never find pl~asure in, and hence act onJ 
the principles of equality and justice . If, on the other 
hand, some one, aay, a legislator, builds up right associa-
tions in them, he is setting himself up as the s uperior of 
all, o.nd ia giving no scope to their judgments , and is fil-
ling their minds with ideas that he considers right . In so 
doing he is -viola.ting the twin principles of equality and 
private judgment . As to the remaining three answers, what 
is required is the knowledge of Truth ,end the capacity to 
grasp it,i . e . reason. This knowledge is open and accessible 
to all . Some men, of course, at present know more,and are 
thus capable of a hi gher degree of moral and political lifeJ 
but there is nothing ' in the nature of things ' to prevent 
the rest from acquiring it. As Jol reason , Godwin asserts the 
thus 
basic equa.li ty of all men . All men a.re /equally capable of 
moral and political lif'eJae the moral end political oa.paoity 
or t he capacity required for rational moral and political 
conduct exists in all men. There a.re, of course, differ-
ences in the degree of reason men have,so that, though all 
alike are capable of rational moral and political life, 
some are capable of organizing their life more kno ledgeably 
and on a more comprehensive scale. These differences,he 
hopes ,could eventually go, thus enabling all men to live a 
full moral and political life in equal degree . A note of 
disillusionment, however, is increasingly creeping in1, 
so much so that one of hie contemporaries accused him of 
having the 'only aim' of 1displaying ••• the darkest and the 
2 blackest passions which corrupt mankind. ' 
There is one difficulty, however, common to all the 
three answers . In order to practise virtue or rational 
benevolence , a man must have a full knowledge of the cir-
cumstances and the capacities of the potential beneficiaryJ 
this,it will be recolleoted ,was made the precondition of the 
practice of equality and justice . Now this will create an 
obligation on a moral a.gent to fully inform himself of all 
the specific circumstances and the capacities of each indi-
vidual in his communi tYj sinoe , r or all he kno s , he may have 
1 . P. J . VIII . X. 533; added in the 1796 edition. 
2 . ' The Gentleman's Magazine ') 1836 . P• 669 . 
overlooked a. person more worthy than the one he ha.a bene-
fited . But, however diligent a man may be, it is humanly 
impossible for him to acquire such a knowledge,as the indi-
viduals involved are countless and their oircumata.ncea for 
ever changing. This imposes a. serious epistomologioal 
limitation on the practice of equality,and Godwin sees the 
force of it . He now suggests that we should act on a more 
limited principleJ we know most a.bout the members of our 
ovm family and a.bout our own kind.red and friends ,and should, 
1 therefore, confine our benevolence mainly to them. The 
pursuit of my own good and the good of my family and friends 
thus becomes my primary~ for epistemological reasons . 
When , however, I do know about others ' oiroumstanoes, I have 
an obligation to consider their clai ~s as ell . I also con-
tinue to have an obligation to et:ci ·te tc k:no more and more 
about them, and am not justified in resting content with the 
pursuit of narrow interests by seektng shelter under the 
limi tad- knowledge argument . I am, .further, not justified in 
pursuing these narrow interests when I .!9a2!! that they are 
likely to harm others . However, even when the force of all 
these qualifications is conceded, it remains true that the 
l . See e .g. his notebook . data for his intended 'First principles 
of Mora.ls 1 : the argument for confining one• a affection, eto . to 
See 
one ' s kind.red is in terms of knowledge . / also, •st. Leon ', 
1831 . Preface . 
practice of equality and justice is seriously delimited ,and 
the principle of equality of all men is made correspondingly 
less significant . 
This difficulty becomes most acute in a political con-
text . Here we are concerned with the community a.s a whole1 
and,given Godwin 's view of justice, we shall have to have a 
detailed knowledge of the circumstances,etc . of each area and 
of each individual . What are we to do? Limitations of avai-
lable political lmowledge would seem to rule out all actions 
based on justice and eq ua.li ty. He refuses to despair, and 
suggests, but never discusses, an interesting wa;y out, which, 
it seems to me, does not really solve the problem. The dif-
ficulties with modern political communities, he argues, are 
mainly two . Firstly, they are so vast th.at we can hardly 
know anything about many of their members and areas . We can 
deal with them, not individually, but only en mass and,there-
fore, in a ,ere.gee . We have to typify si tue.tions and build 
we 
ate · aype& ,and through them" seek to grasp poli tioal reali tyJ 
'type' 'svera.ge' ,etc. thus become the necessary central 
categories of our political epistemology. Secondly, modern 
political communities are so complex that we hardly ever see 
things •as they are '. Things are continually hidden from our 
eyes , deliberately or through the sheer complexity of the social 
and political structure . We cannot follow clearly the con-
sequences of our actions as they are interfered with at a 
number of poin rs by social institutions . I'hc realisation 
ar the knowledge of what we are and what we are doin and 
with what results never fully dawns on us . The answer to 
the problem of political ~..nowledge stated earlier , there-
fore, lies in developi n an alternative t o the modern poli-
tical communities . '11his a lternative, as he adumbrates it, 
consists i n (1) breakin~ them into small local oonnnunities, (11) 
simplifying social , economic and political life, and (111) 
creating gener a l equality of conditions . (1) vill mean an 
increased contact between i ndividuals and a. full knowledge 
of each other ' s circumstances, capacities and defects; the 
practice of equality and j ustice would thus become possible . 
Besides, concrete cases could be dealt with on -their own 
merits, and no gi3ncra.l rules o~ ws would be noae~ ary. As 
to (11), the economic life will be simplified by breakin, up 
l ar ge existing industries into small local ones , and the removal 
of the existing distinctions of status and rank will simplify 
the social life . All this ill make it possible for us to see 
and judge i ndividuals ' exac t ly as they a.re' . V at (111) means 
is that there is to be a general equalisation of conditionsJso 
that all men will have almost equal capacities and nearly 
u..>1iform circumstances . 1.rhia will mean that the epis• 
temological difficulty of knowing the circumstances and 
the capacities of each individus.l,creat ed by the wide 
variati~:>na in these, will then be absent,as the general 
equality, or,striotly, the general uniformity of men's 
conditions would permit a generalisation applying to all 
individuals on the basis of the lmowledge of one case only. 
Now apart from several other difficulties that can 
be pointed out in this ans er, there is one that is most 
relevant from the standpoint of political knowledge . Godwin 
himself , as we have seen, comes to doubt t he possibility 
of the general equality of conditions. Even assuming its 
ultimate possi· Llity , hat do we do in the meantime? Is 
political action paralysed? I do not see what answer he oan 
give • Someone, like Paine or John S tua.rt 11, who,. though 
operating in a different framework of ideas ,ia in general. 
sympathy ith God in's overall preoccupation could answer 
that a closer interaction between various local communities 
through their representatives in a national assembly, a closer 
integration between the representatives and their constituents, 
and several similar devices could faoilita ~e the acquisition 
and dissemination of poli tioal knowledge . But Godwin is unable 
to take such a. position, given his suspicion of ineti tutions 
and his understanding of the nature of politico. He , of course, 
( 6 0 
at places seems to consider representative assemblies of 
1 
some value, but does not incorporate them in his system 
as some~hing worthwhilef and, in any case, he sees no 
value in them from the stan.dpoint of political knowledge . 
Wha.t he ultimately ends up by saying is that vie a.re to con-
fine our benevolence to the narrow cirole of the known 
people; and that all we can do for the community at large is 
to spread the knowledge of political truths . 
1. P. J . , V. XIV . 122. 
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J eramy l e tham 
Bentham' s thGory of equa ity rests on h~ee main bases: 
(1) his theory of r ealityJ ( 2) his theory of acienoe and 
measurement, and (3) h:i.s t eory of moral and palitio 1 
oonduot. (1) de ine "ho are to b treat ed equally and 
1. ost of the referenous to Bentham' s writi e are to ' The 
orks of Jeremy Bentham' s , published under the superintendenoe 
of his executor, John Bowring, Edinburgh, 1859• The r eferences 
are van by th volume and the page numb r J thus ' X 225' means 
' volume X, page 225 '• In o caeeA I have referred to 
more handy edi ionss (1) ' A e,nent on Governm nt and An 
I nt roduction to 'fh inciplos of Morals and Le slation', 
Edited with an Introduction by ilfrid H rrison, Oxford, 19601 
the references here re van by the chapter and the para aph 
numberJ thus 1 Prinoiplo3, ch. l . para 5' means ' An Introduction 
to the inoiplea of ·oral s and L giala ion, obapter 1 , 
para aph 5. • ( 2) • 'fue Limits o J urisprud!mce de ined' , 
Edi ed dth an Int roduction by c. i . bverett , e ork, 19§5J th 
r eferences to it are van in ull . 
IG~ 
in what1 (2) suggesto when equality ie to be practieed1 
and (3) specifies who is to practise this equality, why nd 
within what limits. As will be realised these are very 
broad oharacteriaations of the relation eaoh of these theories be rs 
to his general theory of equality. It need hardly be 
pointed out that any criticism of Bentham' s theory of 
equality will consist in critioiaing any one or all of theoe 
three theories. My aim in tho pages that follow is not to 
offer any detail d criticism, but ins tead to elucidate 
certain marked inconai atencies in Bentham and to indicate the 
general directions a oritioiem can talc . 
I 
Theory of Reality 
Entity is one of the key categories in Bentham' s 
philosophy. He defines it a anything ' for the designation 
of which the grammaticol part of speech called a noun-
1 
substantive is employed.' t1t1ee my be either bodily or 
2 
ment l J the soienoa thut studies the former is oalled 
' aomatology' t that otudying the latter is ' psychology•. 
Ontology oomprieee both and thus is defined as the soieno of 
1. VIII .195• 
2. Thia i a not the same an the usual body-mind distinction 
ae the term ' body' here refers to many entities other than 
the human body. 
t •.1.1 1 on ::tv es . "i'ho e·1titios are eithor r,ercepti lo or infere-
2 
nti!l.1 .. .::Uch of these ca i1 Zurthor, be re:1-l or i'icti tious • 
' 1Jy the i. i. Ali ite t_otir.;oiv of tho.:.r .10 •• w , 
rousoni ,, i . o. vithcut roi'loction1 ; it i , in sl..o , 
,n i. "e2•,:mti 1 ontit., is on.l I t' .. e pors t~::.i::, •1 of 
u10:10 oxisto.1co ir;; p:-oi~ccd by :.·o~. action - is Lu.c:r·.::·od .:'rem 
... ch:u.n of reaoo'1.iag1; tho a, plos cf it are u. l.11);,t, God, 
... il;J ls, a devil• otc •• , .. ro~-..1 o,1ti ty ia on· to ,:.J.ch I on the 
ooo!lsion rull or the purpos of · it:cou.ra , oi-::iµte 1ce is 
ro 11.y me nt to~ ~scri~od '• A fictitio· e tity is thit 
· cou.r;;; 1 
o dstence is :i.ocri od, ' .;ret in truth Cl.id 
io not .. e~nt to be u.scri::>od. 1 ... .:.otitious c titios O'l.l 1n t 
be spoken of o.t ill ii thoy ro :10t spo:- n 0£ as re!ll 011s3:: 1 ; 
..... 
..,.:.. ...... on ,o 001-t 
t: oirs 1 • Wht~t h ee r,43 is th t , on we 
vcroq.l ra lit1 
str .... ot l aopoot 
of roa.l object nl talk bout itt \'i c. not lmt t~lk a.bout 
it in toi: :.!l suited only to :i cone to object or 1s ' t·mce 1 • 
D'lsid s , 
propouitio 
1. Ibid. 
toi• rola.to it to thia subot .ce only thro h 
vt-.J.ch l too I it:1ply a if two cone t o :m:>s no a 
2. ii:lstnm.ere1 ho di 'Vides th~m 
III. 286. 
' r ill.ti a• nd I iati ono t. 
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being related; for example , 1 'rhe earth is in motion I J 
here, motion is spoken of as i £' it were 'receptacle ' in 
which the earth is 'longed ' . Bentham goes on to show at 
so:ne length the speci ic prepo3itions with which different 
fictitious entities are integrally connected. His scheme of 
classification would thus jield four kinds of entities -
perceptible and real, perceptible and fictitious, inferential 
and real, and finally inferential 8Jld fictitious . 3enthem, 
however , does not give a single exanple of the oo cond , and 
does not say anyth "ng more about it . Further , having defined 
an entity in terms of grammar , he evidently finds it difficult 
to distinguish between real and fictiti ous entities in terms 
of their grammatical stats , since a. criterion independent 
o f gr rmnar is needed to ascer tain whether or not an entity 
is real or ficttti ous; he t here1\,_'o falls back on the other 
distinction, e.nd d~fines both these in tenns of perceiva-
bility. 
Anything that can be perceived is real . Our perceptions 
are r -= alJ we ·1cnow them im!:!ediately, and our persl,asion of 
thei existence is 'more necessary and irresistible ' than 
that of anything else . Some may argue they are not real 
entities a.a they are not solid or permanent , but there is 
no 1 su.ffi cient or ju.st reason ' why either of these must be 
considered ' the essence of reality '. As to corporeal 
substances , we infer their existence fr,om our perceptions i 
but this inferenoP. io no 'necessary' Md ' irresistible ' th.at 
we cannot but admit that they exit . Besides, ' suppose ' 
their non-existence and 'act upon it ' , and ' the pain, the 
perception of pain, nll at once bear ag inst you ' J this 
' punishment ' convinces you of thoir reality. In the case of 
inferential incorporal substances, 'no such immediate 
1 punishoent will follovr•. Though ,,e cannot doubt the 
reality of oorporAl substanoes, it remains true th tour 
knowledge of them has the character of an inference1 ' with 
reference and in oontrodiatinction' to perception, tbey are 
' inferential ' entities, and percept ions are ' the sol e 
perceptible' entities. ' The reality o_f a body of ny kind 
oan b establishe ' c,nly by the ev1denos afforded by 
perceptions'f the lattex therefore pos esa reality in a 
2 
' h1 er degTee', 
Elsowhere3 he adga.noes a differont ontological and 
epistemologioal position. Our knowledg of the exist ence of bodies 
ia not a matto~ of inforenco from our sensations , be they those of 
pain r of any other kind, but of ' one of the f1 ,,.e eenaea nd in 
partioul r of the sense of touch'. Any • tangible 
obl~ot ' ie real, •aa thio man, thia be st, thie bird.' J ' th 
1 . 'III.197 
2. Ibid . ,196. 
3. Ibi d.,327 
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object spoken of may be termed a real entity' as its 
e d.stence 1is made kno'Wil to us by one or more of our five 
senses •. A real entity is defined as •a substance - an 
objeot., the existence of whioh is made kno'Wil to us by one or 
more of our five senses ' , 'say, in a wrd, where the object 
is a tangible one •. ' A real entity is either a person or a 
thing, a substance rational or a substance not r ational '• 
This account, it seems to me, is different from the earlier 
one both ontologically and epistemologicallyz ontologically, 
because concrete and perceptible individual objects a.re here 
considered primarily real, while in the earlier account this 
status was given to sens tions; epistemologically, bee use 
here our knowledge of these individual objects is direct and 
not inf rential, wile in the earlier account it was 
mediated and inferential. I shall argue later that these 
two different ontological and epistemological positions which 
may, for convenience, be ca.11 d Senaationa.lism and Reallsm1, 
may perhaps account for two different theorie of quality 
that are discernible in Bentham' s works . 
1. Realism is, of course, a highly ambiguous term and has been 
used to describe at least tw different ontological positions: 
(1) that universals subsist apart from their individual instances ; 
and (2) that physical objects exist independently of being thought 
or perceivedJ I shall use it to refer to (2) . When used in this 
sense, there are several cliff ere'nt kinds of Realism - critical 
Realism, New Realism, Naive Realism, etc. ; Bentham' s position 
wuld seem to come very close to New Realism in that peysical 
objects for him are immediately perceived, and not through the 
medium of sensations. 
tl, 
In either case, ho ever, his account of fi ctitio 
entities remains more or less the same . fictitious entity 
is one 'the existence of which is fe i gned by the imagination 
for t he purposes of discourse;' it has no r e l existence 
and cannot be perceived by the senses . Examples of them 
are motion, ei:istence , time, obliga t ion, otc .. 'l'hey are 
classif ied into various groups, such as ' physical fictitious 
entities' hich include quantity , quality , relation, etc ., 
and 'political and quas i-political f ictitious entities ' which 
include obL.gati on , ri rrht , power , property , etc .. All of 
ll... 1 o\'1e their existence - their impossible , yet indispensable 
existence ' ' to language alone ' • ow, then , can ie deal ith 
them? and why should they be employed at all? 'Every 
fictitious entity bears some relation to some real entity, 
and can not otherr;ise be understood tha.n in so far as that 
relation is obtained . 11 It may be related to a real entity 
directl y , in hich case it is ' a fictitious entity of the first 
remove ', or through another fictitious entity, in which case 
it is a fictitious entity of the second re~ove . 2 Langu 
1 . Ibid., 197 . n.loo , fictitious entity is ' a mere nothing ' , 
and , therefore , a proposition soribi g any property t o it 
cannot be 'in itself and of its lf a true one .' 
2 • Ibid . ee also i bid ., 325 . 
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has two µses - desirna tive or 'intransitive', i •• ·· i ng 
'floati ng' thoughtsJ and cOtll:lunicative or transitive, i.e. 
appealing to other ~en 's unders anding or exciting their will . 
In both t hese a. single word tends to refer not just to a 
single object but also to a class of objects . This is 
very necessary but also most dangerousJas it gives rise to 
an illusion that there must be some entity corresponding to 
such o. general word . Two reasons may be given why this 
should happen . 1-'irs tly , a. general word is used in language 
in the Sa.CJ.a -:-fay in which a word eferring to a. r eal entity 
used , and has the same ammtical status . Secondly, 
our experience of using one word to describe one en tity 
inclines us to believe that to every word there corresponds 
an entity. 
t we must 4o to escape s uch illusions is to take such 
orde or propositions containing them, and tran?la.te them 
into ords or propositions referring t o real entities . Thie 
l 
can be done in two ways • 1Pa.raphrasis 1 and ' Archetypatlon•~ 
1. He also calls the former 'a pointing out of the root of 
the idea' and the latter a pointing out of 'the root of the 
word1 1by which it is deaignated 1 • It must be noted that 
pa.raphrasis is one of the many modes of ' Exposition ', though 
it is the most relevant in this ~onteati the other are 'Synonym-
ation '} 1Illustration' , 1Ex plication 1 , 1Desoription 1 , etc .o 
Ibid ., 246ff . 
/ (, 'f 
The former r.ie:.i.ns ' giving phr..:tse for phrase ', and consists in 
giving for a propositi?n containing a fictitious entity •a 
proposition having for its subject Gomo real entity.' It 
is to be first put into a propositional f o called 
' phraseoplerosis - a completion of the phrase ', atrl then 
arw.lysed. This is because ' In l anguase, t he integer to be 
looked f or is an entire proposition' ; ~eything less can 
communicate nothing. He attacks · ristotle for arg nc t hat 
terms are prior to propositions and for considerinc the latter 
as having ' the character of compounds capable of being composed 
out of these elements •. For Bentham, 1in the first place 
came propositions and that out of these propositions, by 
abstraction and analysis, terma possessed, each of them, of 
an independent import were framed. • 1 By proposition is meant 
a ' logical proposition• 1 and I centence ' may contain one or more 
propositions . The latter, that isJarchetypation consists in 
bringin~ out the archetypal image underlying a fictitious 
entity. A proposition 'With a fictitious entity as its subject 
ad some attribute aa its predicate enerally presents so~J 
image of some real action or state of things, and this ima e ha.a 
(10 
to be brought out. The image 'Will always be of something physical, 
and thus the process of archetypution may also be charncterised 
as tracing ' the origin of the psychological in some physical 
1. vrrr . 322. 
idea'• ' There ie no name of a poyohiQ.'ll entity whiob ia 
not also th2 nano of a phyeio 1 entity, in •hioh oapatity 
alo 1 t must h vo oontinued to h..1.vo '1:>eon ployed long 
before it waG tran er.rod to the fiald Oi p ohioal ontitiea'. 
' Every p oholo cal proposi t ion hno, for its arohotype, a 
l physieal propcoition ' . Benthac giv .. s numb of e mpl s 
to 1llustr t t , l t ha moans by P ruphra i and arohetypation. 
' vblisation' is fiotit ioua ent1tyJ t ere ia nothing roal 
t o ffllioh it r efers, thou de fool as i it doos ihon w 
ay, for exampl 1 th t ' X --!! n obl1e· ti n 
this 11DPoG1tion rGnlly meano i s thn.t a. o 
Y. • 
conduot 1 
t 
inoumbont on XJ t thi in turn . a.no in that, if X r ils 
to behave in oort n y , ho will be subj. oted to P' 1n. 
To convey this 'ide of ~ventu.nl oens tion• and to d eignate 
'the event on the happ n1 o oh ch oonna ion is 
oonsid ed e boing about to t ak laoo' i to offer the 
paraphrasi"' of the t ict1on of • obli t i on•. To f'Urth r 
bring out the 1 ge underlying i t , th •ot a man lying 
do with hoavy bo y pressing upon him' 1 
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l nguage, ibid. , 22 9. 
archetypation.1 It io the doing of both these and the 
consequent resolu ion of fictitious entities into something 
' real ' th t constitutes the 'logical analysis ' of fictions , 
and is one of the primary jobs of a philisophar. 
Bentham liked to believe that his theory of fiotiona 
was a great contribution to the logia of praotioe, which 
includes morals and politioa, and that it represented an 
advance on the Ariotot 11nn logio. If definition is under-
stood in the Ariototelian manner as ' per genus et differentium', 
a fictitious entity can not be defined as it has no genusi 
a right or an obligation,for example, 'is ,!!.21 a species of anything.• 
All real entities onn have a genus, but no fictitious entity can have 
it . Thus the Aristotelian logia which knows only the technique 
of definition proves totally inadequate in dealing with 
fictitious entities, . dis therefore of no use whatever in 
morals and politic& where such ontitios abound. Its 
categories are best fitted to doal \vith the real and conorete 
entities like men and a imals and pl ts, but are utterly 
inap:plicabl to ' abstract • and fictitious• entities like 
righta and obligations 2• Tor d al with the entities of the latter 
1 . Elaewh re ho eJCI)rooaed thi as ' the image of £2!:!!, or any other 
lli or b~ by which the objoot in qu stion is b und, or fastened to 
any other.' Further, the root of th~~ of obligation 'lies in a 
material image, exposed as an archatYl")e', i.e. the image of being tied 
by a cord. 
2. see , particvlarl yt~b1d., 25lf, 292, and 5931 also Xl45• •o Lo 
oome to the aid of toy maeter,Legisl tion•. 
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kind a different teohnique i s required; and this technique, 
as we have seen, i a paraphrasis which thus ' performs in 
relation to the name of the fictitious subject the same sort 
of office which for tho name of a real entity, i s perfonned 
by a definition of the ordinary stamp•. Before we see the 
sort of analysis that Bentham himself offers of the moral and 
political fictitious entities, we hhall have first to 
ascertain what ha takes to be the moral and politioal realities J that 
is, what he talces to bathe real entities in the fields of morale 
and politics. Since mo:ralo and Politics for him are aotivitios of men 
pursuing enda detenninod b; their natural peyohological 
constitution, moral and political real entities are none but 
psyohological real entities. We shall therefore first 
acquaint ourselves with hie analveie of t he human mind. 
:Bentham divides ' the whol e structure of the mind ' into 
• two faculties', perceptive and appetitive; to the former 
belong ' all mental experiences' , and to the latter ' all mental 
operations _ nd their rooults•. 1 Perception or experienoa 
is dividod into 1 pat ematio perceptions ' or those perceptions 
consisting of or att~ndod with ' sensations or feelings 
either of pain or pleasure ' , 1d 1 apathemat1o perceptions ' or 
t hose not oonaisti of or uttended ,nth Pain or pleasure. 
NO\v pain and plensure opera-ta e motives in th , production 
l . VIII. 279-80 
of d~sir"3B And thuo belonr to the appert.itive f aculty as well; 
they ' compose therefore , asit wer e , the bond of union And 
chAnnal of communication between the t wo f nculties. •1 
Pf'3roeptionfl , pathematio or apnt.hematic , are devided 
into t hose involvin_17,, and those not involvil)[•· , judgment. A 
judgment-involvin~r perception i s al way;l l i able to error, while 
the one not involvin:?; it i s not; f or exampl e , ' th"t I see 
"'<'mething, i. e. thAt on the r etin·\ of' my eyes an image i s 
depicted, in ilis i s no error; ' but in my j udgment that it 
i e ' a di stant hill', I may be in error, ainoe it may, in faot, 
be ' a oloud '. 'where mind passivoly r eceives things, it can 
2 
never be mist Rken; where it becomes aotivo and begins to 
judge things, it b ecomes liable to error. Logically a 
proposition eXl,)r essing a simple sensation i s very different 
in oher aoter from that expr esoi ng ' the exist ence of a m tter 
of fR ct exterior to the person of the spanker ' , since in 
the case of the latter one is al yo i mplyi , ' this is my 
opinion or judgment ' , but not in the case of the formerJ for 
example, to a y ' this pen erlsta ' i s to aay, ' my opinion 
is that this pen exist s ' , and, as in all opinions, one mny be 
1. Ibid• J see al so I. 205 
2. III . 320 
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mistaken. But in the case of a proposition expressing a 
sensation , one is absolutely certain, and one ' s statement is 
the description of a fact and not an expression of a judgment . 
In moral terms, this means th9t one can never be mistaken 
about one's pleasures; that is about whether or not a given 
object gives one pleasur e; but one is liable to be mistaken 
about the means of achieving them. As to how our judgment 
reg·.J"d.ing a given object can be verified, the answer Bentham 
implies is that in every judgment we are making a prediction; 
to say 'that is a hill' is to say that, if one looks again , the 
same image will be seen. 
sorts of sensations . 
To judge is to expect certain 
In an earlier argument, liowever , he had argued that our 
judgments are verified in terms of the sensations of pleasure 
and pain, and particularly of pain . Now that arguement is 
obivously at o1ds with the present one where prediction, 
expecta tion and subsequent confir mation by the recurrence of 
the same sensation under the same conditions are considered 
the criterion of reality. The latter is a straighCforward 
sensationalist argument, while the argument earlier advanced 
was a hedonistic one . This is not to imply that 
sensntionalism and hedonism are incompatible , but only t hat 
they are not logically identic 1. It is not necessary that 
l 
a sensationalist must be a hedonist nor, even, that a hedonist 
must bo a sensationaliat . A hedonist must, of course, 
take pleasure and pain alone as real, but may not then go 
on to understand them ns atomio and distinct sensations, 
taking pleasure and pain alone us real does not necessarily 
entail any specific view about their real nature . For this 
very reason a hedonist can as well be a aensationlist 
without incurring any charge of 1noons1stenoy. However, he 
is a particular kind of sensationlist in as much as, though he is 
committed to oonsidoring sensations alone as real , he is equally 
committed to consi dering only certain sorts of sensations, 
that i s , those of pleasure and pain, as re l . llke all sensation-
alists, he too connects these oensations in terms of certain 
general laws, and can justifiably advance similarity and 
contiguity as sunh laws. But he must underatand them 
in terms of pleasure and pain1 similar sensations can be 
connected, but not§.& 3imilar eenaations1 only the 
eenaationa of pleasure, th tis to say, only the sensations 
similar in being pleasant or, more narrowly; perhaps, only 
the sensations of certain nda of pleasure must be so 
connected. This i s equally true of the sensations of pain. 
Further, not only similarity but also oontiguity and causality~ 
1 . It is interesting, howeve1·, tp note that many sensat i onalists 
in the history of philosophy have ~leo been hedonists. 
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must be likewise hedoniatioall inter r e t ed. A 
hedonis t's general e~iatemol o; , lo i c, methodolo y , et o.> 
mus t also e s imilarly orient t ed . e must aooount for r utiona-
lity and its exercise in terms of man 's oonoern to avoid 
pain and obt in pleasur e . lie mus t also ar uo that mind's 
essential na ture i s oonati ve rat her t han oo nutive . Men must 
be i nter1 reted as beoomin a t~ar of themselves , of other 
men, 9nd of things around th em in t erms of pleasure and 
pai n, and as i dent ifyin and reco nisin others only a 
sources of pleasures or pains . All this is intended to imply 
that hedonism i s not j ust a psy ohologioal th ory deaorl binB 
,1ow me n behave and why, nor just an ethi cal theory presoribin 
the ends of human actions or l yin1 do ~the standard of 
moraJ.\evaluation , but that, and mor e importantly , it i a a 
ph~loaophical theory, or better, a philosophy . It offers 
certain defini te views on the n t ure and criteria of reali Yt 
on opist emolo y , on l o3i c , on me thodology, on the ineso publc 
feat ures of human existeno o , on the nat uro of m- •a oa~a citics, 
eto •• One ooroll y of thio i s that t ho usual division of 
hedonism into peyoholo i oal hedonism and ethioal hedonism is 
inadequ te bec ause it fails to notice i ts philooo hloal 
character, o.nd, as a result, fails to observe that both t n 
p~yoholo i oal and t he ethical hedonism are int •grally 
connected throu h pr esuppoain a oommon philosopiioal t heory . 
/7) 
How Dentho.r.i iG a hcdonint; he gives a hedoni~t account 
of reality, of epistemology, 1 of logic, 2 of methodology, 3 
of reaso 4 of the nature of man, etc .. Pleasure and Pain, he 
argues, are the sole psychological or human realities; they 
are ' the roots - the main pill rs or found tions of all the 
rent, - the r.iatter of which all the rest are com: ,osed. 1 5 
One may employ, if one likes, any other 1physical image ' to 
describe the relationship between them and other poychologica.l 
entities as long a.s one ars in mind that ' without ny or the 
rest, these (i . e . pleasure and pain) are susceptible of existence•, 
but that ' without these, no one of all those others over had, or 
ever could have had, existence.• 6 All psychologica.1, political 
and moral entities have meaning only when related to pleasure and 
pain: ' the class of political, including lego.l, fictitious entities ' 
is to be related •to the fundamental ides of pain and ple sure ', 
1 . VIII . 197. 
2. Ibid. 22; also, ibid., 232. 
.3 . Principlefi• oh. XVIII . Para LVII • 
4. n .455rf. 
5. 1 . 2U. 
6. Ibid . 
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J~ rc1. ... t~c.. un; 
-~ll be s,3e 'l.0 ,_.,... 7 ,r "c, t.·1 ~-- '1 u· C'' l .., • ,...., 4,J V • • -oJ. J to ~le .u~~, q 1 
Or ta.le '-"!>1cific v·rtuos l·ko 
:'rio. ds: ip, hu:uni ty and p .:.r:i.otion; the· 'lra 'lot.hi 1 • ut 
~j-. ~)1...tlzy- .:.~ t;.1,.t mdo to 1 s ·.r ·le i i· id 1, it is 
n.tio , 1 p •blic spi :dt 01· p.4triotiar:i 1 ; 
1
: •• cn to .. ni :J.in, ' pi tl· or con:.:,> c!Jio. ' • In si ort., e.11 
· rJ.1 ~m: pcl: t.icw fictitiotW e .t.:.ti es r o ultifil t ly 
~3dt..cible. to s_tJecific ple-_s·:re::; and ino o ich they ·c 
com:; sed 1.nd to 1 nich they r efer, ~nd uot Jeno rd ce f 
'.'i.;f expl unation of ti I is to be adeq to . Bccaur pleasure 
't 1d 'li "\ ·ir e t l-:c sole rc1litics, all jtwtiflc tions nd 
e.'(pl<i tion:; mu..,t oe :l.n their terms . Th~. s o.l::;o off ere the 
i'7'1 
cl'itcrio;,1. of the ,ide:-;,ua cy of any n.n~l/sis of ,1 concept or a 
problc 1 or a si tID tion: only that an:ilysiJ is adequate wldch 
analyses .'.'. ,1d ex. la.ins all aspects o.!.' .'.l [;ivc:1 problen in 
terms of pleasure n.nd puin and wes no 1v1gu'1 1 or ·-:eaninglcss 
words, tlnt is; those not red ciblc: to plou::rnre and pain. \s 
to how nsycholor,:ic:tl fictitious enti ti~s like emotion, rnoti ve 
desire, interest, passion, dispooition, inclimtion and will 
can be reduced to pleasure a!'ld p~in, 301thar: ' s uccount is 
f.:.iirly familiar . 1 7Nery- opero.tion of tho mind ' thence every 
operation of the boy is the result of an oxorcise of the will 
or volitional faculty '; thi f culty is a. br...1.nch of the appetitive 
faculty ' in w 'ch desire ••• haa lace 1 • ' Desire bas for its 
obj ct oithar pleusure or pai , or, whut ia co only tho case, a 
mixture of both. 1 When desire is conaidcred as having 
produced or operating to rds tho pro able ro uction of a 
result, it is called 1a motive ' ; a act of r.ill o tly takes 
place in consequence of u denire oper~ti11g as a motive . 
1;ow ' no desire can take plnce unless ir: en the id of pl easure 
or pain, in some h1pc or de3Tae, hn.s place . ' ' T ke 
away all pleasure and al.l puin, and ou have no deoire . • 
hus every action is the result of will , and will is or1 
is produced by a de s ire operatin as a moti ve ; if t he 
desire ie ineffective, no act of will results . In al.l oases 
desire c auses vill, and all desire is f or pleasure and away 
from ~ain. o desire oan exist in t he absenoc of an idea 
of pleasure or pain even if the latter is ' minute in the 
extreme'; d UOh an idea io ' r equisi te and suffiolent t o the 
formation of a desire.' 
Bent.10.m understands motive as 'power', aomethin 
1orcin or puohing man to c tion; because of this, 
he art;;uea, ·hen the t ndenoy of a desire i s to 
restrain and not to produc e ,rui otion, 'the term 
motive cannot be employ ed wi thout a oontr diction in 
terms . ' his understandin of mo tive is so revealed in 
what Bentham t akes to be its synonyms; viz.; ' induo ment' , 
l. Bentham is ambi uous on t hio point. 6 ill is 
produc ed b d sire ; but h al.so says tha t 1i l l xi ta ,hen 
the production of the st te or thins which i s t he immediate 
objeot of the d sire is oonsii r ed as tollo i ng i mmediat ly 
and o rtn.inly pon the existenoe of the desire . 
2 . I . 208 . 
{%( 
'spur' and 'i 1citement11• Th r L tion tween rnotiv a 
.laasl.lN is vacy cl:1 .... e. ?leasure is .r t all lm it, 
but it c top rte •us a sprin or action ••• but in o 
f ir .,s, in the articul 1r direction in question, ctio i 
, . 
.. , means of obta.ini ,.. it1 ; 
u:.ich camot oper~te a a motive e·cept in so£ r s th 
specific !l.Ction io r arded · s m Il3 of obtai ni ~ it 
Jne chieves loasure or 1voids p•in throu h c.n action ch 
on wuld not do unless o e know it s chievin 
ple.sure or avoid! pin; p1 a.sure h re op ta 11n the 
ch actor of a otive ' ; o doee t h VO motive to 
·-
plei sure.> oince pl sure its lf ia · .otive. 3y definition, 
very motive s some 1 neure 1£or its b oi 1 • 2 Ther 
can be no action vithout motivo, ad all motiv 
pleasure or p n thair basis. All ctions th 
1 . Bentham, how ver, i not entirely clear nd co istent, 
nd also holds a rather diffe nt vi "that n appre nds 
ple sure in a thing, -which t hen ttracte him fro out thor 
.I ) 
and thus conatituteo otive for ction, Thie istot llan 
unmov d mov r-like cru ct r of ple ur is e in th other 
ive Yll0?13JIW ot motiv tmt he lists, 1 . e. ' i t tion•, 
1sollcitat1on11 1allur nt•,. •e tio m nt• nd •temp tion•. 
2• Ibid. , 211 • . 
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deter• ,in•Jd by plensure or pai:1, .nd t:oter ".ined mechanistically 
as natives re , or are li.e, forces acting on men ' s minds 
and necessarily lcadinz them to act in certain specific ways . 
:..ver-J :,;otive, Je 1thar,1 goes on, has a corres~oni ing 
interest . lie also connects interest and le '.l.Sl.ll'o very 
closely. Thero in no inconsiste.~y involved here, since 
nctivo is nothin6 but pleasure oper~ting in a ce:::-t-in charo.cter . 
A rr~:1 is said to have an interest in a.-,y subject 1 in so far 
as the.t su"::>ject is c nsidcred r.iorc or less 111:ely to be to 
him a source of ,1e sure or exemption•;1 tho subj~ct 
concernnd m: ~- De a thing, in which case uo tal . of use, or a 
person, in ,rhich case we talk of pervic.;; . ' Intereot ' t hus 
refers to a. thing Yhich leads to pleasure., i . e . to a ' meann ' 
to or ' source ' of pleasure ; it is a matter of utility., hich, 
in turn., is defined in ter1JS of pleasure and p in. Every 
pl easure and ,t1ain has a. correspondin0 interest ; the pain of 
death or bodily pain, for axanple., has the correspo".lding 
intorest·of existence ; tho pain of fatigue or lnbour has 
the interest of tho pillow; tho pleasure of symp~thy' h:is 
the 1intereot of the heart '. There io er t cloa.l of 
confusion in this attempt to rel te pleasure nd interest . 
It is, to say the least, very curious to argue t. t the heart 
is the interost of symp.thy in the sumo sense s the pil l olJ 
is of fatigue . One can detect · nt least four different 
1 . Ibid. , 207 . 
relationships between them in 3entha. .• (1) Iitcrest is 
what leads to or is likely to lead to pleasure; interest is here 
u means to pleasure which is a.n end. (2) Interest is identified 
ui th pleas ui·e; a thing I pro notes ~ruur inter0.., t 1 , for example, 
if it ' increises your pleasure •. ( ) Inter~st is in some 
::ier1se prior to pleasure: tret act~on is f;OOd \lhich increases 
the huppi~ess of him ' whose interest is in quention' . (4) 
Interest is a.1 objective correlate of :tJle::isuro . Pleasures 
and pains of a r.1an 1re extremely priv.ite; when thorqfore 
they app0ar in the interpersonal realm, which they rust if 
they are to have any role in nioro.ls and politics, they cannot 
appeJ.r as pleasure and pai but only in the foro of interests . 1 
lnterzsts , unlike pleasures and pains, ire objective and 
identifi~blo, can be secured and protected by law, and 
possess a certain durability; oth rs ca identify them and 
thus know wh.J.t my int rests r and where they lie J 
they can then know what not to disturb and \-h1.t to stay away 
from . 11 this does not a;ply to pleasure and pin whioh, 
"being private ad not fully identifiable, ar incap ble of 
ere ting u common politic 1 society, whic, · eing 
tr nsicnt, are h5rdly cap l of mak.i it sti ~ nd durable . 2 
1 . Pr inciples Ch. I . Paru. 5. 
2. Durabilit:r, in fact, is one of. the two central fe1turee 
of pollticul society as Be ntham defines it . 
Fragment on Government ', Ch. 1. Para 13. 
See 1 
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This would mean that pleasure and pain are the sole peyoholog-
ioal r ealities and that interests are the sole politioal 
realities; pleasure and pain may lie at the basis of interests, 
but in politios only the l atter would have a meaning and relevance . 
Ae we shall soe, Bentham does not and oannot t ake this position, 
and t reats pleasure and pain alone as political ( and moral) r ealities. 
No Benthl!lll does seem to see these and various other difficulties 
conf ront ing a thorough-goi ng hedonist as is obvious in hie 
very at tempt to introduce the category of interest and 
relate it to pleasure; foti e is private but pillow 
1 gives it a public character. However, the relationship 
between the two is not clearly orked outJ what is more, 
havi started with pleasure and pain as the sole r ealities , 
he oan define inter est only as amens to pleasure or pain. 
Besides, though inter ests can be identified, they are not the 
2 
sorta of things that oan be measured or even totalled up, 
1. The relation bet aen pl asure and interoet ie one of the 
most contusing and confused aspects of Bentham ' s tho ht . This 
is no less true of J . S. ill . See, for example , ' On Liberty', 
Ch. IV., also, ' Utilitarianism', Ch.IIs h ppiness' epeaking 
praotioally' may be called ' inter est '. 
2. One oan easily speak of ' the greatest happin es' or ' the 
greatest poesiblo ppines • but -not of' the greatest intejest ' 
or ' the greatest possible interest •. 
while J , 1thn.m • s main interest i;:, precisely in measurement . 
Fin1llJ., when he t.1lks of interest he uses the term in a. 
descriptive .i.nd not a. normative sense as, for ex:ampl , 
J . J . 1111 does . Having a certain view bout ' the desticy1 
of man, Iill is able to specify the conuitiom integr1lly 
connected with it, o.nd call then • t'1e permanent interest s of 
rnanldnd 1 • l3 ,nth.:l.m sees no .10rr.1 outside or the things r:ien 
find their ~Jle:isures in, and, as such, men I o interosto can 
o:lly je detarmined by scert ainL1e wh t objects di forent men 
find their pleasures in. Correspo,1di 0 ly, in order :for an 
objact to ,:>e considered n ttor of univars 1 interest., it will 
have to · e presupposed th tall men fe 1 t h corresponding 
t,ind of pl easure, that is; th:l.t they ..i.r uniform in this 
p~rticu.lar respect : men can h1vc . co on inter~sts only if 
they are all constituted alike . ~ie is thus con_,tr~ined to 
o.ssut1.o th, -uniformity of hu:mun n1turo if he is to e, lain the 
e:dst nee of politi cal societies. 
It is the definition of interest in terms of ploasure 
that r~ovides ooth the psychological d tho opi~temologieal 
found.J.tio of Bentha.r.l. 1 s eeoistic account of human conduct . Man 
can bo guided only by pleasure a p in. :ow, sit is only' 
his own pleasur- th1t ho cun dir0ctly nd im .edi~tely f el, 
and s others ' pleasure o.nd pin ca affect him o:ily by first 
affecting his ow pl ea.sure and · in, · n e gui d d only by 
his own pleaoure and pain~ .:,very rran thus is an GE,roist. 
Egoism is an ambiguous expression, and its philosophical 
and popular senses need to be distinguished. 
ln the forn~r 3ense, it implies egocentricity, and means 
that a nun ct .. l be guided only by his o;m feelings and 
se~J.tim9nts; in tho latter, it implies wl t fo commonly 
c lled ' celiishnoss 1 1 and means thJ.t a Il"l.n c..1.res only for 
hinoelf . ':'he ciistinction c .. :i :.;c expressed b,r ref erring to the 
former as 1 self-ish ' and to the 1.-l,ter an I sclfi. 1 1 • The 
two senseri are not neces s.rily collilscted. · hon I ,:ive 
aua1 all my property in ch~rity ~ec~uso this gives n pleasure, 
I au, of cour:::.e, ::ioi~ g.u od by tho c::>!1.niderations of 
my o,m pleasure, but 1 am • ot t 11 'bcin, 1 self isl. '. , s 
I can e 1.otiv<>ted only by lilY own pleasure, 1. can pursue only 
r....y oi.m pleasure; but w:;r pleasure ma:y- be uch that it is found 
only in viving pleaoure to others . 1 It all depends on tho 
nature and the ranee of the self th.1t i bei c red for . a 
enth n: saJ-s, " 'e see ourselves doubl d in thos ,:e lovo; and 
it is by n - :neans possible to love ourselves ~etter in those 
others than in our ct1.1.1l self '. 
th.is io only another mode of lovi 
·e c n love other , though 
ouraelVOfl • To use the la.n-
gu, .• ce of interest ~s Bentham does , evory o.ction is interested, 
since there is no action \ · thout a. r.:otiv , every raotive has 
1 a corros.Joruling intere t ' . 1 ro hu:, n o.ction ov ... r has been, 
or ever can be, disint root d1 • 2 When ctioru:; or en arc 
1 . This, of course, m37 not and does t always happen, and I 
may find pleasure i. thinus th ·t c~u.se ore pin to others; the 
-problem of harmonising the two io one of tho main problems of 
morals and legislation. 
2. 1. 212. But he also t al.lr..s of aymp thy as an independent pri 
ciple and not fully reducible to self- interest ; this is inconsistency. 
called disinterested, the only meaning thiB term h..ls is that 
the ' interest of the ·self-re arding class' is absent ; but 
this is its narrow and ' more confined ' meanin ; etymologically, 
it means absence of all interest, and this is psychologically 
impossible . This, however, does not detr act from the ' merit ' 
of the action believed to be disinterested . 
From the epistemological standpoint, the definition of 
interest in terms of pleasure means th!l.t 1t hero is no one who 
knows what is for your interest so well as yourself'. 
Interest is what gives pleasure, and pleasure is something 
intensely personal as only you know where you find pleasure 
and pain. This immediately involves Bentham in a dilemmat 
if a man never know where another's pleasures lie, how is a 
political society possible at all? His answer is interesting. 
There is a high degree of uniformity amon men so f ar as pain 
is concerned, and fortun:i.tely it is this that a le islator is 
mainly concerned with. All men find it painful to starve, 
to see their expectations frustrated, etc.; from this we 
can easily conclude that a government committed to the 
greatest happiness of the community is to aim at achieving 
security and subsistence for all. True, the a.mount of pa.in 
different men experience from star'IB.tion, etc . may vary-, but 
to a legislator looking at m h ' from a great height ' these 
differences do not appear at all. As to pleasure, there is 
a lesser degree of uniformity among men. Fortunately, however, 
money is the universal instruoent of pleasure . A 1 gislator 
thus is again not handica)ped, since all he has to do is to 
aim at achieving ' abundance ', that is, gener 1 procpcrity and 
economic development . Once he has ensured th:it there is 
plenty of money around, he is to leave individuo.l citizens 
free to use it to obtain their diverse plcasuren . Once t hese 
tt10 assur.iptions n.re ma.de - thn.t mer: arc uniforn in the sources 
of their pain n.nd that money is the source am measure of 
nearly all of their pleasures, it becomes easy for B2nth.am 
to construct a durable political society on the b sis of 
the fleeting and privat e ensations of ploas'UI'e and pain. 
In the light of this account·of B nth3.m1o psychology, 
we may now examine the relationohip betwe n the two faculties 
that w noted earlier, i . e. the perceptive and tho ppet itivo 
faculties of mind . The former, ue have oen• i passive, 
and is referred to a.s ' exper ience ', wile the lattor 
c acterises the active side of ma , · is ref rred to as 
1 operation 1 • . study of the features of the former is 
called a logic of ' the undorsts.ndinP, ', nd. that of the latter 
1a logic of tho will'. or these tw ~ranches of logic, 
1th.at recondite art, istotle s w o;ily' tho former, and the. 
1ouccecdi - lo ciuns, tre ding tho ~teps 0£ their coat 
founder, have concurred in e ai ng v.tth no oth r eyes .• 2 
1. inciples , Preface, para. 35 . 
2. Ibid. 
Bentham rejects this Aristotelian tradition and holds the 
opposite view that it is the logic of tho will that is 
extremely important in understanding morale and politics. 
Of this logic ' tho soience of law, considered in respect of 
its form, is the most impartnnt branoh ••• It ie to the art 
of legislation what the scienoe of anatomy is to the art of 
medicine: with this difference thnt the subjeot of it is 
what the artist has to work with, instead of bei what he has 
to ork~•• The body politic ia no lose ' in danger' 
without it 'than the body natural from ignorance in tho other.' 
It is ' so intimately cormected' \vith the logic of the 
understanding that hardly any differenoe oan be pointed out 
between the t oJ ' whatever differenoe there is in point of 
importance ie in fawour of the logic of tho will , since it 
ie only by their oapacity of directi the operations of this 
faculty that the operRtions o the understandings are of any 
consequence.• All mental operations are aaused by the 
desire for pleasure and tho aversion for pain. All 
plaasuros and pains, since thoy are ' experiences', are 
experienoed in perception, that is;are experienoed by th perceptive 
faculty . All tho ht and action thus arise from the stimulants 
experienced in perception, and all thought ultimately aims at 
discovering the oauseo o pleasure and pain and at guiding and helping 
aotion. The mind of mai1 can be moved in all its operations 
only by pleasure and pain and can take only the direction 
sug:,~ete by hem. Un erstHr.di115 1fl aubor in, t d t n will 
everi at t fo el OJ. mo iv~e - ~ tivo a .. ~ will i . the 
form of nesi . s, rm 1 und :iretsndinr, :tn th '• . ru o • a.ny 
cons i i,rat1on - t n ,\-;,parent t~d n :1 of ~hi h 1:: to givo 
1nor : ·H10 t o tho offi!'lionc~• of t '1o enirc i n the o nr .. ter of 
1 
a mo tive to tho will. ' 'The 1 aa of -:>lo . l"O or n.in 
c.;1pli es in -th.ti tr t instanc to t o ,rl.11 . i ch than, immadi-
ot -J.·• '.let • I hie de" 1a ' not con.a civ • , t e will of0rs 
to it th ur.c.ers o dil'lC w icb c 1 nt h,.. b.,l n~o of 
plea~u:c-e :::1.d pr,.in1 the ~u g .nt o. th i 
that the s rpluc of plo 0 ure ia €,'Oin c tor Ol t from tis 
~otion, the r uault 1a thg v~lition, Ol!O f 
is th,:, 111,~nd o t ' the r:r. Pponding R.Otl is th13 
2 q_u noe. ' Thus t eO'J ntly to otio the 
11 i s al "":re 1n ex roi e , but ' n t rm th und standing'. 
~esidec, , . t opor t on motives t o th~ under t ,n 1rte: 1 o 
11 ineo ' u':> , t •, lOUld not b 
motivN • Th oonv ree 1:loc o not hold o .. ' 3 Th con id rations 
th t opern·e in thr om o mot o to the nd rston iing oper t 
' in subaervienoe to ' the motivee o tho 11. ' f .oul ty• 
l. I. 208 
2. Ibid., 209 
3. Ib1d.t 208 
1q1 
oi' un.~9rsta_1::lin,..; thus iG po.;terior to the faculty of \Jill, 
i~ activitJd by it, and is subordiruted to it, an it engages 
itself only with the problerJS that the will preDents . It ha.a 
no innor dynar;usm of its own., nor o.ny autonomous )rinciple of 
notion, nnd is concerned with increasin;_; the ef1iciency of a 
de;.3ire by showing how it cun best or most ' econo ·1ica.lly' be 
satisfied; it is , that is to say, concer ed only b~th the 
' means • . This primacy of will over und.erst nding implies 
that the pursuit of lm.ouledge or, for that matt.er, of any other 
actiYity is ultimately motivated by a concern forjrran ' s pleasure 
and is directed towards maximising it . This mec.ns, as we 
shall see later) that all errors lie only in the understanding 
and not at all in the will. 
ll 
Proof of the Pl'inciple of Utility 
Since the principle of utility occupies a central place 
in Bentham I s theor,\ of morals and legislation, and since 
all institutions and practices, i:1cluding equality and ineq-
u.ali ty , are evaluated and justified or disapproved in its 
terms , the manner in which he proves it is of crucial sig-
nificance •• 'By the principle of utility is meant tha.t prin-
ciple which approves or disa.ppproves of every action whatsoever , 
according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment 
or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in 
question. ' 1 2 But a little later he formulates it slightly 
dif .:eren tly, and talks of t the happiness of the oommuni ty1 e.nd 
not of ' the party whose interest is in question•. Elsewhere,' 
ha .l..1.a,1>lies that ' conformable to the principle of utility ' means 
1 . Principles, ch . I, Para 2. 
2 . Ibid., Para 9. 
3. Ibid . , Para 6. 
rq 3 
concerning ' the cor:!' unity at largl:'!' • There seems to be an 
inconsistency beh.een the two formula.tiona . Cne formulation 
asserts that :1en' o actions are to be ,judged by the standard 
of the ha ,_f;ineos of the community . .1.he other fonn.ula tion 
·.:- _,,.tai,1s , :-,n the other hand, that we are to jud theo by 
the otar.da.rd of the happiness of those involved; thi□ would 
nean th.nt the actions affecting the agent alone are to be 
judged in tenno of \1hcther or not the:, ::iaximise his happiness . 
This inconsistency seems to oprinr from Bentham ' s concern t o 
so foruulate the principle of u i~ity that it is spplicable 
E.Q.1h to 'priva te ethics ' whe~e, accordin~ to him., one ' o own 
maxi.raUI:1 happineos is the otn.d.ard, and to legislation wher e 
the raaxinura r..a!'tiness of the community is the sole standard.1 
In its ei thor formulation , however , the principle cont::'dno two 
different propositions . (a) 'every action is to be Judged in 
terms of some external consideration and not , for example , in 
termo of its purely fo1mal character or the motivo under lying it . 
1. Ibid . , ch . XVII, P r 3 ff . 
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(b) Pleasure and pain , ·nnd not Gome ' fictitious ' entities 
like justice or per:foction or oelf-realioation or God ' s 
will, a.re to be m1ch extenml ccnnid.orations; and ,. even ·1hen 
pleasure e.nd pain a.re admitted , it is pleasure and not pain 
in terms of which the ntandard of evaluation ie to be for-
mul ted t ,g-ood action is one that leads to plea.sure , and 
not one that leads to pain . .ihen Bentham tries to prove 
the principle of utility , what he has to prove is both (a) 
end (b) . As the propositions to be proved are different they 
must be proved in dif~erent ways, and the composite proof 
thut Bentha~ offers will have to be broken down into two sep-
arate proofs for each of them . It may be asked if the deoom-
posi tion of the principle of utility does not involve imposing 
a distinction on Bentham that e hioself never thought of, and 
if any support can be found in his writings for decomposing his 
1proof 1 in this '~• Both these can be satisf ctorily answered . 
One easy and gmeral ammer could be that (a) and (b) are log-
ically distinct; (a) does not entail (b), a.nd one can a.ccopt 
it without accepting (b) . Their •proofs ' therefore should be 
kept separate . There is, further, an over.1helming internal 
evidence that woul arrant such at o-fold decomposition . 
Ben th.am uses the term 1 principle ' as a com-
mendatory expression; to say that a givon stand.a.rd of 
judgment is not a principle at all ie to dismiss it as 
subjective , capricious and useless . This is how , for 
example, he dismisses the ' :principle ' of sympathy and 
antipathy .1 Further , in the course of proving the prin-
ciple of utility he looks f or all possible ' rivals' or 
' alternatives ' to it , and finds tha.t t hey all boil doffll 
2 to only two , the principle of sympathy and antipathy 
and the principle of asceticism. Tho former is defined 
as ' that principle which approves or disapproves of cer-
tain actions , not on acc0tm.t of their tending to augment 
the happiness , not yet on account of their tending t o 
diminish the ·happiness of the pa,v,ty whose interest is in 
qQestion, but merely heeause a man finds himself disposed 
to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that appro-
bation or disapprovation as a suffi cient reason for itself , 
1 . Ibid., ch .11, para 12 . 
2 . He does , of course , mention the third ' theolo ·cal 
principle ' that takes ' the will of God ' as the standard 0£ 
evaluation; but dismisses it as ' not in fact a distinct 
p~inciple ' but simply one or the other of the three prin-
ciples ' presenting itself under another shape .' 
Ch . II . pare. 18 . 
Ibid., 
and disclaiming t he necessity of looking out for any 
extrinsic ground . 11 ~eaving the detailed analysis of 
Bentham's examination of it till later , what we sh uld 
observe here is that he does look upon the principle of 
sympa thy and antipathy as an alternative to (a) , that is) 
to an appeal to some external consideration; (a) appeals 
to some ' external' consideration , while the principle of 
syro1nthy a1lp-a.ls to an 'internal' one , and the two are 
'clearly ' opposed . ~s fo~ the principle of asceticism , it 
approves of actions 'in so far as they tend to diminish ' 
~~~piness , and J~~approves of t hem ' in so far as they tend 
to aue;ment it; ' it ia 'like the principle of utility ' in 
appealing t o pleas.ire and pain , but applies it ' in an in-
verse manner '. It is thus opposed to (b) • . The logical 
dioparateness of the two principles considered as 
alternatives to the principle of utility einforces the 
1 . Ibid., Ch . II . para 11 . 
2. Apart from whether or not the principles of sympathy 
agrees with the greatest happiness principle , it is enough 
to condemn it that it is not really a principle as it does 
not appeal to an ' extonnal' eonsidera.tion. It is rather a 
principle in name than in reality '; it is ' the ne.r:ra,tion of 
all principle '. Ibid., Ch . II . ·Para 12. 
thesis that the proof of the latter is not unit cy, bt1t is 
i'!".8t~n.d two-in-one . ft.a to why he ohould fuse t e mo in 
this wa·r , o. 1'1 f'.,. 1- to disen, ge an appeal to ccnseq_u"' .,co 
fro": n €valun tion of the consequences in to ,.1s of pLn.nur 
and )B.in , the ans. er seems to lis in his f ilure to dis-
tin,.,nis 1 'ot,een utilitarianisn , , 1,ich simply means thA.t a. 
thin.<; is rood if it is useful, and he onism, which mee.ns 
t},at that thing is good or useful t!-la.t gives plea.sure . 
l~onth .1 f ,1ses these two in his formulation of the principle 
o utility or the utilitarian thesis , and r ila to notice 
th&t wit t 1e has to prove is not one but two eepa.r te t\: see . 
J::efore wo f!O on to an ly e , en t. 1 s proof, it · impO)'~ 
tant to discuss t1ree general questions on the ans,ers to 
hich the rroof dependc . 1at is a 1 inciple ' , the term 
he throw around a rreat deall ~ nd t do o it oean to say 
th t it implies a.n appeal t o some external consideratim1s? 
eoondly, ihat is it that is precisely to be prov d bout 
the prL1ci1:le of utility? th.at it ia a principle? th t mm 
a.lvta.ye unconsciously act on · t'? or t else? Thir ly, 
vhat does it mean to ' prove ' anything? d mo speoi ica.lly, 
uhat does it mean to prove a principle? His answers to thee 
questions are not fully sta. ed 8.l1Y'7 ero an have to be r oon-
str,,cted for him ,and in the ultimate alyais they re in 
very vague and unaatisfaetory . A princi.plc , for him ,alwaye 
involves sane ' extcr .• ..-1 ' consi •for[lt ion to which an appeal 
can be made; thac is to say , it does not involve an appeal to 
c. nn I s conscfo.1ce or oral sense or orsonal wish or anything 
sub.jecti ve , but inrten.d to so::-..c thine; objective that all can 
identify rmd cxn: inc . It is defined a.s ' that which points 
out some external considera tion as a mea.na of i'lar.:a..1 ~inc and 
{.;, .d.ing the inter.10.l scnti..':lent..; of approbation and disa-
pprobation ' • As ·,;hat is external to an action are its con-
sequences, it cnn more simply be defined ao anything involving 
1 
an appeal to conscqnet1ces . Thus understood , a principle 
has the character of a¢standard; it is something to which 
actions can confer~, rith which tney can be compared, and 
of which one can be a ' partisan '. Jecon.dly, a. principl e 
is ' a first idea which is conceived to serve as a foun-
dation o beginning to any series of operations ; in some 
cases, of physical operations; but of mP.ntnl operatio i 
2 the present case .' • ery chain of reasoning needs such 
_i.r,·t beginning or a fixed point i thout hich there ia 
an I anarchy of ideas ' • ;fhat is more , a priciple a.lone 
gi ves ' consistency ' to raen 1 s actions hich , in its absence , are 
capricious and diojointed • .:.an must, therefore , al ays act on 
l . Bentham also :nakes some odd and inconoistent remarks s uch 
a.o that a principle io 'an abrid ' ent of the corresponding r ule ' 
(111 . 215) , and that it can be , ken'o.o an act of the mind, a 
sentiment' , (Principlea pCh. I . Para 2, Footnote) . 
2 . Ibid . 
" r> ::;cttlcd principle which, bcin alwa;,;s tho am , ;1ill 
ri!:o 11 his o.r tions fully conois tent . irdly, a prin-
ciple is difforonv from an end ,thou hit io root din it; 
b]jc ;:roo1 1 o·,;ht to be the end of' the le Ll tor , .'.ile 
enJ ~"' 1 utility Ot:J?;ht to bo 'the foun . tion' 1 o:- the prin-
c i pl . o_ h.t"' r'}A.Oonin • ~ourthly, it ·iust be u.1ive 1 
bot· in tho sense that 1. t ust b vailn 1 for judgin 
ev"'r;r ctio1 o praotioe w:d that it must b true for all 
Jen at all times . 
s to •rl at precisely is to be prov d :bout the prin-
ciple of utility , his ans er is ,'.th ctitue ' . hat s to 
be 1th own i +, t it is cor ec,:; anc i somet11inf'I' on hl b all 
ought to b men ought to act and by which thei 
c11idc • As 'J. ~e t,1ird question re ing t e ture of 
tit is 
i to be 
proof , h- ;_ • 1 en that it iff aocordi 
that is to be p ovad . If a simple 
proved , somo eopirical vidence is eno ., ... 
t 
If axio a 
be proved , ' referrin, to univ ra 1 experi nc as their 
ici. -dinte oasi , they e inc pabl of d o tion , and 
requ·ro only to bode eloped illuotra ed i ord r to b 
+,o 
r\3CO"Tl.izcd as i contest ble . 12 Int c cc.so of the proof of, .• 
l . ~bid ., Ch . I , para l . 
2. !bid., .t>refaoe , po.rs 12,. Footnote 1 . 
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a principl e, hi~ answer i o much fu1 er and clear r . No 
' direct proof ' c ,1 n be given o ,J prinoiplo since ' th·~ t 
which i t used t o prov A everything el se oro1~ot itself be 
proved ' J proof mus t commence sotn8where, but then the 
prinniple it9Plf is the point of comrnonoern8ntJ A man oan 
l 
' move the earth ' ; ' But he must firot f i nd out ~nother 
eR-rth to st nd upon ' . If, b.o aver, it cann t be proved 
i n tho absence of nuch an Ar chimi do11 n stand. oint, it oan 
not be disproved ei ther . at we Olm do io to r emove bis 
' projudioea ' beo:1.ur0 of which ' a m muy 1 ppen to be diaposed 
not t o r el ish it; ' e oan remove theao by s!10 ling him 
oortuin ' atepa ' th t be should t o, and hope t hat ' perh pa 
he may coo to r oconcilo himself to it . ' It G th i s that 
Bentham himnolf oos with rea oct to the prindl)l e of 
t i.11 ty, though in a rath er rhotoric·. manner . 
Would a BCEl tic, 2 e as ~a ' j udge and ac t without ny 
pr1no1pl e j or with a rinciple? I f t o l ~tter, the me is 
up; i f the former t en o i s appaali to the •unfounded3 
sentiment o' of men . Now if oentimento re to be the 
1. Ibid., Ch. , I parn 13. 
2. Ibid. , Ch. I ., par o 14. 
3. ' unfounded•, becauoe a principl e alone by definition oan 
be a foundat i on. 
1 tr,.,. le.rd of ricl1t and n-ong, are they to be hio o m , or 
~v ·~ '.Jo<lJ 1 s? If '1is om, is not hia 3ta..1da.rd 1dospotical ' , 
.:in it .1akec lu..: .., . 1 sentinento the stanr1a.rd for all r .. e ? 
If cvcr,1 one' o , is it not ' a 1arc.~ical ' , sir ce dif ~ercnt uen 
have different oc,1timents \7hic':l, agai , ara tliffere.1t at 
cli:f .::-ont tL,,rn?; besides , ' all arcu.i:iontn 1 ,1ill the .• to 
' n-;; n::-a end' since a I.'lan doe a not have 'an~rthin, more to 
sr1.., ' o.ft~r he has said, 'I like this 1 • If, ::mcing tho 
now 
force of these arguments , the oceptic/ sayo hia uenti~c ts 
1 tw t be grou.n.ded on re flee tlon' , then 1 0.1 • mt particulars ' 
is t e reflection to turn? If on the utility of th act, 
tho game is up . If on :nythin · cl ;c , hat are thoy? If 
partly utility and partly anythi g else, 'ho far ' ·11 
he ,vlopt t. : 1'::ler? Why? ,fuy not ' any farther ' ? The 
scopti~ i~ dcfontcd into oilenco . As if not sati fied ith 
this line of argument , Bentham gooo on to advance a rather 
different kind of argu::ient . upposa there i to be adopted 
a principle other than that of utility; can a M ha.v 'a 
motive •• to pursue the dicta.,es of it? ' If there is , hat 
i~ it? ~nd how is it differ,nt from th t which enforces 
' t he dictates of utility? ' If there ia no such motive, 'ht it 
is this principle can be good for? ' Benthan concludes that 
.riuciple of utility is ' a . right pri~oiple to be governed 
by and that in all cases ; ' it fol lo o • • • • • • that whatever 
2..o 1.-
principle diffo::..·a 1":r it in any c .. ue ouu~ necessarily be 
a wron$ one., - ' 'xo pr via any ot " .r.u:-· :..pl , hor fore , 
to be e. wro . ono, ho~~(; ne0 a no 
it o be \ bat it io, a princ plo e; 
in s ma ~ tit or o .,h f..., · nt f'l· 
t :..- Just to sho , 
ca th dio~ntee are 
o: t ha i,rino;ple 
oi' uti 1 y; 0 lHO "d i(j O oru· ,, i . • 1 
'· e ah•• J.l ow w: o b1t1 1 ~u 1 ;s cJ .3:-,:· • r..m on of the el t-
t3rnin·veu o hd 1-1 ·inciple r ~ l:i..t.v , , •au.:.. o t oon-
nid ati no ho ~yp 1 la o i n down. His proof, 
ae we have a on, l.a o.: t, o d i.'f • 1 ·;. )ru,JOuiv o J all 
aotio s muot b ju ed by uu At• n ... l · w.H, i·d, and only 
tb.e prinoiplo r u ili y · the o ,.., ~uornnl st ndardJ 
t n~?ilpathy 1d o th~ ~' ,, . ~r if ow u .,.,b 
ntipathy, and to 
ouaeio- will thus o 
t hese ,o 1 prinoip 
t he 't 10 proPo li t.i 
r • Our di 
m · oaks down 
o DJ" ' pl:J..cu · o h o just1 a 
le -of ut ility. 
A to · r \1 tio ~ ui' t a 
1. Ibic • , r. . , ... " 
o< o3 
t . ., , hi::; ar ;t..ncnts e.re ,;ia.:.. ly five . First, it is 
• J ·- .ci. 1~ at nll Bince it fails to so, any 'cxtern.l 
co si u.J,a tioo ' .,\., wt1ich an appeal oan be .ade ; t,1is m ans 
£. .. • a :'10\',. o: all o.:-gwnentG , a1d a ro~ection of all forms 
of n~so.inc in h~~an affairs . ~cco d, it leads to ~-
po io,. 'i 1 _·u.c t::..c·? ' , or I in disposition 1 • A :ur_11 co;.rr ii ted 
t'> it 1 .eclai~ s ·sit' fur-J and vir,1lcnce ['fnino:; all ill o 
dif or frorl rii ': .1e is convinced of the ri,;htness of his 
orr.! se 1ti::!1ei1ts , a.,d of the julDents he rr.a. s o. heir l.asis ; 
as 0.. resclt, l-:e cts fo.uatical a."'1.d a.C~UBCC ,_l~ dif:erine 
fro::i '.i~1 ' of corruption ancl insincerity . 12 \lhet ie more , 
it becomes' ' pretence ' for ref:.u3ing to U!ldertako a detailed 
1 . It ~. ,r.' 0 variouo fonns and involve a. peal to thi. 
1 il:e r:ior.., 1 se .se , cor.uncn sense , eternal and iro u table 1 o 
of Ri, t, "'i t ness of Thinim , La. of · aturc , La of Re on, 
.:-.atural -:q1 it· , Godd Order , etc •• He lumpo a.11 t ese to[.. ther 
and expects the following c r iticisms to np1>ly to t r:: a ll 
alike . The arguments based o im. 1 it is more frequent to 
see a lied to morals than to politics : butt eir influence 
extends itself to both'. Ibid ., Ch . II , para. 14 . Footnote l . 
2 . Ibid . , Ch . II , , p a 14. Footnote 1 . 
'inquiry' into tho rightness or otherwise of one's senti-
ments . Third, it ia inconstant in its applioation as it wild-
ly fluctuates between the xtremes of ~everity and lenity, 
especially in matters of punishment: ! ever·ty because 
there is nothing hich some on may not disapprove and thus 
make 'a ground of punishment'J lenity b cause a remote but 
strong miachief may evoke no antipathy. Fourth, it is not 
self-suffioient bu~ parasitic a s it ne ds another principle 
to regulate it,sinoe, after all, men ' o feelings and senti-
ments do , and have to, fall back on something else to guide 
themsel·{es by. "nally, it confuses ' c·uae ' with ' ground or 
r eason• . The form r 'opera ea on the mind of t he a ent and 
produces the act ', while the lat ter ' warrant s' a ' legislator' 
or a 'by- stander' or an agent himself in a,pprov · n · or dis-
approving it. · The •reasons', more ·ppropri ely the 'cau s' , 
'why auoh and suoh an aot .hfil! bean dor ' aro diff re t from 
'the r eaaon' why they ought to buve bean done •. e logio 
of ' wh ia diff aront in both oases. No; o,Yl?lpathy or anti-
pathy may lead to good ' effects ' and wo ~ay therefor npprove 
of it as a motive, but we Cun n ver make it 'a ground of 
1 
action', since it may somet imes l ead to bad effeote ae well. 
1. Ibid., Ch . II, para 19; 
... few gener<...L ob:;ic.2.·vations on the .... e argllll'~onto CTay 
lO" wG cc,no.i. ·~ _ Jd LtaJ.)l ropriate . 3ome of .. i._...,e argw.nents 
-e., tlla. e, ,phas izes in the con text of ' tho l moral depart-
:-i1c.1t of .. 10rals ', others in that of I the part~cu.lar dcpart-
~ent of poli tics ', and the rest i 1 that of both . '..:he 
oeco:1d argUL1ent is largely in a ooral con1,axt and attacks 
the r)rinc~ 11le of sympathy and antipathy ao a moral principl e . 
:h0 ~· iri argULlent , on the other hand , is advance<! almoot 
excluclively against it as a political principle by which 
he >.ere means a legislative , and more specifically, a pe 
,-;ri.ciple, and consists in attack· 1g it for rejecting 'the 
harsh and rugged dictates of political Lltility . •2 In fact , 
this argument , in terms of its importance as vrnll as the 
amount of space· 'l.evo ted to it , occupies a oe 1 tral place , and 
would justify the vie th.at Bentham is mainly concerned t o 
attn.ck the princ ipl e of sy-wpathy and antipathy as a. polit' ca.l 
princi le . It is , fur ther , orth observi ng that some of 
these arguments , particularly the second and the third and, 
to some extent; the first , are in tarms of consequencesJ whil e 
1 . Ibid . , Ch . II , para 19. 
2 . Ibid . , Ch . II , para 13 • 
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the fourth and,to some extent,the fifth are mainly formal 
in that they start from a certain view of what a principle 
should logically be like, that is, self-sufficient, and then 
go on to rojeot the principle of sympathy and antipathy as 
it does not satisfy this condition. What is interesting to 
no te i:J that the former sort of arguments ould mean that 
his criticism of the principle of sympathy and antipathy is 
oircularJsince we a.re asked to appeal to consequences because 
such e.n appeal reeul ts in good cons q u no a . Besides , bow do 
we judge these oonaequenoes themselves? True , the principle 
of sympathy a.nd antipathy leads to despotism.1 but so rha.t? fuy 
is despotism bad? Again, it may lead to violent fluctuations 
in the amounts of punishment imposedi but why is this bad? 
Bentham gives n answer, but , if pressed, he ould argue that 
consequences a.re to be judged by the hedonist atanda.rd i the 
principle of sympathy and antipathy is wrong b cause it le s 
to despotism, severi y of pWlishment , etc ., and these ar ad 
because they result in greater pain in the oommunlty . Thia 
would meEµl that his hedorubsm is logically prior to his utilitaria-
nism, and that his refuta.t ioh of the principle of sympathy and 
antipathy is pa.ra.sitic on his refutation of th principle of 
a.scetioism. 
As to Bentham' s proof of th~ second proposition, it 
will have to consist in proving that (1) only ho prin-
ciple formulated in terms of plea.sure or pa.in is correct 
pr r i ·ht, a; d t nt (2) of theso two, only that re.,., ,_ 
a tandard or principle· is correc t which is formulated in 
terns of pleasU1·e . Now his answer to (1) is in terms 
o.f his metaphysics . Pl easure and pain are tho sole reali-
ties in the f ield of action; everything else is reducible 
to them , andJwhen it is not, it is si~pl y ' fictitious '. 
Pleasure and pain a.re the only thinBS men are r:.otivated byj 
there i s s imply no point in advancine a. princ i le dif ("erent 
from these two_,as t he whole point of advancing pr inciple 
is that it should be practicable . It is in this c ·,ntext 
t.-:.:....t h i'1 famous passage becomes moat relevant . 'N ture has 
placed mankind under the vernanoe of t o eoverai t1asters , 
pain and pleasure . It is for them lone to point out what 
we ought to do, as ell as to determine hat w shall do •••••• 
They govern us in all e do, in all e s03, in all e thinks 
every effort v, oa.n make to throw off our subjection rill 
serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In ords a. n 
may pretend to ab j ure their empire I but in reality he tdll 
remain subjeot to it all the while . •1 leasure and pain are 
our 'masters', and a.re both the 'causes' of our actions and 
the 'standards ' for judging them; they are •sovereign', and 
1 . Ibid., Ch . I . , para 1. 
to introduce any other standard is by definition imJ os-
sibl (~ , as, otherwise., they will not be soverei n • What we 
must do therefore is to r ecogni ze our 'aul jcotion' t o them 
~nd build our moral ~rinoi ple on thelr ' f 0undation 1 • It 
is t he 'tr uth' about man 's n'", ture t .. at he al,vays and 
nec essarily ursucs pleasure and a~oids ~uin and JUJJes 
all ac tions in terms oft eir t endency to pr oduce a ' s urplus' 
0£ 1Jl~~asure over pain, a ' ~rofit'. Any m.oral principle 
basod on a denial of this re s ts on '!ulsehood 1 • 
Bentham's refutation or the principle of asc ctloism 
rests on five mq.i.n arguments, and is inters ersed ith 
some arguments in support o f the principle of utilit • To 
begin with , the principle of asoe¢tio1sm ie incapable of 
'consistent' application, the inoapuoit being praotioal and 
not logical . Even if a small part of mankind re to prao-
tise it, 'in a day's time, they will have turned it (the earth) 
into a hell' as each will be impooin pain on others, t hls 
beins no the most moral t i in~ to do . 1hc principle of 
utility, on the oontrar , '!!!. o able of bcin consistently 
pursued', and, what is more si nifioant, 'the more oon::Jis-
tently it is pursued, the better it must ever be for man 'nd .' 
It may be r ejoined that this is alread to assume tat prod-
uoing more leasure is good thin , hioh 1s preoisely what 
,Ls~mtc . ~ 1L .. (?.1.pa~1.n.'.'" tl 1.z o ,Jection ~ont am I.lakes 
~.., ::; lCv.l'J. ' .. .it . If .... i.,s.ir., or a.Li .1.::: :-enlly go::id , ' I t 
11oul ~~c .. ~intte .... uc. 1hct:1cr it ,er- brJ •.• t 'uy eac. 
u ... ~ .::,cl~ , or by -::,no .o.. • n...'1.ot t'r'; . c us• t . -r e -
• o: e Lo e.1joL cd to Lf ... let as , .. u.c. 1.a-,i as ossible on 
ot .1..: ·s . _.__ t thc1: the ca e peo_ le rho cvnsir1 r rai. rood 
1 1 , t. un impl,·in,,. that 
. i .. l. <• r ..., . ad t.1inr and pleasure a good thi .;; • -l'hi:r-J.ly, 
nc ,crn.~e.t has evar so far r ct1ocd t.e pr .... ciple of 
as"ctic~s.:i a.., a conscious 11 _. , ,1ot eve .. the v co1,..:pooed 
of •. en explicitly coo · tted to the practice of it . J!'ourthly, 
it in ' at Lu · o. but the pr inci o 1..• utility .isapplicd ' s 
mis ..,a~e i.l ._1,.;_.:._ve they can do so o ly by c ourting pain . I t 
is t us : .. iependen t or a separate principle but only-
a i co ceived fon:mlation by ' hasty □ '-'c la tors ' of the prl. 
cifle of ltility . ifthly , &Ld fi l l y , 10 r.1.nc iple of 
utility is already implicit in all the specific moral j u.d.g-
u.e its thet e c nt·nuously ake : take all sue j d ento , 
ano.l:,·oe them , and you ill ace that plied in them all is 
j 
th's principle , which thus io not an r i . ve1tio ut s ome-
thing ' deferred to ' ' on ~n.y , perhaps on ....Q£U occaoions ' of 
h · s life by every man ' wit•1out· thi· g of it ' . 
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These a.rgument3, it wUl have been noticed , are of varying 
logical character. In the case of the first one, th r e io 
a. suggestion of justif' ·ng con istenoy on t hedonist ound, 
but it is not preased; and oonei tenoy is recognized nec-
essary formal requi ent in any yrinoiple1 the prinoipl of 
ut i ity is correct because, among other things, it is oon istent, 
and not that consistency is good b cause it leads to pleasure . 
The eoond and the third arguments are left at th.at, and not 
used to point to any es sential weakn s or limitation in the 
principle of asceticism itself • .As stated, thoy simply refer 
to mpirica.l facts , and do not show that t e facto e.r not ooh•• 
tin n t end could not he.ve been 0th rwise, bu are, in a very 
significant sense, inevitable as they spring from the very nature 
of man whicl, completely rules out the possibility of any action 
baaed on -the principle of asceticism. The fourth a.r nt could 
be highly interesting in criticising a prinoiple by pointing 
to i ta para.ai tic end second-order character, but Ben ha. .. a.gain 
makes a meas of it by turning it ·ol sily into p yoholo iatio 
l 
and genetic argument . A to the fifth and £ l argum nt, h 
does not go on to examine sp cific moral jud ents tha.t men 
and show ho t principle of utility un.derliee th mall . 
1 . See, e . g. , Ibid ., Ch.I., par& 9J a.loo Ch.I., para 12 , 
o<. I I 
Besides, his thesis that pleasure is the end of all our actions 
oan be questioned as it oan at l st be argued that a man 
pursuing pain i s ,!!2! doing so as a means to hi eventual 
ploasure, It can, furthGr, be argued that the fact that a 
principle underlies all our moral jud ente ia not necessarily 
a proof of it s validity. i nallyJhis first three ar enta 
against the principle of ascetioiam are relevRnt only hen that 
principle is seen in a political contoxtJ they do not show why it is 
invalid in a moral context , usi th,, term ' moral ' to refer to the 
narrow area of purely ' self-regarding' actions as Benth himself 
\tv h ~ s \iHil t:{ 
does many times. " I not organize my own personal life in such a way 
that I get maximum pain, and why should I not judge my actions en 
they concern me alone in accordanoe with the principle of 
aeoetioiam? 
To oonolude, w hav~ soen how Bentham critiois s the two 
principles of sympathy and antipathy and of a oetioi sm. It 
11 have been noticed t .t their respective oritioiams re 
not fully integrated, and that each invoke certain a~ enta 
not to be found in the c ase of the other. The r ement based on 
oonsistenoy, for example, ocoupieR n important plaoe in tho o ee 
ot the principle of ascetioim, but not in th t of sympathy 
Pad an,;ipati.y; t :ir, Cl'n ulsJ Le said of ..::evoral other 
r r w Jn. tc . , l. is not int , .• dcr; o.~· r. cri't.tc-~t.,but only 
to s, J -est that i,. c cri ticis,us of the t1 o ) .L,.ci_·le have 
li1 or.i .• t lo ical structures . De,1.tt:aru. n.l u -'-·ails to notice 
~he differing lo ~ic of the two pri..cir,les in their moral 
and })Oli ticol character . and in at tirooo u1.l t.r of a.:i.·e;..i.in 
for t .,nr moral invalicii ty on tic , 8..D:i.s of t., r political 
.:.11valdit;,' , or, vul8.t is \:orse, their .. ,..,litica.l i.ap!-'lica.u lity. 
In uo ~11, hov1ever • it is rnrtu no Gin<:> t t 1 t L.. the o -
tical, o.r , s" riotly, ti.,e legis:i.o..tiYe rca '" tha is mainly the 
coniex of the cr~ticisu . mis · s 1ot sur r ~silg aa his 
a]h,roacb. to i C' rly all t 1e pr 1 1 ln f ou the s ru d:point 
of a le.:;islator . 
I t is --l. er tan t to bear i · nd wl at rccisely it is 
th.at .uer~t· .... : , o roved , He has not proved , an. did not se t 
ou to prove , that lea.sure is e,o od i.J. :,ain bad or evil . 
It i3 s· ;ly a. .fnc about :!la.n 's natural C'.J • ., ~t·tion tbn.t he 
. . d 1 B ti (lcc1.res p eam.re and avo1 s pa~~~ , ~- d c ,m. a.t no 'oint 
co.1siders it a oerious problem for him to sho., that pleasu:e 
is r;ood . ..'hat he :ia.s roved , and ,vha.t he set out to 
1. 1./q notion of man is that , successfully or unsucceaafully , 
t1tJ uims at ha.}lpiness and so will continue to aim. as long as 
he continues to be man , in everything he does ' . 
on Commpntaries , p . s4 . ) 
Ao 
1 prove, is 'the principle of utility'; t hat isJtnat t he 
happiness of the community is the only standard by whi ch 
men ' s ac tions are to be judged . o use his o~n me t aphors, 
men are ' placed' under the 'sovereignty ' of pleasure and 
pa.in by nature. Man' s reason is to reoo ~nise t his ' subJ ection' 
and f orm its standards aooordin2?ly s inoe it oannot sit in 
Judgement on these 'masters' as it has no standards outside 
oft em. Moreover, not to r eoo nize t his sub j eotion is 
hubris in as muoh as it implies questionin the op ra-
tions of ' Nature'; politically ap e in, inoe it is poli-
tical metaphors t hat Bentham is usin6 , it will be an ct 
of •rebellion' 'to abj ure their empire•. Beside, t his will 
be rebellion th t has just no point, ainoe one knows right 
from t he st art not only that lt is bound to f but alao 
t hat the rebellion 1 in principle impoasibl as, in 
t he very aot of rcbellin, one i only obeyinc one 's 
nature-appoi nted masters: the poor aoe tio tninl~s he has 
rebel1.od s coe sfully , but if only he hnel that he is s till 
c ont inuing t o obey the •mast er' pleaaure just as ell ae i ts 
1 . Re ee it as hi s task •to establish the unity and the 
oOV reignty of th ' 
other'. 
r inoip l e by ri 0 ourou~ly xcludin ver-:, 
:::011 ,:;:>:'.; , it is '.__.:, .. ai.,h;tsically irn .. 03.:: i1lc' to do anything 
but lc::iirc .i_)l13a..;uro and avoid. pain , an.cl , a.; such , it is 
siu._ lJ _,ointleos to ask if I should. :·ursue rlca~ure . It 
.,_'ol~o,7r therefore tha:c we m.ust jud6-e ever./ action in 
ter, s of t11c am.oun t.i of plca.nuro u... ... ,_ '1.i _ 1. t loads to • 
. ~ .cc ·.,c a"'c so CJ-1,; vi tuto.d as to de:.,ire pl n.:.mre and I always ' to 
. ,,_'s J it,· \;c ' ootly' - 'on most oscasi ns ' - a.lr.)'.tly juc. e 
our o rn and others' actions by this s tru dard; so~ietirles , of 
course , we do not , and this is becauoo of our ' prejudice', 
or through ' .. .., t unders tandi:ng alm.\ys hou to apply it 1 ._ l It 
1 1 precisely th.,_s hiatus bet7een ,hat e always actually 
desire and u.o u.,:d ho.i we sometimes judge that constituted 
uontho..1 1 s ...... o:.,L;__ which he is trying to solve by urging 
on us to be uore 'consistent ' and a opt the principle of 
utility in all that e do . 
It may be a,s1 ... od, as it has l)eca , if bentham1 s caso for 
the principle of utility does not rest on the derivation of 
an 'ought ' from an 1is ', and therefore cot'li1l.it a fallacy. 
l . rrinciples , Ch . I . , pera 12 . 
An answer has to be reconstructed for him as ho does not 
go into thia question in this :form. His whole ethics, as 
he insists repeatedly, is based on tho vi-tal distinction 
between an 'is' and an 'ought ', and he, in fact , nearly 
always attacks his owonente, especially those conoerned 
to defend the status quo , as wanting ·to fuse that • His 
own discussion of the distinction is largely in the legis-
lative context where it appears in the form of the distinotion 
1 between the ' a:xl)ository' and the 1 cenaor11 1 jurisprudence. 
He insists that any attempt to identify the two ia self-con-
tradictory as it inlpliea ' finding everything sit should 
be', and thus f ails tor alioe t hat •~hatever ~ is established, 
,2!!2! as innovation. ' 'Tho di:f'ferenoa bet\ een Hume and me 
is this1 the use he made of it (1.0. principle of utility) 
2 
was to account for that which ia, I to kno, what ought to be' • 
Reading Hume's ' Treatise on Ruman nature - 'that work fro 
which however in proportion to tho bulk of it, no gre t 
quantity of useful inatruotion ae d derivable ', the distinotion 
1. I . 229f 
2. Letter to Dumont, Sept .6, 1822 
~ -·· lvr I a. • I •• a u • u ~o .... do l I 
0 ..., : ii ial i.::..po tn nee I • .o uny one 
~[ L l .1. ... "':;c s .i.., 'tl., .·.,ole f.:.cl of tJt .;.en •• w..isv evur 
·•vc cc• 1, - yea , 1.r.C: eve 1· wi 11 be - , a 1 ........ t:. :it out 
,., t ' , " i , \ d.:3 to 1 "ro ti us a.rid l t1 ~ o ~ .er ' .'o e m:dze 
iv o c .i.necl the .mr-i ' Jeon tolo 7 1 1.1ich ' turr.n ol to o t r 
'l. "l'Yl ~•1L lfr t 1 ction 1 , :1., l co ·,e ·c t·. idon t o.t o thics is 
) a <.i only .ti t , the I ou l. t' • 
It .::..ay seem a s .,ranee paraJ.ox t~ia t t .o .u•. ilho is oo 
C .a t.:.c on dis tL1 ·uin,,in, t !tween a, 'is ' ,d an ' ou ht ' 
nhouJ., a ~e'l.r to t-a1~e n ;o□ 1 tion ~ v l in : c clcsest 
i<l.e t~ "ice.,. f the ho, and, rhat is moot intereoting, 
nra ,r ph iii th unp-:.rturb d 
caoe • . ~c ~..., n1ox ,ho,ev~r ,10°en its s arpneos when it is 
rera' Le .J:i t 'l. t' _ diotinction and the i entifica.tion tal·e 
lnce at ttlo d.:.<fJront levels . In • political or social 
or ,~oral contex ~, 1 ex1 tine; i s tit tion or , c ti cc cannct 
be its mm standard , and thus ... ct ..., d value a.ro distinct . 
,11c::e t\,on is tho at nclard to oe fo.md'? Not in the I feeling ' 
of a na..l J a thins is not eoo because I feel it is ao , or 
eve 1 beca~~se I have a certain f eoling to\7 d it, a I pro-
1 . VIIL 128 . 
, tt ~ ut c '; this is h u t B .nth.,m 1,ould oul.l hhe princJ.ple 
of sympathy and antiputny , und we h ve noted ho vohcL t.mtly 
ha rejects it . Nor 
J 
ainJis the standard to bo found in 
tho universal a~reement of men; thou·h very unlikely, it 
i s still pos nible t .t at men may como to a_;rec on thini:;a 
th :.. t ar e really t: dl . 'l'he standard oa.n bo found onlJ 
in the nµturc of mnn , which ~rovi~es the ondo in t crrua of 
w11icl all standards are to be f ormecl . It cannot be a.sled 
of ' leasure _!!h;t it is ;::iod uim1,ly boouu <J e it ia t he onl · 
t hine t nat an is nuturully oapnble of des rinJ and enjoying . 
_hi s will nlso r ule out tho question thy c should pursue 
i lea.sure; ,1 e are o.:,na ti tuted in a oerto.in ,~, .... nd to be 
r a tional is to accept this 'subjootion ' to our natural 
..1n ,i 'sovcrei ;n mast •ra • , the subjeoti on bein__; lnho cnt in 
the human oor.clition . But , the tiuost oner oroiot, 
.1a there no pluoe for heroism, a. rand met ph 'oioul revolt 
a_;ainot tl,c c on itiona of one• . e xiot c.noe , even if onl. to 
a end onesolf out in futile combat? his i s no heroism 
~onth wuld repl:, , and• r,rovidcd he oan bo inuuo d to see 
heroiom n.s aomethin v uable, he woulds it o oonsiatin 
ln renw.inin ithin the inevit-r blo limito of the humo.n 
nature and fully r aliain0 its ' r in iplo '; t hat is, in 
mo...-cimiei g the a i ne s s of. the comounity to tho beat of 
one's oapooity . 
'.!.'hooe not ont .1. rely h •;1)y · .. i th his 
account of moral obligation in Bentham may like to con-
sider another poss ible interpretation which I personally 
find totally unsa.1ilsfactory . Man should ,or has an Qbliga.tion 
to, ~ urs ue pleasure . Thia obligation arises from the faot 
that t he pursuit of pleasure is the principle of his nature 
l-,i ch he has an obligation to follow either because nature 
is divinely created, or because nature is itself divineJ th.a 
fonner will offer a Deistic and the latter a Spinoziotic 
interpretation of Bentham. Now tn ia~of course , 
evidence for such an interpretation in hia writings . ' Natlll!' 
ie believed to ha.v ' placed' man under the overeignty of 
pleasure a.nd pa.in . There is also the assumption of natural 
harmony between ma.n ' s pursui t of pleasure and his well-bing, 
at least · that th pursuit of pleasure does not spell m~n•a 
disaster bu instead contrib utes to his surrival . Again , 
most of Bentham' s criticisms are directed against the ' Go 
of wrath and van a.no ' and not agu.1 st Ood a.a sue , there-
for the idea of God is not alien to hie system. Finally, 
it is only on this interpretation, it is argued , that oan 
be saved from the charge of co itting the fallacy of deriving 
v lues from faots . Ho ever , all this doco not build up a 
very od case, and there ts an overwhelming evidence on the 
other side . •nature has placed mankind ••• •, he lat r say , 
is only a ' metaphor' . ire rejects ' na. tural law' both on 
the ground that it ie neither law nor natural . He does 
not think that God exis ts and has created men , and treat s 
a.11 speculations about Hi t=: existence and nature as i dle and 
useless . The s ubject of religion is ' exoludod from the 
list of s ubjec t s taught at his Chrestomathic Day School . 
What is most important, he does not say that man has .§ill 
obligation to pursue pleasure and a.void pain, since man 
do this a.nywa.y . 
In short , a tentative and rat her inadequate answer to 
this very bT'ln,..tant question that we have tried to offer 
is this . Because pleasure d pain are t e aole moral and 
political realities, they alone can oonstitute the ends of 
h~ actions ; the pursuit of anything elseJ au.ch as jus-
tice or , e,~feotion 11 be the pursuit of illusory' ena.. 
or of ' fictions•. Further, they a.lone can provide the 
sta.nda.fd for evaluating human actionaJ sine , if . other 
standard is s eted, it can be shown to be r educible to 
that formulate in term of pl as a.nd pain . Finally-, 
they e.lono can b the motives o underta.king a.otions, as 
man is constitutionally i ncapable of boing motiv tad by 
anything else . These three reinforce each other, f or 
example , if plea ur and pa.in. are the sole otiv a , am.or~ 
stand.a.rd formulated in any other terms will be simply be 
1 i r:1pra.oticable', and therefore useless and dangerous , 
useless because mne whole point of having a stands.rd is 
that man should conform tc it , dangez:-oua because it ttlll 
make impossible demand.a on oen and lead to frustration, 
self-c _ndemna.tion and, even;to cynicism . A:ny moral atan-
da.rd must be formulated in the awareness of human nature , 
and thus in teI'l!l.S of pleasure and pain., as this is what 
Bentham' s elaborate inquiry has convinced him human nature 
is . IJ.'he ul tima.te oho ice thus is between formula. ting it 
in terms of r eP.sure , or in terms of po.in. lllis 1proor •, 
as \7e have seen, consists in oonfrontin,.,. us v,i th t o sets 
of alternatives, each of thin ~rising at two different 
stages of morti.l and po:!.itioal condt\Ot, Firstly, a.re we 
to aot and judge ca:priciously, or are e to have somo def-
inite stand.a.rd? Secondly, if the answer to the first 
question is, as he shows it must be , that we must have sane 
definite standard, what standard are "e going to adopt? 
that recom..r:1.tmding maximum ha.p1,iness , or that recomn1ending 
maximum pain? It m&y be 'laked why Bentbam should see 
only two , and particularly only these two alternatives at 
ea.oh of the two eta s . His first aet of alternatives 
seems to spring from hie vier.of res.son and a desire to see 
that men do not opt out of a rational debate about the 
morality of their actions .1 Hie second set of alterna-
tives seems to spring froc: i-is theory of man 1hich con-
side~n pleasure and pain alo11e as the sole human re!li ties . 
Thus oorali ty cma t be defined in ter;:,i.s of pleasure, 
but this doe ~ not mean that t he pursuit of pleasure is, 
ipso facto , moral . Pleasure is a sensation e all natu-
rally enjoy having. It is 1!Q.1 a ' noral good ' ; it is hat 
he calls a ' patholo cal good ' 1 or a 'sensation ' we call 
enjoy when · " ,..,7 it . He would prefer to oall it a ' phy-
aical' good but f or the fact that • in for+ case, those 
pleasures and pai , the se,t of which is not in the body 
but only in t he cind,might be regarded as excluded' . 2 
Plea.sure becomes a moral good only ' in so far as human will 
is considered aa instrumental in the production of it .' 
l . We shall se~ater what sort of a d bate he would 
consider ' rational '. 
2 . I . 206 . 
When we !111. an action intended to aohiova it, we are being 
l · 
moral, and the pleasure thus resulting i s a ' moral good ' , 
Not pleasure but tho deliberate pursuit of pleasure 1o 
morally good. Now one may bring it about in a misguided 
way, that is prefer a less quantity of it when more is 
availqble, or bring it about haphazardly and caprioioualy 
and not consistently as a matter of principlo. One can 
thus be moral, but not in a r~tional \vay. Desiring pleasure 
ie something natural,and there i s nothing rational or moral 
about it . To~ to undertake actions intonded to achieve 
2 . 
it is to be moral . To !!11 to unde:rtake, as a matter of 
principle, such actions ae will achieve it to the maximum, 
and for th~ whole col'llll1unity or for those affected bl one' s 
etions3 is to be rationally moral . Thia ia precisely what 
1. ' So far as anything else is made of it , either the word 
is thout meanii:?S,or the thiP,S is without value•. Ibid •• 
see also III . 212tf. , VIII . 36 . t ia really important is t he 
oonsoioue ex4roiso of ' human agenoy ' J but as this, like any-
thing alee, oannot occur without will , will becomes important 
in d~fining morality. 
2. ' Will occupies itself about the end'. IV.110. 
3. See the two different formulationo of the principle of 
utility mentioned earlier. 
t he pr i n ci ple of utility s t at es, whi ch t hua i s a p r inciple 
o f r ntional morality , vnd i f Bcnth m' s proof i ~ correct, 
i t is t he prin .:: iple or r a tional morality. An import <.4nt 
conf irmat l on of t hi s interpr etat i on of Benth:im' a e t hioal 
t heory will be f ound in t he faot that ho defines mor~lity 
of an action not i n t ~r ms of pleasure ns suoh but i n those 
of the pr inciple of utility1 ; a right action is on 
'confor mable to th principle of ut ility •; it is •only' 
in t erms of this conformity tha t 'ought', 'right ', and 
' v, r ong' h a ve a meanin '.2 
1. Principles Ch. I, , para 10 . 
2 . Ibid. Bentham himself does not ive a full statement of 
hie ethical theory any hera ; his observa tions are soattered, 
and not always consistent . hat I have done here is to con• 
struot a posi t ~on f or him that seems to do justice to most of 
hie observations and that appears to be in aooord with hie 
intentions o.s well a.a t ho general aoaumpti.ona underlying his 
philo ophy , 
r , r 
~.Ieasurement, Soienoe a,.nd F.q uality 
An action, we have seen , is good if it l eads to a balance 
of pleasure over pain; similarly, any measure aiming at achie-
ving equality of a specific sort and in a specific context is 
good if it leads to a balance of pleasure over pain . Now 
this obviously raises a number of questions,the chief among 
which i s whether it is ever poss ibl e t o ascertain such a sur-
plus . It would , of course , be possible J if the pleasures and 
the pains resulting from a given aotion oan be respe ctively 
added and then subtractedJ but how is this possible when there 
are various kinds of pleasures and pains not always reducible 
to a comnon set of homogeneous unite , and when they have ea.oh 
a number of aspects_,auch as intensity , duration , etc ., which 
again do not look mutually commensurable? Bentham is aware 
of these questions,and assures us that they oan all be satis-
fac t orily answered . 
The question,he says , is one ~f being able to 'measure ' 
1 
' the value ' or ' force ' 1of a lot of pleasure or pain ' • ' To 
a person considered by himself , the value of a pleasure or 
pain considered by itself , will be greater or lesser ' according 
1 . Principles . Ch . IV . 
to its four 'el -:ient~ ' r 1 dir..e .sions', i.o . i1. / t 
duration , certain t.)' ( or uncertai ty) and ·ro1.,in ui ty ( or 
remoteness) . If ~e are considering its value for estimating 
the tende cy of an m by whic::. it is produced, two other 
dime 1siona ust e t~e into account & fecundity or the 
'chauce ••• of being follo'led by sensations of the sar:.1e kind ', 
i . e . pleasure y pleasure a.nd pain b pain , and Purity or the 
'chat ce •• • of t being followed by :13nriations of the 
opposite k·nd 1 • i . e . pleasure by pain and pain by 
pleasure; hat is emphasized here is the ' roductivity ' 
v~ pleasure , the former describing its positive and the latter 
the necative aspect . These two , striotly, are not the dimensions 
of pleasure or pain i tself , but of the act by which pleasure or 
pain has be en produced . ·.~ben finally the social context of an 
a.ct is under consideration, ' ex tent' or the ' nunber of 
pe ·sons affected b it ' should also be taken into ace unt . Thus 
to take ' an exact account ' of the general tendency of any net 
aff ecting the in cerests of the communi ty , we ar e to roceed .as 
f o l o s . Begin ith any one person of those ' hose interes ss 
seem most im.. ediately to be affected by it ' ; see h~t pleasures 
and pains it produoee ·n him · the fir t instance, distinguish 
every 'ingle pleasure and pa· and asoess i ts value . Then , see 
what pleasurea and pains are likely to follow afterwards , end) in 
their light , assess t he fecundity and the purity of the pleasures 
and the pains of the first instance. Final ly, sum up ' a.11 
the values' of the pleasures and the pains 1and ee where the 
1 bhla.nc' liee. Thia will giv us the renult with r spect to 
the 
the man we have started with . Nov work this out in/case ot 
ill the individuals af fected, and we will arriv at the gr d 
sum total -. ... r h vi.11 indicate a surplus of pl uuro or ot 
pain. e 0an1then 1 d cide wh ther or not the great est happiness 
principle requires us to do or to approve the action who e 
hedonic conaesuencea we have thus calculated. Not that this 
elabor ate proc es abould be or c n be done prrn.oue to 'every' 
mor 1 and politiool judgment or decision , but that i t must 
' always' be kept in view)and con 1n prinoipl b done. 
But this is precisely the problems oon it be done even 
in pri nciple? In thi t c1'0110t Bentham hae simply talked of 
' as ~ ssing the value' of each pleasure and pain; put the value 
ot a pleasure ie function of the four or six ore ven1 dimen-
sione, a we have justs enJ can thee dimensions be moaeured? 
Furth r, und rlyins the grand sum total i tho aesumption that 
pleaaures and pins of differ nt individuale can b dded: how 
1. 1.e. depending on whether the pleaeur by it lt or the 
act or the social context is t ken into account . 
is this assumption justified? His answers to these 
questions are sketchy and highly uns atisfRctory. As to 
measuring the value , one of the things he has to do is to 
specify the units in terms of which variou dimensions can 
be quantified and measured, and this he does , though rather 
tentatively . The unit of intensity is ' the faintest' pos-
sible sensation ' that can be distinguished to be pleasure ' 
or pain; a moment of time is the unit of durationi immediate 
'present' is the unit of certainty and propinquity; as to 
other dimensions their unite are not specified. In assess-
ing the value of a pleasure or a pain , the degrees of inten-
sity and duration are to be counted i n whole number s as mul-
tipliers of these unite1 vhile certainty and propinquity work 
in the r everse direction. The reason for this is that in the 
case of the former two we start with the smallest units , while 
in the case of the latter two we start with the largest units; 
the most certain sensation, for example , is the one actually 
felt , and all others can only be less and never more certain, 
In finally determining the quantity of a pleasure or a pain,the 
intensity units are to be multipli d by the duration unite>and 
the r f, sulting figure is to be further multiplied by the frac-
tions of certainty and propinquity; to this are added the 
numbers expressive of fecundity , and trom the total those 
expreesive ot purity are oubtrsctedt the net result is 
finally multiplied by the extent, i . e . the number ot indi-
viduals affected. This ia Bentham' a • felicitic calculus ', 
also called l ' moral nrithmetic ' , ' moral thern:omoter ' , etc •. 
Despite hie apparent confidence in his ability to de-
velop an exact calculus of pleasure and pain>ho continues 
to have misgivings about it . Wh.At worries him most , and 
not surptlsingly, is the question of measuring intensity; 
he frnnkly t s tea at a number of places that it is not 
2 
'susceptible of measurement '. If the implications of this 
are fully fnced, it will wreck not only his ' felicific 
calculus ' but also his politica l and mor~l theory, since hie 
views on what the legislator should do and how , hi theory 
of equality, and his shift from the principle or ' the grea-
test happiness of the greatest number ' to that ot ' the 
greatest happiness' are all based on the po sibility of 
measuring intenei ty. He Jl!.!. thuo to provide for 1 t m eure-
ment, and he does this through the medium of money. Talce 
l . I . :,04. 
2. IV. 542. 
the pleasu~e, he says, of seeing your enemy suffer through 
1 
conviction in a court of' law. To obtain it, you will have 
to file a suit againnt him in a oou:rt of law, which will 
cost you, say, £50. Are you prepared to spend this amount? 
If your answer is in tho affirmative, it f ollows that your 
total pleasure, or the intensity of your pleasure, is equal 
to £50. Now take another pleasure, say, of charity. Are 
you prepared to spend r.50 to obtain it? If yes, your 
pleasures of r evenge and of charity, ming eaoh equal to the 
same amount of money, are 'equal• to each other . Similarly, 
if the same amount is offered to get a certain pleasure as 
also to avoid a certain pain, ' Tho ~leaaure and pain must be 
reputed equivalent•. This can be generalised to aooount for 
all pleasures and pains, and money thus booomoa ' the only 
common measure that things afford•. It is the measure of 
'drinking so many bottles of wine' or of ' enjoying the favours 
of suoh a woman' or o 'doing sue a servioe to one' s country 
or to mankind in genera? J all these oan properly be spoken 
of 'as being in money of auoh a value•. He offers an ' Apology 
for applying it ( . e . money) to such pleasures' , but ' from 
necessity, and it is only from neoeaaity I speak and prompt 
mankiai to ap aka mercenary language.• I:l money is not 
1. VII,569 
accepted as an accurate instrument, ' find out some other 
tha t shall be more accurate , or bid adieu to Politics and 
Morals.' 
Running aide by aide and closely connected but not 
identical with it is the argument that money can .!?l!Y nearly 
all plea..,ur1>fl and ward off ne arly all pains; it is ' a means 
of acquiring even power and reputa tion and love and nearly 
' all such things '. 1 At one place , he even makes this a 
ground for arguing that money oan measure all pleasures and 
pains: because it can m, all pleasures , it ia their 
'representa tive', and a measure of their value . Strictl y 
speaking, it is not necessary for him to connect the two 
argumants in this way, and generally he does not do so . Hie 
usual manner of relating the two is to say that of those 
pleasures that are produced by money , it is both the ' source ' 
and ' exact measure '; of others not produced b7 it, it is the 
direct or indirect measure , but in either case ' an exact and 
proper one'J of yet others, it may be ' the as sumed measure ' , 
if not 'the original one', a in the case of the pleasure ot 
reveng cited above . It is interesting to note how Bentham 
understands moral and political life on the model or economic 
1. Baumgardt , D. : ' Bentham and the Ethics of Today', 
Appendix IV . 
life, and :pleasure and pain on the an~logy of mo '!- • 'i.'hey 
arc I the currency ' of moral and political life; l i ke money, 
they too a.re subject to the law of diminishing uti l ity ; they 
too can be ' r.:iaximised 1 and 1accumula ed'1 goodwill , for 
example , is a 'ca ital 1 one painfully bui lds 1p, and in-
volve□ 's,rring 1 pleasures for the future . 
One important implication of introd,,cing money to 
measure intensity, which Bentham has failed to notice , is that 
the detailed process of measurement , earlier described , 
is simply no t necessary any lon r , as one can take a. 
certai n pleasure as a whole and compa ,·e it with a speci-
fic amount of money. This , of course , would not be the 
case if money were i ntroduced to measure 
but in that case t he whole calculus will 
intensity alone , 
be speaking two 
differen t and mutually non- translatable languages • th t 
of money in the case of intensity, and that of the r especti ve 
kinds of non-oonetar:; units in the case of the other dimensions 
of pleasure and pain. If therefore he is to introduce money• 
which, for reasons we have seen , he ha.a to, he must also take 
the further steps oft slating all the dimensions into the 
monetary language ; and once he does this , he cane sily dia-
J.'enae rli t h the elaborate calculation of the quant ities of 
pleasures and pains . and simpl y take the pleasure concerned as 
a whole and ecpress it in mone-tary terms . Even the quant i -
ta t ive comparisons of pleasures can be most reliably and easil y 
tha n 
made in this way since a pleasure is greater/another if the 
person enjoying or seeking it 1s prepared to make a gr eater 
sacrifice for it . 
Bu~ even the introduction of money does not really 
solve t he problem, since money is not constant in value as 
its valu" ~Pp nds on how mucll of it one already has . A, for 
example , offers £50 for the pleasure of revenge while B offers 
only £10 f or it . This can not mean that A' s pleasure is five 
times greater than B's,nor that he is five times as eager to 
have it, since £50 may be of exactly the same value to him aB 
£10 is to B. The value of money, as Bentham himself recog-
nized, is a function of the r a tio betwe n what is spent and 
what is left. However, if the quantities of money involved 
are small and thus mor~ or less equal , 'the pleasures produced 
by two sums' are '.rut the sums producing them'; in such situa-
tions , money is most intimately related to pleasure as every 
the 
single bit of it is important , and/pleasures felt by two per-
sona can be more accurately measurr dJas ve know,or can j~sti-
fiably 'assume ', that the same amount of money has the same 
va lpe tor both. This will mean that eo long as the existing 
vas t inequalities in the amounts of money owned persist , money 
can not be an accurate instrument of measurement, and the hope 
of t he ' seience of pleasure ' is doomed. B ntham coned e that 
a fair degree of quality in the money owned is presupposed 
by his science of pleasure, but goes on to as ~ert that this 
equality already exists. Mos t men have smaller a.nd more or 
less equal quantities of money, and therefore, for all pur-
poses of 'practice', men will 's t and a better chance of being 
right by supposing them equal than by eupr osing them to be 
1 
otherwise than equal .' Thia will hardly do, and Bentham 
is caught up in an interesting paradox . The lo c of his 
position would require him to insist on equalising the quan-
tities of money in tho hands of a.11 the members of a oommun-
i ty, thus making equality of weal th a. s cien tifio necessity 
or the hecessary condition of the science of pleasure . Kis 
moral theory, horever , would rule this out as the pain of 
lose ia al aye much greater than the pleasure of gain , and the 
frustra.ti 0n of expectat ions hioh the rich will experience if 
wealth is equalised is the moet acute pain in Bentham•s scheme 
This would mean that , so far as u lity ia concernedJacien 
and ethics pull in a di£ferent directions and have very 
different implications . What is more , 1eoientif io ' ethios' 
would be a self-oontradiotory xpreasion, not , of course, 
absolut ely but only thin the context of any exist· aoo-
iety with settled ex otationsJ in a eoceity just coming in11D 
existence , there a.re no established expectation , and equality 
therefore .ill be the practicer commended by the prinoiple or 
utility. The paradox, however, loses much of i ts tingfcrhlm,smoe, 
1. VII .559. 
rtespi te his occasion.al claims to tLe contrary o...n '.is 
e~plo)ment of scieniific Ldioms like ' axioms' , 'science of 
:pleasure I and 'mcasurenent ' to describe ,rhat he is doing, 
he is not really intereGted in developing such a science . 
His main concern 1c l~rsislation, and it is from this etand-
point that he a ,:,roaches and examines all problems . The 
~ain question he is asking and answering in all his works is t 
what ought a legi~lator to do? and how can we ensure that 
he will do this? He is not interested in the principle of 
utility in general , but only as it applies in the field of 
lcgislction ; he himself says as much. Again , the equality 
he is interested in is one which a legislator can help to 
l • ac .11eve . 'I'his is also true of his discussions of human 
nature , of society, of re~ion , of measurement , etc ., all 
of which are undertaken with a view to providing guidance to 
a legislator . He is therefore conten t to formulate gen-
eralisations that a.re rather broad and ad hoc and inexact 
from the standpoint of a social soientiet , but of sufficient 
merit to warrant a. legislator ' s reliance on them; f>r a leg-
in la tor they are all that he ha.s a.>1d can hope to have . In 
the present context of the discussion of measurement , Bentham 
rests content by arguing that , barring the extre of ;ealth 
and poverty , there is a broad· equality of \1eal th in the modern 
communities , hioh enables a legislator t o make r ough measure-
menta that are valid for all prac tical purposes; moreover , 
he can try to r educe pr evailing inequalities , and thereby 
enhance the possibility of a more exact measurement . 
I t may be asked why Bentham shoul d be interested at 
all in the possibility of measurement J what are the r easons 
arising~ 0~ his philosophical system itself tha t led him 
to seriously accept t he possibility of measurement , and to 
believe th the hw! to find an important place for it in his 
l 
system? A number of answers have been given and could be 
given; we shall here undertake a very brief examination of 
four of them. (1) A Benthamite individual , it is argued, 
is a happiness-seeking animal; but he finds tha t the ' materials ' 
of happiness are so 'eoantt ' that he must carefully calculate 
and not lose a sing e ~ossible drop of pleasure through neg-
ligence or oversight, and in general get the beat out of each 
opportunity2• Bentham did talk, for example, of 'the economy 
of happiness.' This argument can also take a slightly dif-
ferent form. The world as it is is so conatitut d that one 
can har dly have any pl asure withou t having aom painJ one 
should therefore be most oareful in choosing one's pleasure . 
On this interpre tation, the emphasis on the properties ot 
1. In 11 there seem to be about el V9n of them. 
2 . This interpretation is implied by Sheldon Wolin, ' Politics 
and Vision', George Allen and Unwin, 1961, 326!. 
rlea:-: 1·e " ' C 1' 8. • 1 .. - ~ J ~) - ) :ri t\ 1 , 1 t0c~di ty' and, to some extent, 
1 1 Tr i ,r, 1 l r,cr) :: e'1s.cr +, '"'X 1., in . I find this inter-
sr .. ~., ' It O; ,c,.; follm, +;he; t:,e sUL, of evil is GTeater 
than th1.t of ·ootl . :Tot onl,, is evil r.i.ore ra"e , but it is 
ac-::i'lc•1tol: i lo,...,s not arise , like [:'Ood, fror.1 constant and 
1ece s ri.rJ c a cco . up to a c0rtn.i11 r,oint , also , it is in our 
0'.7er to rer- ilsc evil fror.i and at~ract ·ood to , ourselve s . 
"'here is also in 1mraan ne. tnrc a feelinr o: confidence in 
llf1,IJ. i ness, +1ich _:,:'evn.il s over the fear of its loss . 11 (2 ) 
·0espi t e -.e,,.,th..a.1 1 <J :)~0tensior.s , it is arcued , his felicifi c 
calcL1lus is . t , otr_ctlJ , n. :cv.Lce of calclllation , but siraply 
a tool of r·las31fica tion ; as such , it pointed out to hit:! wrut 
0. lenents we~: to be co 1sidc~ed in a c iven situation , nnd , then , 
anonc- t hese he co::i .ared in tents o" greater and leso and not 
in any r...-c cisc way : centhrr, \1a.s , in s hort , a clasr-ifier rather 
2 
a c a lc .. la tor . rno ~h true up to a point, I think 
this vim·1 underestir.,ates be importance of t '" in.ea of :ncasl.I!'G-
ment in =:'entha.~ ' s system . i.·urther , cle.soification and measure -
ment ere two distinct activities for him , and have diffe ~nt 
1 . I.306 . 
2 . ~i tchell ", . C.: ' The :Backward Art of Spending onoy- '. 
purposes, the f ormer i s prior and methodically sorta things 
out; then, in each class so f ormed, measurement becomes 
possible. Bentham i s not interested in olaasification for 
its own sake but only beoause it is a neoessary condition 
of measurement . (3) The i dea of measument is intended 
only to provide a more accurate language of expression. 
Like the employment of math atioal language anywhere else, 
it does not achieve any substantial results or introduce 
any new etandardo of jud ent, but only aims at providing 
a more pr ecise and valu r ee instrument of expression; it 
can therefore easily be r emoved from ~enth ' a philoso-
phical system if we shoul d choose to do so . It seems to me 
thi s view ia untenable. • rstly, Bentham is happy with the 
-
ordinary language and suggeeto that we oe.n always use two 
ords instead of one to more precisely expr se our ideas. 
Secondly, though true that our ordinary language is full of 
emotional and valu ridden ords, it.!!!, possible to ooin 
neutral rords , as he hiri aelf is continually doi , in place 
of t he o lls ' syllogistic' and ' dyslogistio ' words. 
Thirdly, he is not orried about men being able to express 
themselve~but rather about their being able to oonvinoe eaob other 
'indisputably', which propositions of aritbm tio ' compelli ly' 
do . lly, as re ar ed e rliel', the id a of measurement 
is of very gr ::it impor t ance, particularly to his moral and 
political theoryJand can not be abandoned without serious 
damage to it . (4) There is a more philosophical account 
l 
sugg~sted by H. Arendt . The post-Cartesian man has lost 
the common world - the world of concre te obo ~cts that man 
earlier shared in common with other men, and has b en thrown 
back upon himself and his 'internal world'. One ot its 
many implica tior._ i3 that certain knowledge is possibl 
' obly where the mind plays with its own forms and formulas '. 
Living continually in doubt man wants certainty, andJso 
far as the oonte~t of our discussion ia concern d, he wants 
to b certain that he 1§. r oally getting the aximum of 
pleasure; he can find this only in the imper onal worl d of 
m thematics which can convi~o~ hi~ ' beyond doubt ' that th 
action he has done is better than its alternative because 
the former gives him so many unite of plo sure , vhile the 
latter would have given much less . Further, for man who have 
become solipsietic , the only poss ible language of communica-
tion is tha t of mathematics . Tho!1gh in general sympathy with 
this interpretation, I find it inadequ te for two reasons . 
Fi r stly, the argument from the loss of t'1e common world is less 
1. ' Human Condition', A Doubl d y chor Book, 1959. p. 240ft . 
What follow is a very general ak tch of her position : and 
hardly does justice to its brilliance and riohne s . 
applicable to Bentham th n to 1'&8.D.Y others1 as entham do 
os Jert the existence of the world of concrete objeote, 
the r eality of individual& around UB, etc •• Seconll7, 
h ens tion aa giving oertein knowledg~ and carry-
ing on their f ce the certificate ot their ve•Roity; it 
Bentham, like oat r s tional1 t, had doubted thie, he woul d, 
a Arendt rightly a ya, haTe to f pll on math tics aa the 
sol source of certn.inty and the only possible m.ediua of 
int rpersonal oo unioation, but he doe not . 
It e ma o that the explanation ay perhap lie in 
Benth m' s view of r eason . Re underst nds r aon, hot,lilce 
PaineJ as a capacity to ap gener l principles nd aot on 
them, but mainly s • taoulty' that •caloul tea •. Because 
ot hi hilo ophical hedoni a, 1t b co a necea rt for him 
to say that re eon alway onloul te in te • ot plea ure 
and pain, i . e. ' dvcmtepe• and 'disndv ea ' or' n ' 
and ' loaaea ' s ' th n • of reasons ie not -vi th any uae of 
propri tr applic ble ' to those 'portion ot diaoo\ll' e that 
do not talk in tem ot, and relate thin to the gre t• t 
ha.ppineas principle' ; no rgw:aent 1 ration l unle a t d 
in terms or thi princ1pl • Pointing out an dvant r• ot a. 
thing 1e a rea on. & 1t, and pointing out it dis dv t ge 
o ve :re one 
1 for s. proposal is to . point out it3 advantn£;os • .About 
r.Jvery thing it turns its e.tte~1tion to renoon al11o.yn asks 
for its advantages nnd disadvantabes, culcul: tes them and 
pursues the d.ir-:.1otio11 of maximum o:in; it 1 lwayo seeks 
surplus or profit in ,:h:,1t9-;er it does . It divid..:is ev ry-
thing into two, one of nhich repro ent □ e:1in and the other 
lo~:m, ' weighs ' the two , and calculates the surplus . This is 
the vary nature of eaoon. It i□ thic thn.t oxplaina thG 
preclcminant place t " t tho ideas of ' ourplua' nd ' maximum •2 
occupy in hio view of human affai.l·a. Roason calculates 
with a view to obtaining the maximuo of ploasuro whi oh i s its 
oole 3nd. Of everJ thing i t touches, it aeko if 1t serves 
this end, and works out an anS\Ver throuGh caloulation. • 1rthor, 
to philoaophia about human institutions or to ra'tion~lly examine 
them is r ~oioelJ to do thisJ that iE to say, to aaeeos their 
~dvantages and disadvantag s, to 3ee whore the balance lies , 
nnd to examine the possible altern.-i:'-ivo institution~ f rom 
th standpoint of their oapaci ty to yiel<l tho bo.lanao of 
mu..nmum pleasure. It i s this that Bontb.am himoelf is oi ng+ 
1 . rv. 54of • 
• Particularly, the idea. of ' maxim ' Bentham aoerns to be 
on of th firot philo 'ophars to c,ivo it .mch a central place 
ad to graup and define ationality in torms of it. 
in all his works, be they a study of penal las or of civil 
institutions or of constitutional codes . The view of 
political philosophy that emer ges from this is that it is 
mainly an examination of political institutions and 
proposals in terms of their ' political utility' , as moral phil-
osophy is a study of its own appropriate propcsals and 
institutions in tenns of their' moral itility'. 
It is in this light that one is to judge the ration-
ality of moral and political oonduot . A man who forgoes a 
gain in favour of a loss or who oonsoiously prefers modest to 
maximum gains is simply irrationalJ or else be must be 
pursuing and finding some gains, as in the oaee of the asoetio, 
that for the time being remain inscrutable to us. It is a 
proof of the rationality of one ' s conduct that one should be 
able to show, at the level of choosing between ends, the cal-
culat ions one has madeJand to establish that one as P\11'-
suing nothing but the mx:rlmum gainJ at the level of choosing 
between alternative moans , one should, further, be able to 
repeat this process and show that one has chosen only the 
means most suited to achieve one ' s end with maximum economy. 
It is this vie of reason that seems to hold the key to 
many aspects of his system. It may expal,n why he is a 
utilitarianJ utilitarianism, on this view, is implicit in 
his very understanding of reas~n, so that to be rational 
is to always think in tenns of utility. It also, perhaps, 
explains his theory of obligationJ since pleasure i s the 
end of man, to be rational i s to have the maximum of it , i . e . 
to pursue ' the eatest happiness'. Of oourse, man does 
not naturally do this, though this is what he must ratio,r-
ally doJ a resolution of tho tension between the two is 
one of the problems of morals and pclit1cs. It also seems 
to explain why he emphasizes measurement, and what he takes it to 
mean. It is the process of calculation made precise to 
a reasonable degree that Bentham means by ileasurementJ when 
one has analysed the units in tenns of which the calcul-
ation takes place and has arrived at some manner of total-
ling them up, on has co e to what he colls ' measurement '. 
If measurement is nothing but a more r efined calculation, 
and if calculation is something that reason does by its very 
e 
nature, it would seem to follow that the idea of meas~ent 
is inherent in the vory idea of reason. Thia relation 
between reason and measurement is also seen in some common 
assumptions that they both share . Firstly, since to reason 
is to calculate aina and losses, there must be two sides , 
and at least two and also only two , of the ledger , i . e . of 
the prooesa of deoision-makinea it is this, perhaps , that ex-
plains why Bentham takes only two elements, pleasure and pain, 
and is concerned to treat all feelings, s ntimenta, etc . as 
aimply ' synonyms ' f or one or the other of the two . Sec-
ondly, these t wo s i des of the ledger must be oonai dered oppcsed to each 
other so that an addition to one is a gain and that to 
the ot her a loss1 what i sm r e, an addition to one must be 
capable of being consi dered a loss to the other so that we 
should be able to use the two expressions , the ' augmentation of 
one ' and the ' diminution of the other' interchangeably, as Bwntham 
l himself does at a number of pl aces, But also, thirdly, the 
two sides must b e related to each otherJ otherwise , how are 
we to compare gains and losses with each other, ' weigh' one 
against the other, and say that one side~ utweighe ' the other? 
Thia r equires a common f r amework of co- ordinates such as 
intensity, duration, etc ., which are equally applicable to both 
sides, it also requires that we should be able to f irst reduce 
all the various sorta of pleasures to simple and homogeneous 
ones and then to quantify them in terms of their dimensions . It 
i s this that may explain why Bentham should f irst break down 
all tho ' ocmplex' pleacures and pains into the ' simple ' ones and 
then assess the value of each in terms of it s dimensions , 
One important consequence of ·the introduction of measure-
ment w uld be, Bentham believes, that all r a ional decisions 
1. Principles, ch. I . Para.3. 
v;ill b fully comm ,ic'. l': ,, ,d ex"laL1ablc to o!;hers. Our 
reasoning will be ' precise:' and 'incontestable ' and all 
::ien could be ot ~'ounct to R 'Tee to i -r~s conclusions; there 
w.:.11 be just no room for doubt or ,! ispute as one cannot 
qu0stion ~he -ocedures and conclusions o:· e.ri thmetic . Our 
decisions a ,d tho procedures leading to them ,rill be I self-
evident 1 , and will 1 com-pc l 1 assen~ from ' reason ' . What he 
ultima ely hopes to do is to ' compel ' cunYiction through the 
sheer'force' of e.ritb.uetical truths a1d t·-.us dispense with 
the need of persuadint;- othe 1.:-s . 
1Y. 
HEJXHITSTIC 'i'ffil)RY OF EQUALITY 
Pleasure and in are tho solo or 1 and poli M.oa.l 
realities. In tho ooral and the political real man 
appears only as a baing f eling pleaom· and painJ ha has 
no r eality independ nt of them. A oro t ur inoapabl0 of 
feeling pleasur e and pain i s morally and litioally 
irrelevant and unreal , aa he juot doe not st for moral 
and polotioal purposes wb re tho c oity to suffer i o the solo 
criterion of reality and oxiateno . ' blnoknees of the 
skin' , ' the number of l egs•, ' tho villosity of the akin ' , 
' the tenn1nat1on of tho oo sacrum•, etc. ara not eu.ff1o1ent 
reasons for ' abandoning a senaitiv boo.ne• to tyraney end 
torm nt . Ao rognrdo these boi e 'tho qu otion is not , on 
thy reason? nor oan thoy tnlk? bu can thy euff' £1 ' A 
ore ture that oan ou.ff'er ha 'inte ot o' to neglaot whioh is 
t o ' degrade• it ' into the class o t hinmJl an is 
eaentially o. auf:f ri beingf to boa an i s to euff'er1 
and tbor fore to tr t h1D as if ho C3.MO or does not 
sui'f er is to imply t t ho ia not ' per on' , but a • thing' • 
Sino pl aaur and 1n ar tho ool oral nnd 
political realitioa, quality muat b3 undor tood 1n t mo of 
tbam as, othorwi , it would be nimply ' otitious'. It io 
th r ofor to b ot1s d only ong and also among all t ho 
oeings wno dre capable oi feeling pleasure and pain • 
.1.• urtner, nose men are to oe tret1.teu e'¼ua.lly who eel equal 
quantities of pleasure and pains tney re equal who 
experience eqm1l quantities of pleasure or pain. '!'he 
content of equality, i . e . the sort of tning men are to oe 
tre~ted equally in is also furnishe by pleasure or pain; 
the equality that really matters omen is the equality in 
ple sure and pain • It is only his kind of e uali y that 
.dentham calls a tl can c ll 1 real 1 quality or quality 1in 
reality'; ey other kind is simply 1f ormal 1 • A ju ge, 
example, may oe f ced with two criminal!:! who have co tted 
the same crime, a may want to impose he same punishment 
or 
on both; but what does this 1 sameness 1 consist in He can 
end both of them to prison or the same period of time~or 
impose the same fine on both; this would be one sort of 
equality. But it is quite possible that one of them h~s all 
his children grown up while the other has all his under ten, 
.) 
so that the total hardship resulting from the former being 
sent to prison may Je much less than w t might result i the 
latter were sent . The appar~nt equality of pun,ishment 
could mean gross inequality in the total amount of actuul 
,Jain felt . Sinoe it is pleasure and pa.in alon t t are of 
real importance, it is the equality in pain t l tis o rel 
importance here; and if this requires differ ng degrees or 
even different kinds of punishment, there is every justification 
or it, . 
)0 
, u.1.c to e tL ·11·e h•1nnin0ns if eq r.J.i' ·· J. "let t1 •8 · ::1 
, . cr:.,t, .1.J. ;J." o.f c, .1.l'tr ,r')LUd re· Ji c ilin to ,,o .. th•t such 
,l ~s .u•o, "J lt i::., 10 s a .Jle • 
. :lat t 12 le• :isl.tto::: o:dr,ts to t',::> :: , ·110 ncc•1r" the 
Concrete inc1i-.T.Ld.als do not c t~r into 
3 :..1ri.lity '.l.!7!on, r.:.£n Gimp~ y a en ·1ot arlse .i. this 
c- 1)nt-J:ri !.'o:· ti.a ver·r sir.P1lo reason tlnt there a.ro no 
cr3 it·"t:"~s c 1.Jud 1r 1cn 1 ; 'enuality of r.10:1 1 , if o 8 is to use 
; 1ch an expr'---~ .ion, con.1j ;::;ts in the tot.A-1 exclusio--1 or 
'J1•1c 1.etinn; of ever,r ni.n. 
,_) t .;o units 0f hanPinesf , ir:-espcctivJ of ---19. i.;; e·~~0-ier.cinc 
t ·1or.1, e :nctl:r fl.£ the \lei; ht of forty !)O,. ,,:i 3 in ry h'. 1Y.is i:J 
•J 1u:-:.l to the roit",.t of forty pounC.3 ::.n yours, irrJ3 ·ective of 
· ,-10 you arid l 1re; 1 i,ho 1 - tho disti •1ct identifiabl 
"i '1ili. vid1.<.::il ei vcs olace to I holw' ;:ruch 1 • For th s-me re~son, 
t 'ree units of haop.inesc are 1rcre th":1. ~,, .. md the_ forD o be 
· referred to, two units of app ness, i::-r3s ect 1e o"' ~ o is 
'I'his, :it would seeti, 
equality or inequality o.f the quantities of plea sure. Of 
cour·se , it c.ccc imply that :ito.tus, vI~:~l th, o .;c . o_· i;h ,.:) :persons 
conc zrned arc not t o come irrtc -i1 e picturu, unci it t!LlY thus 
imply a degree of eq_u3l i t:,' of men quo. L'len. However, they 
do come in indirectly ~u; d'fecting tho c_uanti ty of pleasure 
and pain a man feels . 1.'.. r·ich man, for c:ic,mple , i o u ed to 
a life of luxury, and will su.f:fer 3ll acute p:;in of fruct r :.:tion 
of expect tiom, ·:1hen d0prived of hio vc ·, lth, while a pcor 
man, usod to a lif'e, 01' d.ruag_:; .:-r, c.y r.ot , in g tt ing a little 
t!lore [Tloney, expc.ri oncc such un adcli·;;ional quanti ·y of pleasure 
ao to oi'faet the p ·. in 1'ol t b:,- th rich man. .130:.:::ides oquali t y h ere 
doeo net cprine; from a respect f'or per oono, but it 'irrespective ' 
of them. It does not r est on tb.o Pl'inoiple that all 
individuals are et1u: 1 in 1•10J1:h or impcrt oe or dignity or 
~caredneea, ~uq_ii ty iB juot an incidental, unocught f or consequ enoe 
of concent r ·· ting on qunn'ti t y alono. 'l1hio is bol'Tle ut by 
Benthamla di s cussion of slavery . A ' st.rong argument ' 
aguinst sl avery is thut n slave producoo le~s h la f r ee man 
and that slavery thus means less of ' 3,bundance' , ·thout which the 
hap pine;, oi the oMnuni ty ' c nnot ' be a1l{;.'1Jlented . lforeov r, 
slaves a r e to be emancipated only when this c ~ be done 
' 1. thou ove1·t ur ng' t' I;) ' o tunes' n thb 1 p :.. sonal eeouri ty' 
of the alave-ownor e; el,;;;e , there h: •.calamity', and this f or ms 
' tho gretitebt objuctio ag im,t pro j oo";;:::) o' ema cipation'. 
If, in :tead of one man having many slaves, ue c,::iuld arranGe 
to have 'only one slave to one master ', there may , in fact , 
be nothing wrong \ I i th slavery , a nee 'it might be possible 
tliat, a.:.l things considered, the sum of good in t bis 
arrane;ement vrould be nearly equa '... to that of evil '. 1 
The legislator, we have seen , has an obli~ation to treat 
~qual quantities equally. Thio obligation does not ar i se 
from any moral consideration but instead from the simple 
' truths of arithmetic'. Two equals two , and it is absurd to 
ask why shouli one treat two as e ual to two ; similarly, if 
two individuals feel equal amounts of happiness , it is absurd 
to ask!!&, they should be treated equally; and if one of 
them exr eriences more hapvjness than another , it is equally-
absurd to .1.sk why he should be preferred to the other . 
There is , as \>Je have seen , a general obligat ion on the 
le islator to pursue and acL.ieve t he greatest happiness in 
society. Now it can be argued t hat t his would require 
no t. only thut he should treat equal quantities of happiness 
equally , but also tat he should create a greater degr:ee or 
equality among men thaf!, wight happen to obtain in his society . 
Bentham ia all in favour of thia t and devotes a great deal of 
his time to working out its implications. His discussion of 
it broadly centres round two themes: · ( 1) Axioms of pleasure 
and pain ; and (1 1) .::nds of legislation . 
1. 1. ,344ff . 
' Axioms of pleasure and pain ' 
.tlcnthaJa dra:1s a. clear dist ·nction betweon a principle and an 
axiom. j:e have S..)en 1hat a principle c1eane for him; utility, 
a.scenticisra , etc . are ex8.!l plas of it . 
ment expreosiug CuJ.utl connections bet ;een two entities . 
'l'he axioms ' have to a. cer tain point the character and cer-
tainty of ::iathcmatical propositiona •.1 As a hedonist , 
he is cniefly int.eres ted in t he axioms of ' moral pathology ', 
which he defines as t hose 'expressive of the oonneotion 
bet; een such occurrences as are ooz tin ly taking place 
or are liable to ;.ake place , and the pleasures and pains 
2 
which are r e~pectively the res ~lts of them. 1 They ·ve 
us I the ltno ded of the feelin 
' 
and their effects upon happiness '. 
affections and passions , 
' Medicine ie founded 
upon the axioms of hys1cel pathology; moralo are the oodi-
cine of the soul: legislation is the practicaJ. branch ; 
it ought , therefore , 
2 
mental pathology'; 
to be founded upon the axioms of 
he usea the t o te 
e.nd ' mental pathology ' interchan ably. 
J 'moral athology ' 
They show 
ho different si tuations and circumsta.noee are rolated to 
the pleasures a.nd pains of individuals . xamplee of auch 
1. I . }05 . 
2. III .224 . 
a:rlot1e ai,e & '1 t ia woruo to lose than not to gain ' , 
' mankind in general appear to ba more sensible of griaf 
than pleaouro from an oqual oau□e', ' tho negative evil of 
not having gained is not equal to the positive evil of having 
lost'. Sinoe the •true• principle on hioh the legislator 
is to aot is the principle o utility, we oan deduce , van 
these axioms, oertain ' onda' \,hich alone lead to tho gr atoat 
happiness and at which tho lo □lator ought to aim. Bentham 
carries out this deduction and comes out th four endec 
security, suboistence, abundonoe and equality • . o shall 
disouos th a little 1 t or. 
Not all tho axians ~ t Bentham discuaooe are directly 
r elovant to quality as an end of legislation. Besides , 
tha equality thut ho io mainly concerned~ ·th i s economic 
in o r oter; that is, the one involved in and requiring the 
1 
rodiotribution of rnsl th • As suoh, the' oms of montal pathology' 
that he disouaaea ae relevant to the question of equality are those 
relating ' the effec oi a per ion of ealth upon happiness•. 
In addition to those lietod earlier some of th are: (1) 
a portion of ealth ie oonnooted with a corresponding portion 
of h pp:lness. (11) Gr ator ealth mans greater happiness . 
1. Tho te:nn we 1th 'is used with mor extended signification 
and includeo evorythi:ng whioh serves for subsistence and abundance• 
ibid. , 305• 
(111) m increase in h&.? indr s is not, ho•,;ever, equal to an 
incrc<.lse in ·.ealth. (rl) 'Tht:., 1,:ore ne.'.lrly t he 'lctual 
proportion (between the two nussos of ,;oalth) ._p roaches to 
e"" uality, tne gre t er will oe the t ot l rr.ass of h'..i.ppincss '. 
(V) l osG of a. portion of wealth will produce a loss of 
happiness ' according to the proportion between the portion 
he loses and t he portion he retains 1 • Suppooe I possess 
~ 1, uoo, ind amble with the stake of .. 5LJC ; if' I lose, my 
fortune is diminished by one half; if' I win, it io increased 
only by ono third. O~ suppose the stake is 1,ooc ; if I 
win, my fortune io increased by one half; if I lose, it is 
ntirely destroyed and I am reduced to st c poverty . So 
.. l..;o is the case with happiness; in the ormor, ' my h:lppinesa 
is not doubled with my fortune ' ; but • if I loso, r.ry happiness 
h destroyed ' • 1 (Vl) The greater the number of persons 
with equal fortunes amo tS whom a given loss io divided, ' t 
less considerable is the loss of the tot3.l . ss of happinoo • 
ln fact, th a.xi.oms regarding tho distribution of ha.ppinoss 
operate in ~ revers manner "When applied to the distribution 
of a loss, and we need not discuss them. 
Thes and several other axioms not listed here o to 
decid vha.t policy tho legisl tor should follow with respect 
to equality. Further, th axioms invok w.i.11 v nd will 
1. id . 3 • 
oper t with dif'f eront foJ;"oe . aooord~1 t th context 1n 
hioh ho 1a ~ ting, nuoh as when we l th ' h o ol 118,Y' been 
pooneossd ' , ,.,h~n • it i abou·t to be gainod' , nd rrh n ' it is 
about to ho loot •. Th practi o equo.11 ty thu io 
mntter of ' oalc lition' , and not of ' instinct ' and ' sontimont •; 
Leg!sl torn do, in r t , cencrnlly ' ollo\ tho eounoel a of 
equal1 ty ' , b 1t unfortunately ' und r the nnmo ot qui ty' which, 
however, i ritt r of ' eentimont' and i too ' vague and 
111- ov lop ' • 1 o ould i notead b_o our pr tic of 
equal1 ty on th oiant1f'1o- oul,. tion in t a of • rigorous 
prop081tion ' , an<l oontin lly oh ok it 
the gr& tenth ppinaao prinoi pl . 
h rofei-eno to 
On thio vio t any d oision a out whiab inequality to 
it1g t or ljninnt , wbon and ho,. , ')O d b 0 01 ntifi lly 
ng o t tho 1 D).ie ti~ o thoao ' ri roua• 
t hat x- evant in the cont fin nhort, ual ity 
aB n nd o lll tion woul 
soionQ of pl mu- • 
ly :taGhi.on d 
oi o i me.do po ibl 
by t V ry ur o. pl u itsol lre ey not d. 
h.umo.n naturf3 ntJ th difterono a b t aon 011,. The q nti ty 
n m.. n is l 1ablo to , r1eno do ds 
not only on th oan o oi ·11h pl S\1.r8 t 'bu"; nlao upon e veral 
l , Ibid. , 
other faotoro, called ' oircumst~noon iru:.i.uencing sensibility'. 
Thoy affoot both th ' quantum•,1.0. tho crpooition to feel 
ouoh or such o. quantity of pleaouro or • in fro a given 
caus, ond tho ' bias' of n man's c nsib1lity, 1.0. the 
disposition to f el pl asure or poiu in di forent things, or 
in different p:ropo.,.tion from tho ao.mo thinGo, They apply 
difforontly to di .oront causes of pleasure and pain. To a 
oertain oau oerta1n oircumat noe o y no., apply at all, 
whilo it mQY apply w-l th a great oroa to an ther oauae. 
Toeoe cireumota eos re thirty , in 111 
l d include health, 
stro h, bo ily 1 porfeo ion, quan't1 'ty and quality of 
kno ,lGd&c, 2 strength o int 11 ctunl pow , 3 bent of 
1. en ' bodily inclicposod' , m n i los a noibl to the 
influeno of an;; ple urabl oauoo d oro to th t o ' any 
c.ffliotiv ono'. 
2. i . e. vi ' int rooti • id G 1n atoro or ide that 
influ nc tll!Ul' a o . or oth rs I happineoa. ', n thos 
i oar d of imp0rt no , 1 id to be a man 
0£ laiowlaago• • oo how kmwl d is h doni tioally 1nterp,-
ret d . 
3. i . e. •the dogr of facility' 
up ido s . Thia paoi'ty ' in 
th hioh a man can call 
to correspond. 
pretty e otly to neral strength or body' . Prinoipl e 
ch.VI,para.12. 
. l h inolinationo, peouniary oiroumstances, ha itual oocupations , 
2 
age, sex, connoctione in the way of symp thy and antipathy, 
eto. or tbaee, twenty four are on.111:,1 prim-iry and eight 
secondary, as tha former operate by th8l'.!lnelveo bile tho 
latter operate only through the omer. The effects of the 
secondary eirout1e anooa aro open to oboorvation. Of tho 
primary oireumstancea, some, lilt bodily ioperfeotion and 
insanity, whon thoy oxi.ot, affect all and with the a.ame force, 
and therefore their ett ota also onn be easily aseesaed. 
As to some others oooh as strength and hardihood, we oan 
al nya aeoertain thoir e iatenoo, but can not always measure 
thoir af'feots on n man• s sensibility. There are, howev r , 
eome other s auch as the radical frame of mind and th bent of 
inclinations, in wh~ae oaee neith r the axiotanoo oan be 
aeoertained nor on Iha ffaote b m nsured, and whioh 
' therefore owmot be taken into acoount• except when and to 
the et;t nt their existanoe and intluonoe are i ndi cated by 
aeoondary oiroumatunoos. Bes1dos, they re ' oonnate•, are 
' r lative to a man ••• nd ••• are coeval to hio birth', and are 
what ' met physioians and physiologists' c 11 ' idiooynorq y, 
1. e. 1dioa (peculiar) and aynkroo (cocipooition)t they are, in 
1. i . e. Prop rty or• atever he hao 1n tore independent of 
hie labour' • 
2. i . e . thooo th idea of whose ppine a ve one pla sure or pain. 
short , natural and inelimL ,able , ani even in the remote 
future we cnnnot hope to get rid of t hem . Thus they make 
any ' s cience of fLeasure' imposs i ble not only today but 
also i n any fo r eseeable future . C:ve•1 when the differences 
between men are not natural , they are often 'inscrutable ', 
and this further a leis to t he di fflculties . 
Be ,, tham recogr,izes t hese s erious di f ficul t ies in the 
'aJ of cons tructin0 the science of I,;leasure , but escapes in 
the same 1rmy as he 11ad done (;arlh:r . ~fo mus t, he says, lay 
aside those factors tha t creat e such difficulties , since, 
otrrnrwise , ' it woul 11 be impo3siblc to form a s .lngle general 
µroposi ti:.,n ' • Now it is true that, if we do Lis , our 
resulting gener al propositio:is •may be found false or inexact 
in i::ach part i cular case'; but ' t aey a~ iroach more nearly to 
truth than any others which can be substituted for them '. 
B~sides , it is t h e legislator who is t5oing to operate with 
them, and, as he is concerned with a large number of cases and 
only in a ver y general way , t hey will continue to have a very 
·reat value for him . It will be seen t hat once again , as in 
the case of measurement, Benthar.i is face to face vi th t he 
impossibility of a science of pleasure , tho situation he 
candidly acknowledges . It also becomes clear that he is 
lookin, at all l.is problems from tr,e · standpoint of a legislator , 
and that , as such , all he is i nterested in is a set of ad hoc , 
empirically based , common sense generalisations . 
I 
~ s of L0 ~ sl~tion 
we mentioned earlier now, given tne axioms 01 me tal 
1; thology, tour enus are deduciole thH-"t a legis:_tor should 
aim a in nis pursuit 01 the grea~est happiness . dec~use 
the pain of frustration 01 expoctatiorw is so overwnel ing, 
security is importallt; bocause tne pain of st rvJ.tl.on is 
so intense, subsistence is important; abunda ce becomes 
important ooth because the pleasure o acquisition is grea , 
n. beca.ua t:: the happiness of the coIIDllunity is maximised 
through prosperity and industryJ inally, eqU:1.lity is 
important because ooth money and pleasure are subject to 
the law of diminishing returns . 1hese four are hierarchically 
arranged in terms of their importance for the greatest 
happiness of t ho COilli:iuni ty. ecuri ty occupies the topmost 
place in the hierarchy both because the pain resulting from 
frustration of one ' s expectations is very acute, and because 
v.ithout it there is 'no abundance, nor even cert in sub-
sistence, and the only equality uhich can exist in such a 
condition is the equality of misery• . Subsiat nee occupie 
the second, abundance the third, and equality the fourth 
place. 1~bundance ia lese important than subsistence because 
'the pain of death will always be a greater evil than the pain 
of disappointed expectation' J as such, ' the titlo of the 
indigent is stro er t han the .title of the proprietor of 
superfluity '. Indigence oim be removed by so securing the 
institution of propert y t hat t he economy of the community 
develops and creat es prosperity and employment all around. 
Where this i s insuff icient l aw i a to t ake ' a regular 
contribution' f r om the rich and create a common fund hioh i s 
to be used to help the poor. This levy will not disturb the 
security of expeotationa i f it i s ' est ablished on a fixed 
footing ' , since each propri etor will know beforehand what he 
has to paYJ a loss lrnown i n advance gives must less pain 
than when unexpected. There will , of cours~, be some who 
are indigent through thoir o\m f ault, but t o let them starve 
on that score io an aot of vongence which can not be the 
motive of a legislator dded to the pi'incipl e of utility. 
To argue, further, that they should be left to e·tarve so 
that a proper exampl may be set t o other s is also wro , 
ainoe suoh people are ' weak i n logio' and hardly ever 
li~ely to draw and learn tho proper l essonJ even if they 
do , they will hardly act o~ it and start saving for t he future 
F,::; t,hey are siven over. sol~ly to the :f,lresent . at wa can do 
with suob men is to ' plaoe the motive near' them and show 
them the i mmediate proapeot of a marriage or of any other 
pleacure, and they will ' soon' begin to aavo to improvo 
t heir condition. 
_.1 !ii.., c:.:.~cu ... sion oi' Jcp ..2.i ty, J nth-im stn.rt.., '.,' 
Hu ... di.., t:. .ction i.:; dr _\,n i. ter:i.:.. ol.' th.; hier -rchy 0:!.' ends: 
i_' e 1.: ty ~lone is ~ ,)h::.siJod ar.u i ,n .,roper _)l .'! in the 
hier re> i 6nored, wt.it ·re mve h b::wLite e ,l..llity; men 
e .~1lity iJ nttcndo to after' rovi io iS effectu.e.l s c n 
J1., L,.,de for t' .ono tlr::-ee ot. er .rtict..Lr ends of cu. erior 
noce::;Ji t rt , .1hat we luve is ractic~l ~lity. 1 A. solute 
o ~lit ' h~o place in p ics; it upplies ••• to woi ht, 
r.10 sure, tine · nd thor ce to r.iotiu .. 11 • :tis possi lo nd 
ac::iir blo in -tterc; of security n ::: ·bsi:::tor ceJ which 
ou~ht to be bsolut o ual to 11. In tho c._..,e o 
::;ubs ::;tencc, w"O ro r to t.10 o ' instrun..,nts 1 which ro ouch 
t.-t, \Ji.th . lesnor qll.'.lntit , e · 1..>1:,onco coul • not rmv 
pl ce 12; this io cc lly true o ::; curity. But wi 
re pect to woe.1th or 'a 
c rnpl to rul d out bee 
to be se]~ ore tiv 3 
:1e 1 , such eqt.....lity is 
se, if pr~ct sod, it wuld prove 
wealt v.ill o frittered w. d 
1. IV. 541. 2. IX. J.4 • 
.'.3 . ' The establishment of equality is a chimera: the only 
thi~ 'Which c~n bo done is to diminioh inequ~lity•. Besidoo, 
' the cry for equality is only a prote to cover the robbery 
which idleness perpetrates upon industcy-1 • EqIDlity implies 
violence. both for establishing it in the first instano , and 
or pre rvin it by gUJ.rding the commo level aoove which none 
iJ to be ~llowed tori e. ' This o much bo sted p ssion for 
equa.lity ••• is a prop nsity wich begins in vice and leads to 
ruin. 1 ' In the scale of merit, it is as much belou selfishness 
as selfishness is below the virtue of benevolence '. 
· e 'fill .1 J l 1 ·t ,_- t· .:ti. .r ..:r;.; ~1 . )V rty; _.,ido , Lt will 
.~ · t 1 . l 
_ ru avt-rs .e>n o io ' • 
• • LL lity 0ccc1p.i. s tho t}i.nt' _11.l.ce in ':.h~ or·er o' .)riorities, 
th- otL.3rs '.I.re rovided for 1 • 2 .:>cc....rity is I the fou.1 Ltion 
Jf lii'-; • • • ~u- li ty oitl _)ro I.lees ce ti o~tio of 
.mp .. Li s ... 1 ; Jecurity an"" uosbt,:incc u.re 'lil e lLe it Jlf 1 
hile -bun u.1co nd cc . • t li ty '1r I the ornrunento of life ' • 3 
I we i(ee eel' lit to its ro er pl ce in the hier rchyJ 
ol' ends and conce tr.te on t!le oth r thru , .::> rticul rly 
socuri ty-, the ar.ount of encr 1 ha. i>L c.,.., re liu d 'will be 
.. :mch grunter, and o Llalit itself will oonefit . In n~tion 
w:1ich rospers by griculturo, . nuf ct a, n conm rce, 
th re i:3 a. c1..;ntinU-l p .. ogress tow.irds aqua.lit if only l V.J 
do ot op oso it by er ting mono olie3, tting ct ils 
..1 rostrainin trade; 1 1 r "e ro ertieo will b see 1, 
without effort, 'Without r volutions, without shoe , to 
~ubdivide th oselv s, by little ~nd little, a much ro t er 
number of individuals will p .• rt.icip-to in th dvant e of 
1. ~he institution of property is needed to over omo ma.n ' s 
2. III. 294; ...1..lso, ibid ., 293 . 
3, I , ;--.. )::,, and 311 , 
:'hi., will :Je I the u;;.ttu·al ro:Nlt of tho 
clifforant ~.Jit:; l'or.,ed lv opulcnco a:u.i J.iovo1--ty1 ; tiut is to 
f;~'.f, the rici. t,nltl to ..>ecome indJlen'., ll:rl tll ~ poorer, while 
'He lea, wo r.'•Y conclu.:io th..i.t s0curit1, 'by prc:.;ervirii; ito r ..... !lk 
ao t.ho suprerao pr1.nciple, in<liroctly co (1.J.ucto to tl c 
eGtn.blishl!'ant of eqllillity, while tt,ii; .lc.ttcr, if tci~on :1:. the 
b1.usis of t ho ooci..'1.l nrr.:.1..~en nt, 'WOi.Ud deutroy accurity in 
e3t bli:;hing itself• ' 
very ' gently', nd ' fav,)ur • ,1ualio!!.tion i..rhcno·rer 50 doing 
au.:.,111e.lts I U..ltiou .. -il we.u.th ' and i.ucre'l. os gonorJ.1 l:uppinos:.1e 
'.!io 10£1.in p.-oun.:1 for beliovin6 t.h&t e·.u~is tion uu_:ments 
gen.oral hui.)piness io tho axio:.i stating tho inoro1.r.lng 
disproportion ,)OtioiOon an inc .. .ioe in I:Jonoy and th:t in 
he pi:naoo . li0 taken tho too c ::100 o · r.on..rch o.n.r.d!,... 
wxi a labon.rer e ko 
!:ow ;1uc.h clti'foro.1.0e in 1)pinoss doe5 thi' Vil.Ot tli.f.L' ro 100 in 
uonoy na.ko? l-'ifty thou.:rn.nd tims? Bivo hu:uirod ti~uJa? 
' Five times the labourer•::; seem.a ·1ery 1 rgo, not to s n 
ex:eeaoive allow: nceJ oven twice, a libor"l.l OI 1 • 1 It a 
1on the f:,'l"Ound of .ii:.:;.:i;:::.::..=:. consideratio •2 that eq!.l!.lity 
•dd d to tho other throe ends o£ l o.w,. nd i • no le. '1 , t rial 1, 
l . Ii• 541. 
2. I'! . 541. r wxlorlinoa . 
..,.tuul I t-:1. .... e the load 1 • icnt ..c11 .ilsO e te,.ds the · ion 
'l:..Jc ti~ t~ o relative ini..:e:m .de ce 1f cu ppines.., ot' oney to 
covur ' .ll Jt.1.Jr :Jource::, or c3.u::e. oi' .)le sura 1 ; 1 dd 
ri.Jbonc :11.'t-r ribbom; to 2.. m:1n 1, 1l, you will d.dd incre!l....;i'1i;;ly 
'.i. nio 1, ~zhli.)1ts thl.:l 
ul!'-'icillty he find.::; in ~ccom: ,ad tin tl1e idol. of justice in 
ni.., nyr.,tcm. Justice m' requir tna.t 1ri'bJons fter 
r b om,' lJo piled on n if hio deeds deserve tho 11, while 
:, e !r atov t h J inos:, principl- r:...1y re 1uire th•1t gorno of them 
uc conferred on othero s, 11 wo, ho evur un e .... ervin, wuld 
cert ·n1y 6ct ~ lot nore ha~ iness ' ro~ 6ottin~ them. The 
o 'iontJ.tion OJ. the pri i le of utility is b ..... s · cally different 
iro th~t or tho rinciple of ·u~tico • 
. :o\.,, t .. 1on) .:; thi::i I gentle 1 e lio tio to e achieved? 
·p to c rt n point, quality nd security re i·1eot1p tibl , 
;JJ.t 'ui.t a little -tio:ica 1 t 1 y o :.JI'OUE,ht by 
n br v to coincide' . e mo i tor t\loen tho two ia 1ti.ue 1 • 
.1.f logi~ tor 1ero pr aiding over tho i tio of n.n 
ontirely n..,w soci ty., the gre toot happinesc principle will 
enjoin on him th duty to pl c all its members on level of 
e ty, s all men f el or or less equal quantitie of 
ppi os nd t er is no r ason iy o e hould to.rt off 
oetter th n anotier. But , if he is oper ting i tne context 
of n alr0ady est~blished society, his situation is very 
different , the most important differenc being the existence 
of established expectations; people expect to continue to 
own things they have always owned and to enjoy the ouatomery 
standard of life. No any attempt to eliminate expectations 
and wipe society clean will create a tremendous amount of 
pain. Besides, why do we \Vant to do so? . If for equality, 
your action is simply going to destroy itJ if for security, 
the best thing to do is to preserve, and not change the 
existing institutions, i f for subsistence and abundance , 
these again can be achieved only by retaining the existing 
institutions and introduoi gradually hatever changes are 
felt necessary. In short, the whole oase is for preserving 
the social arrangements and improving tham very gently 
in the direction required by the eatesChappiness 
prinoiple . Any improvooienti does, of course , mean some 
frustration of some expectations. ibat we oan and ought 
to do in such oases is to minimise the expectations right from 
the beginning, which we oan do by making it ole r that there 
can never by any absolute right to property, by getting the 
individuals conoorned prepared ~or it , by spreading out the 
frustration when it does arise and by choosing a moment when 
the expectations are likely to be leas strong. As for timing, 
the best mome~t o disturb expectations is a man' s death. Law 
may then intervene 'by limiting in certain respects the powers of 
disposing of it (i . e. property) by will '. It may also extend 
the law of Eschaat . Bentham elaborates this at great 
length. 1 Vlhat it involves is broadly this: (1) all •vacant 
successions ' are to be appropriated for public use ; 
(11) only the interest on the property but not a share in 
the property itself is to be given to those relations in the 
pale who are without children and have no prospect of having 
one, this latter being detennined by inquiring i f a woman of 
or over forty eight and a man of or over sixty had any child 
within the past five years; (111) and, finally, a portion of 
the deoeased1 s property is to be taken a ay hen the relations, 
though in the pale, could hardly have based their plan of 
life on the E3X1?ectation of suoceasion. 
Beforo endi the discussion of the four ends of 
legislation some general obaorgations may not be irrelovant . 
These ends , it ·11 be seen, differ in the logical 
chnracter. Beaidos, they can not all be realised in t ho same 
way, and make different kinds of demunds on the legislator. 
Equality differs from all the three in that it ia a 
1. II. 585 ff . 
1 c.:.istr1. ·.Juti·1-:: 1 iue l am has no c0 1cent of its own; we c1n 
o ,l.lJ ta..!..t' o .. : c 1...w.lit.y oL sec"'l:ity or o suosi tence or of 
1 
.:..ace . :1oreover, it is .1ot 1 .:~adi te iru trument of 
\3licity ', .:,u.t operate ... 'only throu..,h the 11efilu; , of those 
U!ree, e:::,;eci...J.ly through abundance nd ~ecurity' . It is 
1., .,roduced only oecalise of the diminishin · utility of any use 
t rauy be sked ,i y Jentha.m 
do o;:i not me.1.tion ..... s e_ ., o 1 gislation macy ot~1er thine;;s 
thut one would expect him to, p ticula.rly I li .:rty '. The 
reason seeos to lie in his reductionist nalysis . ouppose 
.i bind ne to a tree, and a legislator steps in to comm'.lnd 
h m to unbind .. • 'h .... t he is doinu stri .. tly spcakinc, is 
not to re ::;to re my liberty, but r dther to coerce my neighbour, 
i . e . to visit him with pai~, ~nd thereby to ~iva ne security. 
Property too is assimilated to security. It does not at 
~u consist in pnysically possessinJ a~ object; it is nothing 
mor3 th!ln n. ground of expectat.ions, or, r::or ,3 ,:rccisely, just 
~ Jet of secured expectations, and, 1s such, is an a~pac t or 
' species ' of security. Liberty and proporty nre thus su ).,umed 
Wlder security. Fimlly, it is by r:ieans of expect tions that 
1 
-;_.1,,8 successive moments which form the duration of life are not 
like insul~ted and independent parts ~ut become parts of a 
continuous whole . Expectation is a chain which unites our 
1. IV. 541, also, I . 302 ff. 
.q_,66 
p'.L•t:t:,i::nt and our i'.lturc orlntnncc' . It in in tcnnc of 
the@ th~t a mm achi evoo a GonJe of i dentity, and therefore 
to seourd ~hew i s to decur,:-; hi.::; id"mti t y . Thie ~y ex11n.lin 
why seoud·Ly t1ho ld be d O import,~nt i'or l3entham. :Bacides, 
it is law Li.Lat 01·ea.t<:J~ 1:icurity, a.ml thus uakos it poo::::i ble 
for wen to achittVB a aenae of icluu· ity. Legisla iv:s acti vity 
on this vi~w, acquires an ontological ai gnif'icance, aa it sets 
up and attenus ~o t lle frawework wi tllin fllich alone lilan 
diacovers hiurnel f , aoquil·es a Henue of i 1lentity, and achieves a 
sense of oontinui yin tiino by imposi 
required measure of durabllity. 
on fleeting sont:iations a 
! 
INnr vr nu1,L.1., ? IC THEORY OF Ji~0UALITY 
Bentham ' s earlier theory of equality , as we have 
seen , treats pleasure and pain alone ae real nd reduces the 
individual to a certain quantity of pleasure or pain, with 
the r esult tha t the concrete individual just does not 
appear. Bentham , however, is not entirely happy with thi s pos i -
tion and g dually slides into a position closel y connected 
wi th it, but yet very different from it in its philo ophical 
character. He now argues that ua.ntities of plea ure and 
pain r efer to specific individual men; they are not detached 
entities floating around in the air, but are felt by c-
ific persons . As a r ,sult, a concrete nappe rs on the 
scene whose reality,Bentham says, we all know. He 1 a unity 
and is asily distinguishable from other; i n short, he is 
a unit . B aids , he is not a oonventi Jnal but a natural 
unit, and is not a construct of the legisl ator, but exists 
in his own righ t . As unit, he is one, Bnd so is every 
other man. Since one ie always equal to one, one unit, i . e . 
one man is equal to another unit, i.e. another m • When, 
th refor , a legi lator ppears on the scene to pur ue 
gen r l happiness, it becomes hie duty to 'count ' ach as 
. ' 
'one', and the simple reason for thi~ is the ' truth ' ot 
arithmetic thet one is always equal to one. His duty 
to treat all equally arises from the fact tha t al l are 
equ 1, equal in their numerical value. ~ach individual 
is a single whole , and as such a whole has a value , not 
a morol but a numorical value, which is one; since each 
has the same value, all are equal. As this position does 
not rule out the view th t individuals feel pleasure and 
pain,the latter do not cease to be the central ends of 
morAl and political action, and equality continues to be 
defined in their terms; tho value of each man is inte~ 
pr ted ae the value ot each man 's happin s s . le ,then, 
simply take 'individual happiness' as a ingle unit, nd 
do not on to calculate how m y unite of happiness it 
embodies or represents; our calculation takas its bearing 
from thin unit whose further breakdown w do not attempt . 
A Benth m says, ' Tho ha ppiness ond unhappiness of any on 
emb r of the co unity - high or low, rioh or poor - wh t 
greater or lesser part is it of the universal happine Band 
1 
unhappines , th n that of any other? ' ince society i 
l. III . 459. J . S, Mill in his ' Utilitarianism', Everyman' Libra~ 
p.58,calls 'everybody' to count for one, nobody f or mor than one •, 
' Bentham ' dictum', but &ivee no refer nee. I c ot find any 
trace of this prooioe formula in B nth m' s writing J it seems 
to be a rt of the unwrit en folklor of the I eter and his disciples . 
However , he frequently , as in this quotation, comes pr tty close 
to saying the a e thing. See also IV. 540. 
nothing but an aggregate of individuals and since all are 
equal qua uni~, this conclusion seems necessarily to foUov . 
1his is particularly important from the le islator'b st, nd-
point ; he is 'a common guardion' , and in hid eyes , ho, 'can any 
one man ' hap ineJa be shown to have any stronger or leu8 
trong clai~ to regard than any other?' If there are two 
sources of pleasure both of wh'ch ive the ame qubntity of 
pleasure, but one gives pleasure only to one man while the 
other to two , the choice between them ism a matter of 
indifference to the legislator. 'In the yes of a common 
trustee entrust d with the intere ~t ~ of all the three and 
cting according to his trust , the value of the second source 
of pleasu.r will be just twice aa great ae thPt of the firs t '. 1 
Now this position, wnich we may call the individual-
istic theory of eq lity, baas ver l interesting implications . 
(l) It maint in that each individual has a certain unity, 
and tha tJ qua a unit , he ia well rounded off ; it he had loose 
l . IV . 540. My undorlinea . See alao some ot his argu-
ment for the emancipation of colonies ; ' You choose your 
own government; why a not other people to choose theirs ' 
Ibid . 408. 
ends transgressing into ot her units such that no delimi -
t ation or demarcation was· esible, he would no l onger be 
a ~st i nct and ident i f i abl e f r om other s . This implicat ion 
would t end t o draw t he theory t o rards considering man' s 
body as a central to the establishment of equalit y, s ince body 
i s observable , i o most di st i nct, i s clearly sepa te from other 
bodi es, and i s a uni ty; body would become a mark of 
i dent i fying individualo ong whom equality i s to be 
est ablished. Some such philosophical view would seem to 
underly the expr es si ons l iko ' everybody ' , 'somebody' and ' any-
body' . (II) The individual s ar e irreducible and separ at e 
uni t a and t her ef or e can be added to each other . It can 
al so be found out whioh of the t wo aggregat es i s great er 
(in the number of units it contains ) than the other. In 
short, thi s theory makes it possible and necessary to under-
st and morals and ,olitics in t erms of the cat egory of num-
ber . \ t t he l egisl at or is t o do i o to pursue the h P-
pines a of all alike~and, ainoe this i s not al ways possible, 
t o pursue t he happiness of the eat est number . lliile the 
idea of ' the great est happiness ' had loomed large in the 
earlier view, it i s no t he turn of the idea of ' the great-
1 
est number • . This enshrines the principle of ma jority rule 
1 . The great est happiness principl e i s basically a critique of 
inaqu lityJ the great est number principl e i s a plea for equalityJ 
t he orientation of t he t o is differ ent. 
-< 71 
as the process of arriving at a ~ooioion i s , in tho 
ultimute analyeio, one of counting mon or of add ing num-
bers of units . Politics becomeo a mntt~r of nritbmetic. 1 
It i s some of ~he implications of tho logic of number 
that frightened Bentham away from this theory a~ we shall 
presently sea. It io \7ortb noting that Bentham' a defonco 
of the majority principle, unlike that of Hobbes and Locke, 
is on arithmetical and not on mechanistic lines. For 
Hobbes and Looke, a majority represents a greater force and 
can alone therofore ~ the body-politic; for Benthat, 
on the other hand, each individual haa the numerical value 
of one, and a majority represents a great t3r number or value 
and should ther fore decide . (III) The individual alone i s 
real, and institutions nd communities are fiotionsJ we 
have, therofor,~, nothing to guide our atepo in pol1 tics 
and morals save the specific inter ests of the concrete indi-
viduals. About any problem that is raised, it oan and ought 
to beaked who the specific individuals involved are, 
and about every institution, re should ask and be able to 
answer whose interaat it protects and hoao inter st it is 
1. ' political arithmetic' as Bentham calla it. IV. 540. 
l to protect it' . If it cannot be trRC d to specific 
i dividuals , ,,., Ar to conclude it protect s ' nobody'a' 
interest and that it is 'nobody ' s ' interest to protect it . 
tiimilarly, all obli~ations are obli ations to specific 
individuals . ,le can and must ask , ' You say I have an 
obligation tu preserve this institution; but first tell 
me , to whom do I have this ob lig,i tion'? • One i mplication 
of thi is that the idea of posterity does not enter into 
the understanding of politics as it does not consist of 
specifiable individuals and cannot permit such a broakdown 
in terms of identifiable individuals . An argument such 
as that one has on obligation to transmit intact, md, when 
possible~ anrichod, the existing institutions to the suc-
ceeding ge crutiono becomes simply incomprehensible , aa 
it actually does with 0ntham. So too an ar gument baaed on 
2 
an oblig tion to ancestors , as again it does with Bentham. 
1. In the hedonistic theory of equality, the questions eked 
will be different; in de ling with any queetion ,one would ask 
what quantities of pleasure e.nd pain are involved: and re -
nrdin every institution, one would sk how much , i . e . hov 
many unite of happiness it achieves . 
2. I.32lo 
(IV) J ince the happiness of each individual is equally 
important, it would follow that the legislator should see 
th~t each ia as ured a nearly equal quantity of hapdness ; 
he should ensure not only security and subsistence to all 
but a ho other ' ir struments of felicity '. Hali Bentham 
does not work out the implications of this i rg,iment , but 
wi1E' t he says concerning women would throw some light . A 
woman is entitled to'as large a portion of the universal 
ha p,ines3 and interest as does that of a person of the male 
sex. No reason can be assigned why a person of tne one sex 
should as such have leaa happiness than a person of the 
other se:i:; . ' 1 < he should ' ther,:i::oro ' have n.o le s a portion 
of 'the external means of happines s ' . 'If, in this respec; , 
there were u d~f~er~nce , the principle of equality would 
require that it s hould be rather in f ~vou.r of the female 
than of the male sex: 1n as much as the are so many caua s 
of suffering which do not attach upon the male , snd do a ~t-
ach upon the female ae:x.' Man, for example, has a reater 
physical power which could be a means of injury; to secure 
her against it, 'if ' there is to be a difference in poli-
tical power , it should be in her favour . Now there is no 
l . IX. 108~ 
reason why this gument should not be extended to cover 
other 111 e1·~ Jf the co mW1i ty aa well; d then 1 t Youl d 
LJ.eHn thcLt a legislator ie to en:.1ure th p ovi io of ore 
or less equal means of happiness to them fdl. If he finds 
some are hrui capped through lack of education or wealth 
or political 1. pa thy> he should i vo the1u additional poli-
tical power tiO that the oqual i mportanc of their happiness 
continu s to be aok.nowl dged and aoted upon . Thi would 
imply a ~reater degree of interference on his part with 
the established exp ctu.tionsJand a reater concern with tho 
happiness of th larger number than with the great st quan-
tity of happiness in general . .• ~.i.s will involve r defi-
ning the hi arcby of the ends of legislation, thou h the 
ends will i·uma · the satie . uen will continue to van t secu-
rity and subsistence; ther wi ~l only be misery i f t he com-
munity i not prosperous , and thus abundance too wi l l have 
to b trived for . But their rela iv importance vi - a-vis 
equality would cert inly change . If the expecta t ions of the 
rich, for ex ple , have to be disturbed in order to di -
tribute the i nstruments of felicity or widely , th1 should 
bo don v n when th pain caused to the rich ie re t . or 
cour e , if thy are o di turbed ae to lose all incentive , 
they will not produce bundance , and this ,nll affect equal-
ity of happiness itself . Thie, ho\lever, i s to be d cided by 
the principle of' equality itself . It is security and 
abundance tho~ wi:l now be judged by the pr~nciple of qua-
lity to which they ill hav to be acco ioda d , and not 
the other way round as in the case of th reat1.:st hap,.i-
n ss principle . This ia confi od by the way in which 
~enth m critici es Lock in his unpublished article on 
'utilitarianism'. Locke consid r property ll i portent , 
~rd only the 'poosesaors of property' are to be the objects 
of government 's care; thy alone are to be represented 'in 
and by' the legislature , and the poor r to be treated as 
'alavea' . Locke had 'not got b yond aristocracy , the opu-
lent , the ruling, the influent · l ftw' , and 'the pepplo, 
the pur~ly subject many , had not aa yet fallen within the 
sph re of hi observation.' 
~ha I have been eu eeting is that there re two dis-
tinct th ories , o equality in Bentham, which I hav call d 
hedonistic and individuali tic . In the first theory, those 
men re to be treated qually who feel equal quantities of 
happine s; if on man feel ore, he is to be pr ferr d. In 
the eoond th ory, a.ch indiv dual represent unity; hi 
d nobody ela ' ; he is to be taken as a 
whole , and his happines is to bet t d, no matter what its 
quantity , ae equal to anoth r's . What I , furtier, suggest 
, •<'tb 
is that the two theories can be r elated to two different 
ontologies that we noted earlier. The first theory springs 
from the sensationalist ontology f or which aeneatione alone 
are ultimately real; the individual i s a construct out of them 
and, as such, i s real in a 'lower degree ', or is simply 
unreal if no need of suoh a oonstruot i s felt . The second 
theory springs from the r ealist ontology where the individual , 
the natural concrete individual, i c r eal and exi st s in his 
own rightJ his reality is not a derived one, nor i s our 
knowledge of him an inference. Now it may be argued that 
the two theories of equality can be explained differentlyJ 
in one, Bentham i s taking sensations as units of calculation 
and i s adding them UPJ in the other, he talces them as con-
stituti unities and i s adding up t hese unities , sensa-
tions r emain ultimate realities in both, and t hus no other 
theory of real ity i s involved. My arguments agsinst this 
are mainly three. (1) It takee no account of Bentham' s view 
that the tangibl e natural objects , 1hioh include men, are 
r ·al ; we see them, touoh them, and lmO\v that they are there. 
(11) It ignores hte own observation that the greatest haf-
pineee prinoiple rests on •a fiction ' t hat the quantities of 
happiness felt by different individuals oan bo addedJ 'It 
i s vain to t alk of adding quantities which after the addi-
tion will continue distinct as they wer e before J one man's 
~Tl 
ha~uiness will never be another man ' s ppiness ' , Such an 
adnition brea.; , <iown r,gains t the natural bar r ier created 
by the physical eparateneas of natur-,1 individuals . It is 
not surpri~i.11g th , t the exrunple he gives should be th t of 
and 
adding apples and pelirs , t he rwtur~1/ physicRlly aepars te 
t . t· l e 1. ies . 1111 The idea of body occupies a tremendously 
important place in his ph losophical sys tem. It provides 
' tr.e principle of individuality by r irst demarcating one 
individual from another , and then explaining nearly all 
difference bet een them in terms of bodily constitution. 2 
Further , there ia a persistent tendency in him to reduce all 
pleasures ultimately to the pleasure..; of the body ; the plea-
sures of the mind a re only the pleasur _ of the body r mem-
bered; the ~iOL-~ s of justice or of doin one ' s duty a re 
likewise explained. Though this is his general position on 
the question of the r el tion between mind and body , it ie not 
his only po ition; he al o y pathised with a s lightly dif-
ferent position. 3 
1 . Las ., Univer ity College , ' o . 14 . 
2. Principles , ch . VII , Pnra . 12 . 
3. J ee Jfor example , I bid .) Par a . 31 , Footnote 2. 
Now Bentham operates with both the hedcnietic and 
the individualistic theories of equali ty, and hence hie 
formula tion of the principle of utility as ' the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number' . I t is not a self-
consis tent formula either in terms of its practical i~-
plications or in those of its philosophical as~un.pti ons . 
1,s to the former , a policy may achieve the gredest hap-
piness which may not be the happiness of the great st nWll-
ber. Let us take the example that Bentham himself gives . 
Imagine 4001 men in a state of perfect equality. If you 
ware now to reduce 2000 to s lavery and distribut8 th i r 
pro perty emong the remaining 2001 , you may have secured 
the happj,ness of t he a.,rr ,,h~t number but not the greates t 
happines 5..isince t he amount of pain caused to the former will 
far outweigh the amount of pleasure issuing to t he latter. 1 
2 He also discusses the )lypothetical case of distributing 
the few Catholics in England as slaves amon the much l nrger 
1. ~uoted by E. H~ l evey: ' The Groth of Philosophic Radical ism', 
London, 1934, p. 501 . 
2 . M • article on •utilit.srianism ' , loc . cit •• 
co u::nui t.,· o: J~l!o , rot ' nta.?1 tu· . ..:he tcmiion botm.: ... 
two hLlveo of tnc form ,la rcven.ln i :.nelf here as v:ell , and 
much more ::; ta.rklJ . It is becauoe of this t nsion, v:hich he 
1 
,;;a::; a·,;a.re of , that he had to abandon the forr:mla in f rvour 
o~ one cnbod.., i c e, • .. one of the wo principles , and for a 
varietJ of reasons he 1l ecidcd to opt for the b-r ~atest ha.p-
p.:..r,css principle . Eovever , he did cont inue to employ this com-
posite formula in noa.rly all his works 1tblished even after 
this cxplici tly acl. o 1ledGod. shift . 'i.'l1is 1eed not sur rise us , 
nor ~us t ::e be cri ticisod for it , s · nee he do s ac 11icve a cer-
"'-•l. degree of pro..c tico..l r.armony be tween t. o two ha1 veo of the 
formula by o~king cortai assru ptions . If it can be argued , 
2 
as ~enthar1 hi nself does , that al " i dividll.!lls generally exper-
ience more or less e q_ual quantities of hap1-ineso , it follo s 
that the greatest happiness in the co .nuni t iQ. the 
1. For 'reason alto ther incontestablo', he disca.:rdod ' this 
a . ondage '; he felt that the t,10 parts , the I gr a.test happiness ' 
and the 1greateot number', represent 1at botto~ the opposite 
qunli ties 1 • 
2 • .:>ee his example , cited ea.rlier, rega.r ·ng the oone.roh feeling 
hardly even twice the happines s of the man a.t the other end of 
the economic spectrw:i . 
ha !;piness of it gr atest number, though, of cour , not 
exactly, sinco 0 w experiencing , sayJ one and a quarter 
ti es ore happin s than others, could up e~ thi ' equi-
valence '; however , t e ecuivalence is :.c.ore true, the 6r ater 
the number on either sia.e , aayJ 4000 en to 2000 instead of 
2001 to 2000 . uesides , no entham vi we equP.lity from th 
standpoint of al i lator, what he wants ia some broad 
u• ULValence betw en the two halves of the formula , and this 
he can ce r tainly have on thi assumption. Or he could, as 
he actually doe at places , go about chieving this harmony 
in a diffJrent w y . Though each individual does not at 
pr sont -=.i..:.;:-=,=~ an equal quantity of happines because 
of the vast .. t .J •• ~ . .;.c inequalities, etc ., arch has an equal 
o c · t for h , iness . ~a.n has a t d ca acity for 
hap in as , and all n have it in a more lease ua l d gree . 
G vef ent could rJduc lh~ cono c inequalities ~and thus 
ev ntually, in tie , the two halve of the formula , in i s -
cord at p esent , can b harmonised. The equal capacity for 
hap inee is not an ===,A,l~~ of the legislator which he 
ak for his convenience, but =--------- con-
titution of n. If men , in :act , have vastly unequ l oap-
acitie for hap ine , th1 sumption will menn eat unhap-
pies to those with groat.r capacity for happineas, and thus 
will lack any justifi~ati n . 
ta philosophical level, however , the conflict betw en 
the two theori nL remains insoluble . hey repr sent two dif-
ferent ontologies as well as t wo differ ent eniotomologie . 
The greatest happiness principle is born in a framework where 
pleasure and pain lone are real; individual man ie irrele-
vant ave a a locus of pleaoure d pain nd as repres 
so 1118ny quru1 ti ti s o plea ure or p .. n; he ~ t ose qu•m-
The 
g 
ti ies . / s nsations of pl asur~· and pain alone are real , and 
to h ve them ia to know th • he r u ult i th p dominance 
of impersonali in v ry aspect of entham' s ystem. As to 
the r uatest n ber principle , it ts a.ppe ... rance in a 
f r a~ work of 1 eas where individual man is t ak n a a uni t: 
s9parat fro ... v 1 vl'- , irre ucible , and ex sting in his own 
ri h . Wli~~ ner e int rs of pl sure and pai n because 
it is~ ho feel th m, whil in th case of the greatest 
happiness principl , our pri r~ conco is wi pl aeu and 
pain, and he 1 only an incidental construct out of th ui. ·rom 
the tandpoint of equali ty, the philosophic l iff rence is 
gr a t . In the case of the rent st numbe r principl e , equality 
ong men ia quality qua eparate irreducible unite ; tho 
ground of quality is their b• in equal qua mon ; and the prin• 
ciple o! hapyine .~ co es in only to provi de content, i . e . to 
sveoify what it ·e t~at men are t o be treated equally in 1 
and not to ns1er ..!!!.2. aro to be treatod equally , Besides, 
equality here ia a positive oon Oe!Jt in t a t i t doee ,,o t 
consist in the equal oliminntion of all individualo us 
unJer the greates t happiness princi le, but inste d in 
to.hint:: .Jo_;niza.nce of the intlividual and ivin0 nim an 
in.portanoe, tt ooi tivc value, , hioh i6 equ. l in the oase or 
all men • .tis a result , equality enters as an importont e l ement 
in tt e hit;hest moral o.nd political ideal. o.nd • in fact• .;oeo 
to shqJe it, 1d does not remain an inoiaental conseqt,enoe 
of pursuinu an idoo.l hich it obviously has no h nd in 
ahapin~, ~a io t !e c~se ~ith t he •rcatoot happineac prinoiElo . 
Tho ha.ypirless of the ·reateet nWD.bor is to bo .i?Ursu•~cl )re-
oisely beoauoe the happiness of e a01 iG oqu lly ;i.u.portunt; 
tlua the reateot number prino le is d rivod from oqu - ity, 
hile in tho oaae o! th greatest ap in oo ;rinoiple, i t i 
equ .:,lity t .nt · s <lorived .from 1t. 'l'lli po;l.n.ts to nn iuter-
estin;;; dlffer noo. In the cas ,of the •rcate ... ha inoss 
: rinoiplo; tho round for oqualia tion i t hat ·t .c:iaximi 
happiness; it is thus 0iven a utilit ian · uotitioation . In 
the o s of th gr ateet number pr!noipl, th ha·~inoso of 
eaoh is oqu lly m:ort · t beo u.., o o 1. d vidual i ual 
and nru1 1.ho a value as nny othor .P r on in the ea of 
the legisl ator. This does not seem t o be a utilitarian 
justification of equality. It seems to me the latter principle 
cannot offer such a justification, since a utilitarian jus-
tification r equires a prior i ndc;iendent principle in terms 
of which anything, equality in this case, can be justified; 
this is available in the case of the gr "' a test happiness prin-
ciple, but not in that of the greatest number principle whioh 
ic itaelf derived from, and is thus not independent of,equality. 
These differences, houever, should not blind us to 
certain general s i milarities between the two theories, and 
the existence of these simil Eities need not surprise us as 
both of t hem are ariti:unetically and hedonistioally orien-
tated . (1) The nature of man is t o pursue plea.sure and a.void 
pain, and tl ius pleasure and pain continua to provide tho ends 
of moral e.r.d political action, though, of couroe, they have 
very different 1·oles to play in each of them. (11} _ In both, 
it is equali more than the other three ends of log:i.sl~ ion , 
that is , security, subsistence and abundance , that provides 
the principle of movement. Security, eto ., will require 
the legislator to practise 1quietiom'J it ie the concern 
for equality, however understood, that calls for action 
on his part . (111) In neither is there any talk, as in Kant , 
of t he int rinsi c wo r t h or digni t y of t l e individual . 
( lV) 'J.he considerations o! ari t.hmetio continue to 
dominut both ; in one, the quanti tl es of ~loasure 
and p ain are added ; in the other , the individu e as 
unite are added. The result is the reoocu t ~on it 
'tne r eatest' in both, t hou hit has a diff erent 
lo~ic in e oh case . (V) he conoept of 'ri hta 
does not emer ge in eit her; ven in the individualistic 
t heory men do not have a right to equality or happineao . 
Instead , it i s t he conc ept or duty that i s pr i mar y . In 
the course of purauin t he eneral happiness the 
legiolat or v1i l l , of course, creat e a framework of 
rights, ns these i v oeourity ·hioh is the most im-
l . he di fferenoe betwe n t he 'rational on or' of tho l aws 
and'the anarchist' i s t hat th former w' ll say that me n ought 
t o b e u l d not that t ney ve a right to e qu lity . See 
,( 
ul v, loo . ci t . ,175; also , X. ~14-15; 1 . 134 . 
~• Du ty, of course, i a a ' fi otitioua entity ', slno plo au' 
and po.in a ~one ar ' r eal e n Lit 4es '; but right i a kind of 
s e c ondary fiot itlous nti t y' . Li its of Jurlopruduteno 
Dcf_ned' ed ted by Charles ver tt , P • 30 f f. lso 315 ff . 
3 . I uec thio term to oover both 'the roatest h FPin se' and 
' t he hapJ,ineaa of the rea tost number' and thereby avoid 
havin to men t i on both each time . 
portant 'inatrumont ' of felicity. '~e logi lator hae a 
duty to puraue tho greatest happinoao or th happiness 
of t ho groateat nµmber, but this clooe not w ve the indi-
vidual oi tizen a r1_tllt to der.iand thr4t hio h'.\p-pineas must 
be pursued. r thio prim oy of duty i' not Jrloi 
in the oontaxt of Bonthom'o general ayot , nd ho could 
have arrived t it in a number of , u. A right must bo 
baeod on reaoone, not ' eontiment a• ;1 all ro oona are in 
ta a of the prinoiple of utility; hor for , all ri ts 
must be baaad on thio prinoiple. lfo;r t this prino-
iple mainly doea ia to emphasize an in ividual ' e dutioa1 
duty thus munt bo prior to ri bt whioh oo.n only be com-
pr ehended in to G of duty. Bentham also aohi vea this 
r eoult in a different • He undor tnndo righto ao oon-
eisti in ao any oarvioes from other peopl I to rcndor 
theee ervio o io the duty imPoaed on thm by la f nnd it 
i s boonus t hey hnvo thio duty tb.~t I cnn b said to havo 
a ri t to tho e rvio s. Th pr1. '.l y of duty 1 loo in--
t gral to hi under t ndi ng of law. L 1 oommand and what 
B command doo is pl'imarily to ask tllU1 to do GO et hing1 
1. S~e, tor exaopl; 
Halevy, Loo. cit., p. 179. 
t hat i s t o say, tho i dea of cor:1::1.and leads, i n t ho r' ... rs t 
i nstance, t o tho id.ea of dutv, which, then , l eads to the idea 
of rieht . Besides , right s are the er atures of the leg-
i s lator , and one can not have ri; ht s airains t the legislator; 
who can thus have d,ities to his subjects that do not derive 
from t~e latter ' s right~ . Bentham concludes that he approves 
of right in • _ts adjective s hape ', as used in the expressions like 
' i t is right that men should be as near upon a par with one 
another in every respect as they CAn be ma.de consistently 
nith eene-ral security ', but disap:r; roves of it in i -ts sub-
stantive s ense ', as used in the expressions like ' I have a 
ri ght to put myself upon a par with averybody in every res-
pect '; in i t s former sense, right ' breathes morality and 
peace ', but in the latter sense, it 1br .athee anarchy and 
violence' . (VI) Equality , : 1 ~th theories, ~u looked at 
from the le gislative standpoint . Besides , it is discussed 
mainly in the economic c ,,,.,t.ext . The two are closely connected . 
The l egislator's duty ia to maximise the happiness of the co~~ 
~unity . Now happiness , as we have noted , is largely the 
result of money which can .!!.:B.:£ 1 nos t ' pleasures . As such , 
it is hie dv.ty to achieve o. m.easure of eoonomic eiUEl,l.i ty . As 
Bentham is concerned with happiness , hioh is largely a func~ 
tion of money, it is not surprising that economic equality 
should enga~-a his attention so nuchf at several paces , he , 
in fact , defi1es equality as essentially an economic cate -
1 yory. Bentham ' preoccupation with economic equalisation 
could also a iso from two otr1er sources . l.:oney is ' the 
measure of the quantities of most pleasures , and ito suit-
bility as such a measure is increased , the ne r the quan-
titiee of money in people ' s han ls a.re to equa.lityJ his con-
cern for measurement would also thus incline him to be pre-
occ pied with the question of economic equality . Secohdly, 
economic equality would ve him one of the criteria for 
ev~luating a society , though vrith certain que.lifi ations • 
.:he aater the eq..18.li ty achieved peacefully in a society, 
the cater must be the amount of ha.J iness in it, and the 
'better ' to this extent that society is . Equality is to be 
' grc ater' but not ' absolute I because , then, rare is only ' misery', 
and ouch a society oust be considered I orse '. Thus a soc-
iety i th an I absolute I eq cta.l. i ty of eal th or with i ts sails 
turned towards it ranks vory lo ; that with I vast I inequality 
is a little better , though it is still bad ; one vith the 
highest 'practicable' de e of equality is the beat . (VII) 
1 . 1 . 302 . 
In both, utilitarianism does not always find arithmetio 
a very congenial companion . The latter implies tha.ti if' 
two quantities of happiness are eQual , say, ten wiits each, 
they are to be trea ted equally, and thia for the simple 
reason tha.t ten is equal to ten . Nov this does not alw~e 
go well 1rith a ._tilitaria.n argument which requires an 
appeal to be made to consequeno a . Arithmetioal truths 
by t hwmselves oan have no obliging powe for a utilitarian. 
Why should two e ue.l qua.ntitios be reated equally unless 
it can be shown tha.t this lea.de to the greatest ha.ppiness1 
On the other hand, if treating two equal quantities equally 
reaul ts in a g,.--ea.ter pain , ont. COl~ld have no obligation to 
treat them eq nall~ 'T'a Ke an example of a oomr:iuni t j where 
t he Jei o e~1erally ha.tad. To tree.t s. Jew feeling an 
exactly equal quantity of hap in s.:; 1,ith a. non-Jew on equa.l 
terms with the latter will result in greater general unhap-
piness as the non-Je swill be pained at seeing the Jews 
treated as their equals; and) since it is the general happiness 
and unhappiness that is the concern of a utilitarian, he will have 
to disregard the ' Truths of arithmetic '. This remains equally 
the case whether utilitarianiaTI is underatoo as meaning ' the 
greatest happineas • or 'the happiness of tha Jatest number '. 
The former ill rule out treating two persons who feel 
equal quantities of happiness equally) if thia is likely to 
ir c ror se t e gennr1 1 unhB p iness in the CO!!lrnuni ty. The 
lrtt.,rj to0 j will come to the anme conclusionJif ~uch an 
eou li ty of tru!1tment io likely to mP.ke mnny men unh~p 
and thqo lerf to the ~~inesr of the preater nu~b~r. 
In b0th cases, one is looking for the consecu nces > rnc 
thi r- i..s Pc t in <iccor wit the nurely form., chnrr cter of 
the obligation implied by the ~rgu~ent r os inc on the 'Truths 
of -rit rre tic ' . This., of ,course1 makes utilit..,rian . ,,.~,,nee 
o ecuPlity very ina equate end shaky , but thi is , dif-
ferent -point . ' nt is importan t in this context is to note 
thnt the rgumentq based on arithmetical truths see to 
have different pr~ctical implications 1 and seeo cer <i nly to 
have e different logicnl stJructure , to those based on utility. 
VI 
-
,, 
/£tCh in:li vidU:·.\l plU' Stl:05 his own J.ater-e:,t, JUt, ho ought 
to pursue tho int.o:re:,t or the comnnmi ty; how c11.n ~oho tw be 
har..o'lined'/ Thia question thu.t has come to oo called 
•the problem o.!.' t ho idonti.fioation of 1. ntor0At,s l h.,9 tw 
aopeets: how em1 an inrl.ividu..:.1 n:.1.tur-ally purauln; his oirn 
:l.nterest :.n~ got to pursne tl10 genor.1.l interest? arid., 
second:ly, hoY can a O vern.>1:ent tJ.v.t a.lw.ys cons:i.cto of 
uelf- i:iterestcd 1ndiVid::i.~ls be got to j,u.rsue the wid r 
question. 
other. 
Let us st mth the first 
'!1he :i ndividusl irrterost ::,n...1 the gaoor.il interest, 
a.re not tc tally opposed to eJ.ch 
'lo M.y th'\t eaeh puroues hia 0wn interest i:s ml. 
to say th::1.t · n ha.a no co:noe n for otharo. 
earlier ho\1 egoism as a philoooph1oe.l theory io di.f.t'ereat from 
:h.'lt 10 comonly en.l.led selfish.r1 es . An iooividQ<'ll can a.ni 
doac reel sympr1th7, be:10volenae, etc. for othe:ro, aoo mo.y even 
::m.erifice hi. selr i"o:r t~m; t:1-0u.gh he ean uni dooa do this 
o rlly ~oauue he f'inds his pleasure in it. ~ t tho othor e::id.1 
the genor:tl intereat ic not so'1'1oth1ng totally different .fro..,i 
tbo individuul interest, b11t is only an aggreg·-..to of such 
interoats; ii' t."lo individual i :t rest la ha.rood, to that 
precice extent the gener::u. intero~t too is harned. 
the general inter est itoelf ~equirea that each should pursue 
his interest as , otherwi se , he will stop carrying for himself, 
will destroy himself, and will eventually spell ' the extinction 
of the species•. Conversely, the fact that the species is 
not yet extinct is an empirical proof that the pursuit of 
self-interest is in the general interest . The problem of 
identifying the individual and the general interest thus 
becomes more manageabl e as the two sides that have to be 
harmonised are already permeated to a large degree by the 
principles of each other. 
The identification, Bentham argues, is not achieved as 
a necessary consequence of the natural prooesaa there ie no 
natural harmony of interests. It has to be ooneciouely 
sought for , and government i s the only agency capable of 
seeking and achievi it as it alone is t~ charge of the 
I interest of the co unity as a whole. Halevy takes a different view 
and sees a aerioua conflict bet een Bentham' s juristic and economic 
theories. He maintains t tin the fonner Bentham makes it 
the primary function of government to create an artificial 
harmony between the individual and the public interest , while 
in the latter he reaches lqisoez-faire oonolusions on the 
l basis of an assumed h~rmoey of inter ests . It seems 
1. Loo . cit., 17J also, mbid., 488 ff , 
;,0 qe l r, 1_ r.,· is ,,rron~ and th t hi£ C'l.nc r l tis on •1. ist·1k n 
,. ) 11. e,p1or 11 fr , 110 or:c rrj_ thin . ich ~cono11io ncti i ty io to 
It.s r.n.in concern i3 ,,.rj th th h::m n._,, ~ of the 
com.nu u. ty; •rnd i ta relr.tions ,,-1th thJ conortic life · re to 
1)c dete~ l'Tline oolcly by this considc 1ti0 • If H e ln 
ti.. t the : 1er1l ha.p.t inE, s is boi':'l_; TT!Ln.misec - t ~ 
ctices of th economic life, it is to ~te in; or 
the. 
xwiple, it is to give -iid to ",.iorl er.; injured b in ro-
duction of labour-s vine ·machinos; it is to up o n 
unprofit::t'JL industry to provcnt tho r n of' the . n 
c ployed there; it is to soa th~t full er.1plo .ent s ~3inta1ned, 
~~d where it is not, ~av rnme ti to provide t 1blishments 
for the J!'_'l.intemnc and onploymo"lt of the bl -bo ied poor; 
1 it is to _rovidc security ~gainst .o shortLges, etc •• 
This is not to arcue th:it B thin .. nts ioverw. to 
continually int rf er w.i. th the econor; c lif , 
9entham ' s appro ch is proem1tic not doem tic, 
non-
t only that 
d t ere 
e does advoc~te/ interf ~ence, his e~s for it resto not so 
mu.ch on thJ ssumed m.tur l ru:1rrnon;r of i:rrtere:Jts o on his 
more general vievn that e~ch individu~l alone kno his 
'1terasts,, and that all acts of coer ion result n ain and 
pa.in i·s ·evil . f'hilooophic:l.l.11 s en :in_;, Hal vy ' 011.se r ats 
1 . III . 38 ff; alsoJ i id. , 72f . 
on the belief that Bentham wants to neatly separate nature and 
reason, leavi nature to re late eoonomio life and reason 
to regulate legal life, ao that the greatest happiness is 
achieved in the former by leaving things alone, while in the 
latter it requires the intervention of governmentJ in short, as 
economio life and legal life are different in their nature 
the principle of utility is believed to take different forms 
in both. It seems to me thia dichotomy between economics and 
la is unjustified, einoe Bentham does not neatly demarcate 
the areas between nature and reason in this way. Human 
affairs are to be governed by the principles which reason, 
not nature, formulates, though, of oourse , in the light 
of the ends suggested by nature. The prinoiple of the 
greatest happiness which alone is the highest norm in 
human life is something deduced by reason, and is not hat 
men naturally ~ot on. Further, in the course of realising 
these pr1noipl8s in social life natura often helps1 for 
example, the natural sympathy of parents for their children 
ensures that the latter will not be miserable . In such 
oases, reason is to leave nature alone . l3ut also quite 
often nature ' falters ' and acts irrationallyJ for example , 
the natural sense of revenge a viotim or his relations feel 
towards .an offender, or an excessive fondness and indulgenc 
parents may feel for their children, may both result in 
enonnous pain to the parties involved. In such oases reason 
is to step in and correot nature . us of every ~re 
ot human lif roaeon ia tho • judge, aud is never to leave 
nature oompletoly alone except whero it hao found 1t 
to be reliable. In politioal tema, thia oana that 
goverr.mont alone ia the supreme jwic.>,e nnd custodian of tha 
happiness of the oomcun1ty, and ia •to praotis non-interfer-
enooJ whenever, but o.lao only :men, thio io likely to maximise 
the bappineos of tho community. 
Ae to bow vornment ia to id ntify tho interest of the 
individual with tho intoreet of tho o unity, it seane to 
me three difiorent a.nsworo are disoarniblo in B ntbom1 s 
writings. The first an r is b adly on the aaeooi tionist 
lines. Rational behaviour 1a only a rittor o-r the co1Teot 
assooi tion of ide o. Govornment io to oo eduoat ohildron th t 
thy do not find plea in hinl; VO tis tn the 
g neral interest. Aa to tho gro up on, the solution 
lie in oreati?lg no aeaooiationa. Jibr those aoaptioal it 
old aa ooi tiono on be so thoroughly ,:-eplnoed and new ones 
formed with ouob e Be, Bontham baa tho unmr r b sad on his 
b lief in th 
respeota pl aeure, he mind of 1!1llJl 
fl rlbility. On source of amua ent b 
minds • As 
happy 
out off, it 
ndeavours to open up another and l'W8ya ouooeedea n 
habit is aaoil~ form d. • 1Met pbyoioa•, i . e. psychology i 
' a soienoo ch, nO for the first ti , may b put to tho 
test of exper1ment, lik 
-
1 
ny other ' • l3ei an eaperiment 1 
1.IV.64Jalso I . 436. 
Gcience, the t ins ection- ho(we princi.,1le I c,u Je appl ied to 
tne tru.inin_; of children; then 1 tho geneal ogy of e:ich 
oJservubl o i dea ni.;ht ,o trn.ced throu ... :. a.11 its degrees with 
t .10 utoo::it ucety, the par e..-it stocks oci.1£,; all known and 
numbered . 11 It is thus pos ~dule t o co t rol cor.i letely the 
environment of a child a .id, thr ough t his, the i deas enteri ng 
int o b.is r.und. and t '1oir relationships . Tho leg:L~l-tor i s 
to e ·. loit t his ed :cational po ::; sibilit t o identify the 
interest of t he in.di vid ,ll:l. l with t hl..l.t of t he co!:".munity. 
The second a :aswor., ill..e t he t >ird, i s o the ro.tiooolist 
lines . l<.an is a rat i onal a ni ml who ca.loul~t os a:!'ll..1 pursues 
t he l i ne of ~irudmum l oasure . The legisl ator iJ to set up 
a lci":\a l f r amework where t r.J.ngs a.re so arr nged t rut an i ndividual, 
civen his r 1tion11ity and l easure- pursuing nat ure, '.till ngage 
only i n thos actions that a r lso in the eneral interest . 
'rilut the l e i s l.a.tor i s co.lied upon t o do i s t h i s : (a) to deci de 
w.b. :.it sorts of actions are socially us ful and iJ: t ul; 
(b) t o see i f tho i ndividuals let to t he elv s re likely to 
perform t he ormer ...1.nd abs tain from the l att r ; (c) if not, t o 
find out what t cmpta.tions prevent t hem from doing th former 
and r e raining ~rom the l , tt r ; (d) , inally, to tta.c such 
l 
consequences to these actions as, b~ their nature and 
magnitude , will countervail these ta~ptations and l ead men 
t o do an refrain f rom doing precisely those actions that 
the l egislat or ha s in mind. Like God, the legislat or is 
invi sibl e and is never openly instructing anyone, and yet 
he i s omnipotent and i s always maki?l6 hi s will effective . As 
in the case of the associationist ans er, here, too, be is 
educating hi s subjects, though without instructing them co 
the sorts of actions they are to do and the objects they are to 
find their proper pleaeLu-es and pains in. He is a supreme 
political t utor of invisible omnipresence. Now the euooess 
of thi s whole sch, me depends, firstly, on individuals 
continuing tb desire maximum pleasure ano not suooumbing to 
the seduotions of wrong principles likG asceticism, and , 
secondly, on their calculat ing t hings more or less exactly 
and scientifically. The l egislator theref ore haa the 
1. They must gener lly be in t erms of pain rather than of 
pleasure , and must take the form of punishment and not of 
reward. The r easons for this are many. The sensation of 
pain 1s more acute and effective than tho corresponding one of 
pleaoure. Secondly, there i s more unifonnity among men in the 
causes of their pain than in those ~f their pleasures a thing 
may please one but may not please a other. Finally,the only 
oertain ins·trument of pleasure is money, which, however, is 
subj ect to the law of diminishing utility, and oan be given to 
one man only by first t ak.i 
pain to the latter. 
it from another and thus oaueing 
obligation to ensure that all individuals are and remain 
rational and have their minds free of all prejudices. He 
oan seoure this by ensuring the general spread of education and 
enlightement and by creating a political framework where a 
man ' s exercise of hie rationality does not prove frustrating 
as a result of his etting into continual conflicts with 
othersJ an individual must find it pleasant to be rational. Now 
this ould mean that the ligislator himself must be perfectly r ational 
as , otherwise, he will not know if his subjects are 
1 
calculating properly. further, he must have a full knowledge 
of human nature or or wh t men are like and hat motives aot 
on them, of the general tendencies of moral and political 
actions, of moral • truths' or oorreot moral principles, of 
the circumstances that affect the sensibility of the members 
of his oonmunity, eto . f he must thus possess the knowledge 
both of the general principles of man' s nature and of the 
local conditions of his community. 
Nowordinary mortals normally in charge of publio 
affairs would rdly measure up to this demand. This, however, 
need not be a oauee for deB!)air, as a philosopher of Bentham' s 
1 . Truth ooncerns ' the constitution of things', and the knowl dge 
of it is-important for 1 the euooesa of every enterprise•, it is 
the only true foundation for any aotivity, and all 0th.era are 
' false foundations•. x.146. 
l 
calibre i s available who possesses all the relevant kno ledge , 
especially of the general kind, and ho wil l embody it in a 
code which the l egisl ator needs only to copy. Of course, 
the code will have to be altered and modified in some 
respects so as to ouit national diver sities in mattero 
relating to ' the local situation, tho oliuata, the bodily 
constitution, the llallllers, the local customs (and) the 
2 
religion.• But here, again, the la giver himself, if he can 
'wait the time ' , ' oeek out ' the relevant data about a specific 
oo unity, and give a code that is ready for application and 
does not need to be modified: ' posses sed of these data, all 
1. Bentham thinks heh s ' Pointed' out ' tho truth ' about man 
and society in his works (X. 146) . 1 I fir t the sensation of 
Archimedes when I eommitted the first rough and imperfect 
outline (of ohrestanathia) to one side of a half-sheet of 
paper•. Ibid. ,80, Chresto athia is a complete ' chart of 
the field of thought and action'. hven a tentative and 
eketoy attempt aa it gave him a ' aenoation' of having found 
•another earth' from here ' to movo ' the existing society. 
Seo also Prinoiples. oh . I . par . 13. 
2. 1.180. 
places a.re .1like t 1, since the data .. re rclevJ.nt only at the 
level of 1.puldns the univer:,al princiµles of hur,1.n m.ture 
which thei!l.selves are true for all times :'.l::ld places and have 
2 1 univerJality and eternity• • Once n code for any 
particul!lr c0r.11unity h drJ..fted in the li._;ht of its 
pecu.Jhriaties, it remains true and valid for all times so 
far as that community is coroerned. This view finds a 
philosophical reflection in the interesting relationship 
that 3entha.m establishes b~tween time and space . Timo t is 
nothing of itself • . 3 Whatever influences can be attributed 
to it are resoluble into those exercised by ' causes of a 
SQperior order•, that is, by place, and whatever nodificationa 
1a.re 1;1ade requisite by time will be such o.nd such only as are 
made requisite by place ' •4 ' To be capable of b~ing spoken of, 
time itself must be, cannot but be, spoken of as a modification 
of space . .itness the propositions in and~: •• • !!l an 
hour - ~ 12 o ' clock ••• Witn-ss again the c0mmon expressions 
- a short time, a long time, and space of time '. 
course, is a fictitious e tity as it has no existence ' '.Jit 1out 
some body pkced in it, or considerod as being capable 
of oeing placed on it'; but t ime is ' a still more fictit ious 
1 . 1 • . 181. 
2 . Ibid , 193• 
.3 . Ibid. 189. 
4 • I . 189. 
t ·.1. I 1 1 ... _ ltT • f nee tn r~fore \,e iL"entify J) ce or t .. e local 
:..1 rs t tic~ :1. i • clrai't L w~ v·cordin_,.,, th~y r~ tru for 
11 1 t~,, 1, i ,e tim0 i t self is impot 9 .t .• 'ld ro 1 4<'es no 
•,.~· ct.. · • vur; space cL :::: , ) t t' , . i-t !l s ., r < y lJeen 
t. a~ ace u.~t of . 
This i0 the kind oi' political k owled e ro<111ired or 
31· tin., up a ~olit;ic .11 society e.nd for r'ltion'llly co iucti 
it.:; .d~f .i: . l t 1,,:ill aLo help th• l"'Ji::::l tor .i..:' he ' td .11 
i:i ds of elev< nt st:itistics., ·hicL ~ th cc.lln 1• ro:::ce:ida 1 , 
s c'1 a.J t:.o..,e a'Jout marri ges, deaths, the nun r of houses , 
th num.Lr of offences car .. · ttod ,otc • • 
lei:;ir blo to hive ,in in.,titution of I mercerar infor.ners ' to 
_lr1.ctise'e.,_:->iom.,;e ', th·u._.h he ·would like to c.ll it 1inspec-
.... I • 1T .Lh rd . +i ,,a 1°" 'tt che ; 12 uLOil S1DCO Ou 6 'WO 8Sp10na~e, , Su = w 
it 13 to be co 1cerned ~rincipaJ.ly Tith t 1e re ortin0 of 
offe· darn dnd t. i~ offoncea . Rernr J rn 1the springn uf 
-:iction 1, :ld are to be freel e~ .. loyed wh n re uird by th 
pri ciple of ility; there is nothi, wro ~, s v on the 
msg.tlded principle o e rmp thy and nt:l.p .thy., i c;ivine 
ro ds to n if ov ,rnment thiru ho is likely to pos 30s s 
. 1d p ss on some useful inforr:t'ltion • .3 J?urthor, in order to 
detect crimes easizy very individual is to have rop r 
': . e w lich should belong t.o him lono .u.ch should includ 
2. II. 222 . 
3. Ibid., 201. 
)_' ·,i.rth; 1 thi: cor1pow1'.i. deno,.J.11.tion ..,h0ul..: uu r0pe~ted in 
.1.ll 10,_;d.l .ff.:..1.i::.·s ,~s t:.i::; will i,.:rv78 n,.;t:lods of iJo 1tifica-
c..1.oa 1 • 
, J0 p, inted on tho wrists of everJ ,.,_n; thl., ' tJ,)uld DC a 
11cw :3
0 
rin__; .,.'or u1ora.lit.1, a :i.ew source of po,ror for t!1.c l.:i: . .rs , 
~.1. J.lr.to..,t in.fallible precaution ~gc.i1 ,;t a multituJ.e of 
".lJ..'..'J.1ces ••• i/ho 'lre you? Tho a,1s· rer to this import.mt 
question would no lonL;$r be liJ.ble to evasion•1 • 3eforc 
endinz~ I ca!ll1ot ruGist the terept~tion of quotin one r eall y 
juicy bit of his fancy. Jill not public opinion resent and 
resist 11 t1rl. ? .d.nd w:10.t of liberty? .i3enth'1m. is not 
lL'1.a1,rare o: these questions .::ind h n his ans iers ready. 1. s to 
li'.Jerty., it ~ust give pl ce to tho general ha ... pines"" which 
does , after all , consist in c'.l.tchinJ 01'fe ers and preventing 
off"' cos . Besidoo., liberty will, in -~ct, be incrBased; 
s1.nce w no lo er need to im rison men s they are already 
hold ' as it were by an invisible cha.in12, that is ,by their 
visible nominal identity p inted on their wrists. As to the 
public opinion, it can e ch~nged ' by p.tiontly guiding it 
with skill', u.nd thin is wh:lt I poll tic, .. l art ' consists in. 
•;e can, for ex . pl ., make such a. p int1n'-l' of es .!:lrk of 
1 . 1. 557 . 
beauty as in the o:~ e or th en o ' th i,lando of the 
South Sea', and one o s of doine this 1a to begin ' With groat 
xampl ec', suoh " the nobility, and ir.i1print th ir titleo 
' upon their f or h ado'. 
\Ye h 11 now consider the third nna. or that Bentham 
giv o to tho quoation of tho i donti o tion of inter eot c. 
An individual ' G obli C,) t ion i s to sue tho genoral happinesoJ 
to do this in t o bo rational. i' , the lo al ator o t to 
do is to show him the rationality of th v •rioue notions that 
he mmta him to do, to argue th bit., nd convinoe him, and 
hope th tho 11 como to do th 1 o hi o treo 11. 
Tber 1 no attempt h re to condition him or to oo rranga 
hio f i el d of action that he chooses but only in nai:,eJ there 
nd oonvinoing 
him and ther thy aohi ov1ng a r tional ht ony of int resta. 
There i dialo botw nth oitizen and tho legislator 
wb r e tho latt r vs h1 r a ona for doi n thi and the 
2 form r rgue baok nd •oenouree f r ly' l 1n f ct, uoh a free 
oritioi 1 ' th duty' of ho o1~izen. Thar is no 
monopcly or eono tr ion of p0liti r tionality 1n th 
le sl tor i e th o o in th fir onowers. 
Gov rnemnt dooa no ' poe ees in cone ntr tion all tho tional 
intelligonoo• , and dos not •poesaso ona th oelvos lone 
2. I . 230. 
all the general and local knowlc ich the functions of 
governing r qui •.1 To enoure that oitizone aot in a 
politically m~ture nnd rational mnnner, a loa for a programme 
of political oduc~tion ism de , and nuob r of oonorote 
suggestions aro •id 1n that dir iCtion. Ro law, f or eitnmple , 
i s to bo p ulgnt d thout the ' renoonn' -or it bei.ng 
given, tbeso ro nono oonoi ati in tho explanation of hy 
th l aw i a d, its advant ages, eta •• Giving euoh rea ona 
' enligbteno' p oplc nnd mnkas th ca blo of f ormi their 
2 
own judgmento. Further, governma tie to aot a a vast 
inf'o ation bure u nd furnish i to oitizen th all kind 
of information bout i taelf and tha oooioty, so th.~t they oan 
plan and act knowlodg e.b)7a ' Baa-t '78.Y o inatruotion is 
simply to IX1blioh facto•. 3 Through ' bl io instruction' 
gov rnment 04?1 also remove many imPoaturoo, trnude , nnd 
supor stitionoJ it ean loo ohieve this end by sending ' mis ionaries ' 
into • to e and country vill g • • 1 proo edings of the 
legislature ar to b von gre t publicity o that ' A h bit of 
reasoning and diaouo ion will p n rat nll olassee of 
aoo1ety', and Political dioouaeiono con ba n to te.ko plaoe 
'in olubs and 1n erior ass bliea'. ..\ codi d body of 1 w 
is justified on th und t tit ll rve a • oode of 
1. II. 312. 
2. I . 575 f . Soe al o vol . I. 159 t . 
3. '!'heor;y of L g1 lntion, tranelat d by C.ll. Atki on, Vol. 
II, Ch. LXI. o lco orks II. 3lltJ I. 575f • 
instructions, moral anrl intellectual t ogether ', applying 
itself to the intellectual faculty and calling it i nto 
•continual exercise' , and not mt:rely to t he will 'operating 
upon it by meons of 'the irresistible force of a super ior 
will 1 • Such a co de is to ::;;i ve uoth the reasons f or anJ 
the reasons against each proposal , and is intended to 
ensure t he ' rule' o f 'reason ' in ovt-: ry walk of social and 
political life. What is most important, the government can 
direct 'the compi lation of political morality, analogous to t he 
body of the laws, nnd similurly arranged in one general code , and 
ulso several codes treat ing of special topics'. Such a co le, 
to bo compiled by 'tJ·,e wise men' or the illustrious 
mi ds of t he a8" ' or t he ,~ea t t enchP.ra of truth and of virtue' 1, 
will advise t he citizens in ' forming a judgment' on the 
V[l r 1ous questions a.rising in politico and morals' . In short, 
there is a certain degree of dialogue between the ci tizen and 
the government, and an independent exercise of r a tionality 
on both sides; there is also a common criterion of 
r ationality, by wl,.i.ch both alike arc bound and which both are 
equally equipped t o operate wi th. 
Of t hese t hree ans wers , it is t he second one on which 
Bentham l ~r gely r elies . The first one l oaves no room for 
r tion11lity and calcul3tion on the part of t he individual 
1. T.,eory of Legislation, Loe . cit. , p . 298-9. 
citi~cn; t10 third on0 te:ids to underomph-si. e hio 
.utur:u. self-preference, sit requires th t J if he is 
co~vinced a law of his government is rational, toot is, that it 
pro~otJs gcner~l happineso, he must obey it, and for no 
other reason than that it is r tional . Tho second answer, 
on the other hand, accoomodates both the r tiomlity and 
the self-prefer nee of tho individual . 
Jut, it uill be contended., the government itself consists 
of such self-preferring individu..~ls; how then can we be 
sura th tit will set up such a frane\.JOrk and in general 
pursue tho hap iness of the coIDJ:1 · t y? This brinc;o us to 
the second aspect of the p~oblem of the identific tion of 
interests . The solution lies in 1 n. third principle ' - the 
' means prescribing., or junction t-interests-pr-scribing 
principle ' that will bring ' vb.at is into ccord nc with 
whut ought to be. 1 ny ' situation of the individ 11 th3t 
create I ny incomp tibility' ' between the hn.ppiness of the 
greatest nunbsr and the happineso of aey les~er ntur~-r• in 
sinister inturest., and devi tee ov rnment from its pro1or 
end by ma.kin& it its interest to pur u narrow and limited 
end.S o When sini tor interest is destroyed the only 
interest n man uill have -would simply •con ist in the sh!l.re 
he has in the universal inter ... st ', and he will naturally 
pursue only the latter. There a.re tw ways or destroying it -
1 direct mod ' nd ' indirect mode ' ; the f ormer consists in 
1
· tt•n' i71 'r'7C:,tinc him of the 9o'ror of _-i~r ... orrni:1:_: the same 
C .1. I v • <!.y tb · former i:.. '1ppropr..!. t"'· .s tho (:r mtio of 
c .ec ·in_: ·i. (. i tlstor i:it.,r.est ~.rh;es o uy trhon ..i.n indiYi<l.u-1 
; rilrc _<ly investe ,rith po er . 
r r ) V •c of ,rovidin13 counterintere:..t, _mnishnont '..nd rew:i 
8t1t :)Ot:1 t'..oso in their U..<;U'.· .. 1 forr.1s ,.r"1 i::.1applics.,)le h1Jrc : 
1 o uill ouni..ih him mo Yields so·1oreignty? :1.nd uha.t more 
c.n you give him who has all ho needs? 
ecnora::..1- su...,zestod c..rc ern.:.:i.lly u.1S ti:;f ctorf. The 
sep·1r:1tion of powers will not do; !...S the p rts Of 
i;overnment may cl1sh nnd a so7oreign thorit,y becomes 
n0cesn~1.ry to re0olve this conflict, _nd thus the probl m of 
checking it \lill rm· in. The ideu o chec·.s a~ o lc.ncvo is 
also u eltJSS..> slnce all the or a11:J of 1,., govortment , y 
h ve a v~sted int est in t he misuse of .ower ~ad may theru-
fore cormive ~t e·oh other's ' wick d,ens '. On more or less 
si ·1~r groll!:1ds, nnual elections, constit tio111l limit tion 
of ow r , 0 tc . e rule out . Sine int rest is t'e only 
principle of motion in ~ n, it is o .... by I oountorintor st ' 
- thit motion can be ol eckcd nd diverted in a. different 
chrection. :Jent calls this the th ory of ' counter-
force '; a ' counterinterest ' acts on tho ' will of the r er 
and 1opposes 1 the ' f orce' of a sinister interest . As the main 
i ntere ~t of any ~ov ernment is to remain in ~o~er , the only 
and t he most effeotive oheok on _ t is the wi t hdra,•ial of its 
power; tho i de a t hat it dep enua on people's good wi ll fo r its 
power ,., hio n o n be t .. en a ay if they are r1<., t satisfied v,L .l 
1-Loep i t loyu). t o the pur~,ui t of the general interest , and 
Lhus ito interest will be identified it h tat of t he oommunity . 
his answer broadly oorres~onds to tho second ane~ r dioouased 
earlier in oonn ection ith t ,,e f i rst s p e ot of the problem of 
the i uentifioation of inter sts . Bentham also thr o s u 
hua. 
su,gestions oorrespondin to the th r d ans er and they are 
"· 
broadly that a government is to oonsist of m n 1ho have a 
s ense of duty and who will purs ue general happiness even in th 
absence of thee oheck s and 'junction of interests '; but these 
su estions are no t developed . As for hi first ewer to the 
earlier qu est i on i t has no oounterpart here , sinoo ho is to 
educati onally so condition the rulers th t thy will find 
pleasure in nothing save oneral ha pin as? lot that this i s 
im11oasible ; a 1>hilosopher as So or ates aaya in Th Re,eubll o, or a 
Le islnor could i nitially s e t up a framework witnin which both 
the rulers and the ruled could b p ropri tely conditioned; 
but this• evidently, has 
has nothin to do wi th it . 
'riatooratio ' bi and Bentham 
here are also t 10 subsidLlry modeo of oh40kin the 
s overnment . The first is •tull publicity • 1hich, in brief , 
means that everything a overnment offio r does must be on 
to the public . This is s eoured i n a number of a . 1'v ry 
) ':.ce:t , ' 0 lVU ..)U r' in fro1+ 0 hiJ de~ -::, i'!:i - the .., 
.., Ll.! ... ; t .. Ul. . .i..ch ho i ►> c ,_>cct ,cl t '.., th re, he t turu of ~ 
C.:u(.,.:.o.:: )0 ,r , , tc . ; ne ) ,..,.. ,. o ... the Tl ~ ic can 
-
;: :. l ; (' >l :.n l.~' . •• e :c • )SC , "''"- ... le L .. 10, & 1pposod 
..; ✓ , or i. ·ro_u.sin~ tr clo n job he i., : ..m._10..,ed tc 'o , etc •• 
lo ,th .. ~ ·.:. c · · ses 1.11 thir., t son0 .... e .• __;t • ., t. t HP- .1 11 r.ot 
0 i . ,0 ... t . 
c •:t . .:..1 ;riou of :,al.Hie 1.J. S _J co J "'I • •• or .1.p .• ~ 1 " . L_1. u ii: ' to 
~ Jvor 1 cv-tJry ac_)cct o!' politicul lL0 ; lse, 'roo .. 1 ia 
, t fur d· "' ront 1,1 .n to set un so .. e .:'icti-'- ·. .• t. t 
1.:,po.u to ..>c to t Leir J..dv 1ta o . · r.rc. s, p rt - :.e ders, 
...,overnnent ofi'ici ls a d ot .. ers need •void op ca~ 'J ... :J 
1 t3Ver sL:c:1 void S:J 1ce in the 'ood.7 of t. l.'.: w 5.c nu sorviont t 
... o tn•~ir si1list.?r rl.ni Jul .tion. He .cc, var· p rt o 
;)olitical lii'e nust c I ctmlJ.y covered' by or r coivs 
1 cc ruri 1"" ' ol' lau. 3 leJvine no p .4 v of it ' b re' we 
Lti ve o 'room for .t.r")i tr rincs ::i 1n' cor .. uptio I to o t nd 1 , 
md thus da,?ri vo them of any locus in the . oli t · c 1.l sp ca . 
':hen t ' J.o is do 1e, a.11 th t the poople ed to ·. ve t 0 
owled..;e or ls how a by Yh ... t ny vo area of 9olitical 
life is 1co ;rercd 1, :.JO th•t t ay c n detect i. . di tcly acy 
. ,tte~pt to 'cover ' it 'wron ly1 • The::, co of 
n; the ovar. nt i., tho ' ra: ✓d.c.io tion o .. ropri te 
officis.l ptitude ' on its p rt .1 0 thi.., aptitude., thor 
1. n . 272. 
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I 1 
... : vc • 0 
·' vV t . O."J.l 
t · ·-' rl., , 7,..;;ili ty in tLu -ll tim to I oo unt0r.:' ~rce I to 
~ .it will 
1r to 
_ • .J .. ov~ it . ._,inc th.., ha.ppincs.., of ach is equllly important, 
'3 J.m./.:. Ji vo c ct . .i.n oq....J.l :Jhare in r,3 :;.ovin_; it . This 
\;,--Dat :or u:.u.v-or:rn.l fr.~.1c i;;c :-.,prL1gs from b.l;:; individual-
.:.~".:.ic t:.:ior.,· of oq.u.lity. 
l .... ~ .... fou:id .... tion in :i.turo . 
3csides, poli ical equulity here 
'.:.'he 01il.y Im .oter3 1 t l it 'ot , 
in -:; .c fina.l u:in.Jysi::.i , hu.vo .iro ple.~s~ •J J.nd pain; they 
':.:i.0:10 re 1 r.,ovcroign 1 • The sovcrcien in the _:olitical 
..,ucioty .u.,t be :Jubordi11J.tod to them and cun not b u.lloued 
to net up c;1 rlvo.l sovaroi nty. J.-io·, iko feel 
:)loa.c .re a, ·: p.:.in, thoy ro equal q sn· j ectn o 
u.turo thus treats them e ually, and so o.lso mu•·t the 
. .;ove oign. '.i:'he nss p~\iion cf r.10 o:r le s equtl n.turol 
c~ acity for hap ineo~ will further rei..11.foree this point. 
t or~ fuller dizcusJion, see IX. 60. 
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Bentham also :..dvances oth"'r minor arguments , one of 
w ·ich goes particularly well with the ht: donis tic tneory of 
equali ty an:i h.<is the sam~ ci.aracter as t hat of the irgument 
for economic equalisation; it is t ;.at , si !lce power , li e 
wealth, is an i notrumcnt of felicity , t 'ie nearer to 
e iuali ty the sh·1re of each is , the g ·oate r is li.i<ely to be 
the total quantity of happiness . 1 
I!is case for unive_...,al franchise , it mny 00 observed , is 
not based on the C<• nsid~rationa of political knowledge , but on 
t rcGe of the rnecha.nism of :political control . He does not say 
t hat because every man alone knows his interest , he must 
have a chance to communicate this private know1e,1ge to t he 
s 0vernment through voting , freo speech , debates and discuasions , 
etc •• Benthao ' s whole enterprise of the s cience of plea_sure 
is i ntenaed to enable the government to know in i vidual s' 
interests , ani t hus to dispense with the necessity of relying 
on cor.11:,unicutions from in lividual citi zens. Of course , as 
the science of pleasure is not exac t it doos not give complete 
knowle lge; but the knowledge it gives is cert ainly adequate for 
t he purposes of government. The problem of political 
knowledge is thus already ~olve . The problem that worries 
him anJ for which he has to finl an answer occurs at the 
inst itutional level , and arises from the nee to ensure the 
remov~bility of the rulers . Nearly the whole of hie 
1. 11. 271 i 111. 230 . 
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discussion of de.mocraoy is untlortn'cen ::froo precisely t his 
standpoints people al'a to be eduouted so thnt they c n check 
the government botterJ public diso11soio11 ia t o toke place 
with precisely thio end in vie J thin is also preoi eely 
ho f r ee epoach, free press, nd no\I'ly all the practices nd 
inotitutions connooted with damocrncy rod fended. But 
lying at tho baaia of this argument is tho assumption that 
each individual knowa and Ptll'auea hio r eal interest , inc, 
otherwiso, ho mi t elect ong men, Griticiae and diemieo 
them for wrong reasono, and make ,ttong d nde on them. The 
difficulty arieos f'ran the faot t hnt h mil~ht calculate 
wrongly, or be a victim of 'illusiona' and •supor atitions', 
or simply may not know what aotiona will l ead to what 
consequences. Boaidoo, in all 111-organizod society be 
might get involved 1n olashos with ot haro oven hen he is 
aoting rationall ~, and might find ratio l bohaviour vary fruotrati • 
o thus need both r ational men and n rntionnl politio l 
enviroment. fe have saen that Dent ' r:1annor of 
providing tor both is to dopend. on tho govornr:iont J but oan 
we bo aura that any goverment 11 do th1 , as it kno a fully 
ell that all th1o i s intend d top.rev nt it fro pursuing 
1 ts o • siniat r int r ' ? Tb.er i no hopo of a good 
government unloss ther r e r ational p <)Pl , but th r o n 
not be r ational poopl unless th r i o 11 od gov rnment in 
the first innt noe . i s question is dif nt from th 
one oonoerninu th identifioa.tion of th int rests or the 
ovornm •nt and the peopl~ . ~ven ~hen i ey are orrnally 
idonti:Cied tnrou·h election, removabi ·ty (llld uni.nhibited 
or1ticism. people may not make ~ropor use of those inotrwncnt-
alities, and the ovor nment may not ba int rest din eduoa.ting 
them. ',hat o to b done then? 'h pro lem lies the lev l 
of unders to.ndin6 and not at th&t of i1l1J ci c c , once an indi-
vidual l-'..no a \Vhere his real interest lies~ he •;ill neoesuar-
.a:i ~'ursue it . Ben th • s 1ay out of thi vioiou oirole is, 
liltij tho.t of mn11J other , to brin_ in a philo o~>her whose 
preaise rol ·ill vnry aooordin to t he ntaxt in which he 
has to <--p" r atc • t)hilosophers l one have the kno\':l edge of' moral 
.... nd ~ olitioe.l 'truths•, nd are the only persona able to per1e-
tratc through the ·oloude of 'fictiors • and 'illuuions ' to the 
'roa.lity' underlying them . It a new s ociety ha just been aet 
up, a ~hiloaopher will provido a oode o! l ws and ~ereuade 
people to aooept it . If a aoo ety is already a goin 9 concern, 
he will provida nuoh a oode, and re~oribe a manner of realising 
it that will not unduly diatuwb the establish d rran,;ements . 
He will then try to persuade the people, mainly t hro u.;h books 
,vritten by h..i.mself and hls didciplea• to aoce t the oode and to 
implement it in the mannor presoribed . He 11ill also u.ndertake 
a detailed examination of the existln .(.netltution and the 
measures t !1at the government muy pass from time to t · m , and 
'bring the results of it to the lmowlodge of tho u.blio . In 
thi s way political educatiQn and enlightenment will spr ead 
and will l ead in the f irst instance to a demand by the 
peopl e f or the change of t he exi sting ins titutions , and, eventually, 
to the enthronement of t he principle of ut ility in every spher e 
1 
of life . At one stage he had hoped for an alliance bet ween wisdom 
and power, and had believed that a philosopher could communicate his 
knowl edge of the ' moral and political' •truths ' to the rul er s 
who would i mmedi at el y act on them. He l ater came to · 
doubt thi s . He had expected thnt the 'kno ledge of truth ' was 
enough to inspire men t o aot on itJ but inst ead, he f ound •univer sal 
antipathy ' to his pl ans, and was confused as to why this 
should be so. ' Sirtty year s had rolled over my head before 
I had attained to anything like a clear perception of the 
1. The best societ y Bentham would hope for i s one wher e , among 
other things , the crimes ar e absent , eaoh class of men knows its 
duties, and where t her e ar e complete seourity and the full est 
developnent of oon:meroo. M~hing beyond this i s ' chimerical ' 
and ' i mnginary' , since men will al ways have ' unequal gifts of 
nature and of fortune ' , ' will al ways purchase pleasures only 
by pains ', will al ya have unaatis:fiable deaires,eto •• Thi s , 
of oourae , applies only to t he area of lite that comes wit hin 
the scope of l egisl ation. About non-l egisl ative ar eas such a s 
poetry, art and muai o, ' The limit s of perfeotibil i ty are not 
so easily assigned', though it i s ~robable t ha t the ouroes 
of novelty will be exhaust ed'. I . 194• 
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Conclusion 
Political activity io an activity that takes place 
amonf" men . Go,ls do not need to undertake it either themselves 
or in their dealin_;G vii th men; anin.ala , on the other hand , may 
need to , but cannot undertake it . A political :;:Jhilosopher 
engaged in philosophising o..bo.1t it is thus bound to say 
something about man , that is, his nature1 , hio capacities, certan 
inescn:puble fea tur •s of his existence , etc . , arnl about the sort 
of relRtionship thPt can subsist among men; he ould argue 
that , --;iven a certain view of mnn , men can enter only in a. 
certain sort of relationship with each other , und only in 
a c0rta.i.n way . 30111 equality and inequality are one such 
sort of relation.chip, and a political philosopher is there-
fore li~ely to say so~ething about the~ ; ~hat he uill say and 
hmv he will underotand tb.cm will , of course, depend on what lila 
takes tho real nature of nan to be . I have a.visedly used the 
term 'likely' oince it is not nocosso...ry that he must 
1. Some philooophers , like Arc .dt and Sartre , do not think 
man has a nature, and would instead use the idea of condition; 
r;,..an I s hu:.anness in their vie,: can only be defined in terms of 
certain conditions of his oxiotence, a.nd not of eny properties 
believed to be inherent in his nature . Some others, like those 
uho em)hasize the idea of the Gr~at Ch ·n of eing, ould instead 
talk of the 1 s tatus 1 of man . I include all these and other 
similar approaches under the general expression , 'a view regarding 
the real nature of man'. 
-·•:c- ions -::1. 'l.U'' lit., ·1..nd 1.n q w.l 1, _e mny , for 
l ' l.1. ~ical .,cL·r ... t;y i t r s r r low• 
r.- _c' , i l a v 
, q rlit· .-esp oscs a c~rt i s~·cc 10.1 
'tV;c ... ',,t 
; "r'" , ot tv,·o i.i. livi l 1.a.ls .,c',,ee 1 ,r c , 1 ~ tier.ship 
£1li ty ca " aff ir.:erl o.,,. c•c. · ➔ • o , o. t:.e other hand , 
striv0s tot:" ,1!:lco11d t,is scpa::·ateness i, e. unitary :,;_3ion 
, ·1°i-r t·,e , o p. rcons ac ievc a. ·mi t,.,- a 1cl t , ,s cease L c 
t-.. o . It coulcl, or coLL""se, be argued tr.at eve, · ere one can 
detect ci.n ele .. 10nt o" eqt.ali ty, thv lg' not of the same kind 
as ii1 the er □ "' 1f olitir.nl '1~.J.c.li ,,, or equali-b before law , 
etc .. It ; ,a:· alcn bn c n t nded the. t love is introduced not so 
,uch to -'.:;:;:, ~ i.1 ")li tical uctivi. ty 9n to · co M'lf>t1d tho.t it be 
replaced b:~ "·) 'i i.n ~ eloc . It is not necessary to press this 
oint , an;i I ·,,ill simply be con ent tJ "'ri.y thn.t every political 
philosopher io li\ol:y to oake some observ tio_1n on equalit , 
and that ever:1 ma,jor figure in .., t :·as in 'a.ct done so . 
T owever t though he will have oom.e ideas on oq ua.li ty , he 
is not , by that verj token , a ~-hilosor,her of 01 ·ali ty . His 
philsooophical eflrction ray not t!.ke ite b a.riu from the 
puzzle crea. ted by the idea of eq '8.li t · , nor ma· he be looking 
at othor idP.'as from the stand.:5,r>int of eq_u..~lity nd in terms 
of their relation t;o it; in short, his Yiew of equality may not 
be the unifying pronci.ple of his system . 
not be interosted in the detailed examination of equality 
and in s eeing how it differs from other cognate ideas, like 
similarity~ unifor mity, equity, fraternity, solidarity, 
and justice. He may, a ,,ain, not be interested in examining 
how the idea of equa.li ty arises in -li ~ferent con texts such 
as the julicial , t he legislative and the administrative , 
and, more widely, in art. mathematics, economic life, etc., and in 
asking if these are different ileas of equality or are simply 
different forms that the same i'.Jea. of equality takes according 
to the logic of the context in which it appears. To un er-
take an elaborate inquiry of some such ldnd and to coordinate 
one's views into a well-knit system is , in my view, to offer 
a philosophy of equality. It is, of course , possible and 
obligatory for a commentator interested in the idea of equality 
to construct such a philosophy out of the writings of any 
person; but t his evi ently is a construction for and from 
him , and does not tum the writer concerned into a philo-
sopher of equality, as the basic orientation of his philosophy 
rem&ins different . Besides , any such construction is bound 
to remain inaiequate, since mruiy questions , relevant '·o the full 
analysis of equality, will simply remain unanswered . 
Between having some ideas on equality and a full- fledged 
philosophical reflection on equality there is one other 
level, that i sJ theoretical at which a reflection on equality 
may take p1.ace, yielding a theory of eqt:.ality . In the case 
of the former, we do not expect a.n e l aborate inqdry of the 
kind delineated earlier . What ue can e..--cpect to find and do 
find is either of these two thiw;s: we ms,y be present ed with 
a certain broad and tentative view of what equality is, a 
set of practical implications drawn from it, and some eug[;'8s-
tions as to the best way of achievinP, them in society; or, we 
may be presented ,;d th a ' ecicn tifio I socio l o ii cal account 
where some cor-ele,tions a.re established bet;,ee ... the intensity 
or the character of the demand for equality and the eoohOJ:J.i.c 
or religious or any other vr _;_ - -1.. ~· ,, f background of those ma.king 
the demand , and co~e- -eneral observations a.re ma.de about the con-
ditio11e under which the demand for equality arises, tho oon-
sequenoes of it on the social and the economic life, etc •• 
Thus , from the standpoint of equality, we ce.n loo at a 
political thinker in three ways ; he ma;y have soma ideas on 
equality, or a theory of equa.lit~, or a philosophy of equality. 
In each case, a commentator will have different criteria of 
evaluation• a.nd will make different kinda of demands . 
.:> 19 
No we ha.ve argued that · a. philosophy of equality im-
plies a certain vie as to the real nature of man to which 
various ideas on equality a.re related . But, it may be asked, 
what precisely does it mean to say anything about the ' real • 
nature of man? /hen a philosopher says that men are really 
such and such or that this is hat is real about them, he is 
not describing them, nor is he prescribing anything or issuing 
any injunctions about hat they ought to do . ·lb.at he seems to 
do is t o interpret human experience a.nd aotivi ties , and show 
what underlies them all that explains them and makes them 
intelligible .1 Bescriptiont recommendation and interpretation 
are thus three lo cally distinct activities , though in praotice 
they are generally co.c.wi ed, and give rise to thr e distinct 
sorts 0£ statements; that is , descriptive , recommendatory and inter-
pretative . Their differences a.re generally symbolised in the 
copula employed& the first is in terms of ' is', the s oond 
or •ought ', and the third of ' must . 1 A metaphysical statement 
is generally in terms of 'muet! and uses or implie the term 
•reality ' or 'in reality ', aa in 1 must really be like this 
or that for hie aotions to be meaningful or intelligibl e , ' a 
1 . ; . e . he is making meta.physical observations about man. 
32.0 
is . ,mt ..:a~i. rc.d.ly L and this is hJ., ho .,,us t 'Llz responded 
. bo-1.t eqL.n.li tJ arc .1ot e .. ,.Lir _.;al iiescrir,tlons of men , nor 
are ttey recorr:.r ... endations trn.t ,;e ou1.,ht tu ... ·&ctise eqc:.ality ; 
the,/ ar .. s ta tc:.1ent'"' about what t10 ta..:.,s L l,,s tne real i~a.ture 
or condition of ..:an , and. the manner in which equality is 
rela tcd to it . -e w.igh t, for c:x:a.. ,le , ..;CJ La,., ~he real 
nab.re Os.' will.,l is to su .. .'fer anJ. that thio l.S '., .a.t ultinatoly 
explains hui;1a.n t3:Kperience ; as this is tr..1e of all uen qua raon 
ho \iiil ern.phas.Lze their ultimate equality and anchor it in 
the nature of ~tan . Ile may , on the othl:r haul, r_ject such a 
reflection o .• l,G.') 'nature' of Lan as e3sc .. tio.listic , and ar&Ue 
that the only th1 ,0 human about . an is 1.hc co. di tions of hie 
existence , .:;uc:1 as mat he is born wi·tnout choice , that he is 
a distinct 0,1d identifiable individual ,,ho remaino rnspcnsible 
for whatever he does, and that ho is Gent need to live hio 
li •'e amon.; other ne.1 ··hose reality he cannot br h ardde . In 
t'1ese . a .. l =i.en ara equal, and tL.u., t;, uali ty io ontolo ioally 
anchored in ·t;b.e human condi tio,l . Si.oila.rly , a p11ilosopher 
may establish the metaphysical impossibility of eg_uality , and 
t 1 is he can ,8{;ain , do in a number of \,a.;s . fue universe , he rlight 
say, is hierarchically o~ganizod , and so ultimately are human 
r~lationships; any at tempt at establishing equality violatos 
3 '.l..l 
the real nature of man and the universe and is bound to 
fail as the latter ·th its irresistible reality will soon 
reassert itself. This is broadly what St . Augustine is 
eaying. 1 Or he might say that the real nature of man is to 
be God-like, to the Absolute, and that it thus necessarily 
2 involves the negation o! others. Or he might aay that the 
real nature of man or the reality underlying human efforts 
and striving is the discovery of his i dentity and that man' s 
identity can be achieved only int :rms of his v rtical distance from 
others. 
In these and many other ways a philosopher might 
0~ 
go~to the establish that equality i s metaphysically imPoseibl 1 
that ie, given the sorts of beings that men are and given 
certain inescapable features of their existenoe, they c 
never real1so equality in practice. And, if this is the nature 
of reality, it is only rational to acknowledge it and guide 
one' s actions by it. , it is simply foolish , or ' absurd ' as most 
philosophers call it , to deny it and base our actions on the 
1. Sea, particularly, hie diaoussion of ' Order•, Ch. XIII , Book XIX , 
' The City of God '. 
2. See, e. g., n inter oti interpretation of Hegel by R.Tuoker 
in ' Philosophy and llyth in Karl Uurx', C.U. P., 1961. 
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nt , her tvo distinct view I in o e , 00 indi-
• unit. h an ric l valu ot one , vid 
i l to every on in th other, th pri ry con-
cern i vi th th 
bl e ,and tot 
o.t J j pin 
xt nt th t , it 
ob qu 1 in, t 
' 
d equ lity i d ir-
ppine • 
to w t a n di!f r . 
or Paine , the only ai ific t qu litY, 1 
n tur l r1 J tor Godwin, it 1 the v lopm tot 
t ndin and le di the lif of tu n a to 
b e u l s or ent it i the <l lity of J> ine th t 
lly tter . V con id rd 
C rt kin ot o t 1 port nt ba lr .dy be n 
ea 4. aoh n, ot wh t e t 
to n' e r l n tu 1n t baenc ot hioh hi lit 1 
just not human; e corollary , equality in eny oth r 
r epeot 1 not 'real ' but "fo l", or is of rel~tiTely 
leoe importance . For Paine, me.n 1s a r tional creature 
cap ble of "imita ting" God rrom whom he drives hi ex1 -
tenoeJ a such, hie r al n ture is fulfilled through liv-
ing lite of "'a p ndent judpent and pursuing his int-
or at . For Godwin, too, Dl,!lJl 1 eentially r 1onal 
being, though he underetande roaeon very dif rer ntly fro 
Pine. As a r tional creature, an u tact on th know-
le~ or Truth or of things a thy • The fir t d 
the mo t import nt rer "!"',.. t ot hiD hature ia that he 
is.1 
should obtAin this knowledge , that/ improve his und a1:~ ndin • 
Further. since 11· en natur evel'Y m ~us t 
practi e ben volenoe . Li ing th lit of lcnovledee and 
Tirtue i thu a truly h an life , oncl 11 n equally 
muat 11•• it and be helped t o liv it . Senth , on the oth r 
h nd , ia truck by the t ct that an 1 easentially aur-
teri.ng bein , in who tels ~lea ur d pain, an whose 
real n ture is to pursue the one d ~v id the otberi b l -
ane ot pl _asure over in io hnppine , nd it is thi that 
ell n q 
a lon 
n a continuully king and Oftnnot but o •' 
they re n n. As ucb ,the only rel u lity 
th t must b ~et blieh,Jd a on the ia th to pn1n ; 
uality of any oth r kind , it unconn ct d with b i r pu uit 
of ha. p iiness, will simply not have any mo nill8 and rele-
vance for them. 
Because each of the:n emphasizes equnlity of a spec-
ific sort each diff ers 1n what he considers desirable ao 
a t:1eans to i t i but they are agr od about cert in other 
things which they all think lead to or av y from it. The 
clergy, the lawyers , the lmidlords, and the king oo e 
under their common critioiem, though for different rea one. 
Paine will get rid of them on the around thet they are 
obstacles to the full r ealisetion of man ' a natural right s ; 
Uo· win on the ground that they impede man's continual per-
fectibility; and Benth ... - r. the ground th, t they make it 
impossible to achi ve the maximum happiness of the co u-
,i i ty. Th y are all agreed in m3king ii powerful ple tor 
implicity in every opect of sooiol lif , e pocially th 
political , though g 1n they do so for diff rent r sons . 
Paine baa-ea his plea on man's obligation to emulate the 
simplicity of tl1e structure of the u.niver e; Godwin on the 
epiat olosical ground that it enables n to aee thiD.B 
es they are; nnd Benths.m on th sround th tit denie cor-
ruption a locu in tho political sp ce, and enabl s citizens 
to det ct 1t vhenetver it occur end th r by to control the 
rulers ~nd identify their inter oto vith the r own. All 
are agreftd that rep sents tive government i most co lible 
with equality. odwin, of course , di ap~roveo of all 
govtrnment, not exceptin this on yet, of all he sees 
aom urit only in thi one . Pain , on th th r hand , is 
most enthu ia tic about it , and has the feelin thtt his 
age has discovered, for th fir t time in human hi tory, 
a fo o 6ov rnment that is most nduri and that olv 
all pro·01 me hitherto rai ed in conneoti on wi equ li ty . 
It had g nerally b en ar ed gainst any ttempt to iv 
all men share in politic 1 power tha masses ar un du-
cated and oan not be trusted and that, ther for~, wen d 
and must continue to have an arietooracy to run the affairs 
of the co unity . "t)his problom is now solved' one nnd for 
all '.1 since representative gove ment co bines the a van-
tag a bo of aristocr cy anddtmocraoy. This enthueiasm is 
hared by ntham, James ill , John tuart ill , and many 
of their cont purari e and ucces ors . Godwin, when he 
does see so merit in it , justifi sit on the ground that 
it provide the wise a locus from wh re to pread th ir 
mes age and improve their society . Benth juati ie it 
mainly on he und that it alone can dentify the inter ate ot 
the.governm nt Yi.th those of it people . 
Clo ly connected with this their co on mpha ie 
on 1 adership, though this idea rises dif ferently and t k 
dl.ff r nt fer sin eech of them. For Pain , societ y ne de 
viodo for th conduct ot it aff~irs, and this not ll 
m n have. He. doe not go into thio qu sticn, end, as w 
have seen, it is difficult to know wha precisely h h8 
in mind, particularly when th politio 1 knovledg that 
he considers important for govornin oommunit1 is eo o-
thing th t ol are conaid red able to acquire , li'or Godwin , 
the naod for 1 dership is lnr ely epist&molo cal t a 
society must be based on the knowledge of political truth 
th inve ti tion ot which is undert~k n onl1 beat•• 
All , how ver, can grasp it when it ia communio ted to hem, 
thus mtJking lead r hip onl a tr~neitional nece oity. A 
f or lienth , there 1 th initial need of a law- 1ver vho 
ust be an exc ptional man; the subs uent running of 
political .,_,ci~ty is a f airly e aftair ,einceJonce the 
mechanis i set up, its p, rts cnn generally b depended 
upon to regu.lat each other. 
Fin lly, th philo ophies of all th three r anthro-
pocentric . Not only th t man ia the only conc1rn of r u 
and the measure of all things hum811, bllt al o that he 1 
in so e sense the cent re of the univ re, or Paine , God 
i import t as the eouroe ot equolity nd n tu~ l ri hto , 
but c be dis pens d vi th one secur a. Godwin 
has no intere tin epeoulati one about Rim , eh t!a1r 
ne d no uoh tr n c ndent l basis . For Bentha , t oo, the 
ultimate sourc e of a~ l authority nd the most ~crm~ ent 
found tion of politioal sooiety l ioe wi thin man; t hat is t o 
eas , in pl aeure and pain; God , if ne i to b brought in at 
all, o.nd reli•ion .re useful only as .1roviciin furt h r sanc-
tions for morality and law. e for tho , tural ,orld, it 
exists only t o rat ify man und ~r ovide him oa:Lm j oy ~nd 
relaxation. his nttitudc is extended to 1ioalo as toll ; 
but, as 1e h:ive seen, no oerioua ar .;um nt iiJ advanced why 
equality shoul d be confined to men only nd no t be exten-
ded to animals as well, exoept in the o a of Uod in who , 
wit his eatJblishment ot the primaoy of ~euson ove r th 
simpler elin a or ploaoure and puin, 00uld or e asi ly 
dcaJ. ~i th ~hla quect~on . 
Bo o uea their t nd oints ar different, the deJree 
of m. ort ..1.noo t he· as in to dli'fer nt eorts of equ lity 
aloo vo.ricu . J in •s intere t is mainl in le 1 . nd pol-
.1.tloal. eiu -.it;> ; that 1st inc oh bin_; left oquall.Y fre 
,nd prot ~t d t o pur u hie •oomfor G and hnppinens ' and in 
each hovin n ri ht to vote. As to oonomio oqunl.ity , h 
1ants 11 m n to be ma de oort n peymonts ut ditterent. a t a 
of their li.f'; but b yond this ho ,ould le v tho eoonomio 
• fr owork undiaturbf! d . Oodv in ie core alit ri n . Unli · 
nin, is main conc ern iG moral equnli ty,ns it ia n's 
~.1orrJ.l be i n~ that !J tri. i: o hie n most e "3e 1tio.lly hum.an; 
1cre, ~e be Levee, "'!Ot connide 1.nr· fo- the p csent the 
sta,"'8 
of hio life, all ...._.,..c Aually car"'ble of lcndin~ tl~e ful l 
:norrJ. life i:ur!. n.tt1.ini11L--; the hir;heot hu.'"'la.'11 excellence . 
,.. "lso c.-·n.ir.at rll ooci~.1 i. 'f"""""litiaa . ' ... 'he 1 olc 
1. .... ~ f.·) .J. ,.. ~ .... , ~ .... ,J ,I. J. i.~ to ~ , 
rud le=l 1::0 c-lit· i_,... ... 11 s _ointle,,,. . ''he l <Jtit tion of 
.. overnr:e,.t is to ._..,~t -'..,110 s n.0 u ~c , a.rd thus political 
cq•u,lit , too, brn 10 oint . As to ecor.omic equality , he 
hop(?S for an event ·al e'l •:tali ty of oa""ni l"'G; the roco mi t i on 
of r..orr 1 ecl''-ali t:· ~ ill c.1□ ll""u iv • en use it ,1ill al tor a man ' s 
<'.tt·tn,1 c to ""·rOp"rty, n.J cl r~ will tho cone to re 0 a.r it solely 
as Et social 
and not just an cc:""cl opportunity to be happy , t10.t 1.t-. :·"--
ta.1t . "a:p_:)inesc fo!' : •. ::i depends on three t'1inro - ,J curi ty 
( of pe:::.'r o 1, _,ropcrt:,·, condi t n, ct .,) , s J.bsis tence and abun-
a.nee or "'0ne.,t . i..c first two urc to be seci;:red t o all i~ 
an ' absolutely ' 0qual ~oeree; as to the third , he takes two 
different position., re:prenonted by his t 10 diff=irent thJories 
of equality . iic en.1cr'!l position is to-eq_u8lise c th 
r., enever this can be shoml to lcac to the g~neral happiness 
of the cor:1muni ty, and he cx-preosly states that 1 s '..lain concern 
is not to achieve equality but to reduce inequalities. For him, it 
ie equality that must justify itoelfJ for Godwin, on the 
other lmnd, the initial assumption is in favour of equality. 
The political atand~oint from which each examines equal-
ity is also differentJ that is to say,when they consider political 
l t 
equality, they look at ~from different angles. Paine looks 
at it as a constitutionalist and is concerned to see how 
man•s natural equality can be enshrined in the very struoture 
of the political community. Godwin' s standpoint is that 
of a moralist and he is oonoerned to see how every man can 
live a full moral life and how other men, qua moral beings, 
can assist him. Bentham approaches equality from the stand-
point of a legislator, hia ooncem i s not with equality of 
happiness in 5eneral but rather with how a legislator can 
contribute to its achievement . Both Paine and Bentham are 
thus still thin the political realm, while Godwin seems to 
operate from outside it . Thi s is revealed in certain pr 
oocupations ~o .mon only to the former two , espeoislly the 
question of the equality of generations. If all men are 
equal , those living now are the equals of those already dead, 
and those yet unborn ara the equals of those living now. 
This leads to the vie" that eaob geberation has equal 
authority with every other and is equally oapable of dis-
posing of its destiny and thus is not bound by the commit-
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ent, institutional ant.l _othorw~s• >of its prodecessol'a. 
This could led to brenk in e history of a co unity 
evory eo many y ars wb n a new generation coinee to huve 
politicel control . Thi8 r iee certain theor tic l prob-
lems that? ine resolves through th idea ot th oo on 
co.mm.it ant of ull gen ration to 'the prinoipl of Republic '• 
and .a nth throu their 1 11~..:r CO:ll 1 t en t to th prln-
cipl of ut~lity . In none of thea three do a t he ide ot 
oo unity ari e, nd eq lity , of en or of pneration 
obt no on.a rather iso ted and not closely connected 
units • .For both P ine end Benthe.m, ommunity is erely 
reg t of individual: for God.Yin , too, nooi l 1· a ia 
' a luxury ' end ach cane rry on his pursuit of ru,th in 
i olation. mb l't 1~ no co unity on differant 
tion either. ot urpri ingly, the id 
indi iduals and ' aover ei ' gen rations loom v ey l re, 
and eq ity ia between th se ~overeign. nd thus neo -
anrily isol ted, unita . 
to the 1 Tel of an ly is, none of th three has any-
thin like a Rhi12 oqhx; of equality t o off er, thouen, as a 
co entator; l have tried to con truct one for ch or t hem. 
Ao tl1is ort ot reoons truction can b don van about th 
manife to of political rtyJ it ·10 not enou to turn 
the thinkers involved into uhilo~ophers of equ~lity i 
bee1d , T n at r euch a philooophy bas be n con-
struct d ny import t q etion re ain un ns rd. , on , 
hov ver, ideolo ~es bout qu lity. though there ar 
elements of it in Godwin . The genorol lev l of ro l ction 
is lar ely theoratic 1 , ond vhAt ve have in e ch c e is 
n theory of equality. ot one of then~ lys e the en-
ing of equalit..)it and seriously di tin ishco qu lity fro 
oth r ideas vi.th which it has be n oft n conrua d. t 
each do.• is to 8ter\J>ff 1th o rtnin cce 
view cf qll8lity and/ l out i ., i rnn ic tions d the 
of echieTi.n the in pr ctic. In th C S 0 e th , 
t d 
0 • 
there is even an el bor te attem t t di coverin th axio e 
of ' mentel thology ' and ovin scientific 11 what con-
eequ nces eqU8lity will have, when it 1 d ir bl nd in 
what d d r'epeot , he 1 the only one to try to dee-
lop gience or eq ity. 
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